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ABSTRACT
This dissertation contributes to the critical expansions now occurring in what Douglas
Mao and Rebecca L. Walkowitz have termed New Modernist Studies. This
expansion is temporal, spatial, and vertical. I engage with the latter in a literal way:
what effects can Modernist texts have on lived experience, the extra-diegetic space of
the reader that rests “above” the page. My study analyzes the structural similarity of
linguistic metaphor and the mind as considered by cognitive scientists. Working
from the conceit that the human mind is linguistic and that language is an artifact of
the human mind, my research extrapolates upon what I call the “psycho-ecology” of
reading, a knot of reflexive level-crossing between text and mind as the constituent of
lived experience. Far from being a remote, abstract process, psycho-ecology is
concrete and the closest of presences: unique textual engagement is equated with a
transformation in perception. The project opens with an introductory chapter tracing
a lineage between modernist aesthetics, phenomenology, and the appearance of the
cognitive sciences. The first chapter considers the relationship between two narrative
levels in Oscar Wilde’s novel The Picture of Dorian Gray (1890). The logic of this
diegetic relationship is monstrous yet proceeds elegantly. The second chapter is a
reading of Virginia Woolf’s experimental treatment of temporality in her novel To the
Lighthouse (1927). By considering Woolf’s temporal experimentation in relation to
Martin Heidegger’s formulation of being-in-the-world and being-as-time I suggest
that both the novel and Heidegger’s philosophy act to disclose our experience with
language as temporal and uniquely finite. Ultimately, our experience with Woolf’s
narrative is predicated upon an intimacy between reader and text whereby the reader
extends a kind of physicality into the text itself effectively making manifest the
singular importance of being-as-time and being-as-text. The third chapter examines
the “sentimental information” of James Joyce’s Finnegans Wake (1939) from a
phenomenological approach to information theory as a response to Robert Scholes’
reprinting of Clive Hart’s call for investigation into this mode in Joyce’s work. With
Joyce’s self-negating sentimentality, experience is dynamically mutative and such
metamorphoses reveal to the agent that they proceed by themselves. The final
chapter analyzes Samuel Beckett’s Endgame (1957) as a zero-player game: a
computerized game that proceeds by code without the input of human players.
Meditating upon Beckett’s utterance, “something is taking its course,” I suggest that
this multi-diegetic architecture reveals the finitude of extra-diegetic experience. The
dissertation follows a trajectory beginning with the intimacy a reader has with text
towards the increasing experience of exclusion, or illiteracy, when encountering
digital code. The movement of the analysis is metonymical for a shift from textual,
alphanumeric narratives to digital narratives. Finally, new languages of code and
programming suggest the dawn of new arts.
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Prologue

Metaphor and Metanoia
___________________________
To study metaphor is to be confronted with hidden aspects of one’s own mind and one’s own culture.
-George Lakoff and Mark Turner
Disappear and reappear at another place. Disappear again and reappear again at another place again.
Or at the same. Nothing to show not the same…As one in his right mind when at last out again he
knew not how he was not long out again when he began to wonder if he was in his right mind.
-Samuel Beckett
Where word breaks off no thing may be.
-Stefan George

The following analysis is a study of Modernist texts via the structural selfsimilarity between linguistic metaphor as conceived in cognitive linguistics and the
mind as considered by cognitive science. I unite this lineage with the philosophical
school that is in explicit conversation with both: phenomenology. A leading feature
of Modernist literature is the marked emphasis on how we perceive our surroundings
over what that environment may objectively be; this preoccupation tends towards
reflexivity so that literature inquires into its own function to such a degree that these
literary experiments in perception may transform the representation of objective
environments. Emerging in the 1980s, the field of cognitive linguistics and its
literary branch, cognitive poetics, takes the premise that the conceptual structures
constituted by the affective materiality of the brain are determined by language; the
reverse simultaneously operates. This conceit is shared by phenomenologists of the
early twentieth century, notably in the work of Martin Heidegger. Rather than the
paradox of infinite regress, a vocal phenomenological criticism of self-representation,
this process offers a variety of diegetic level-crossings—between vehicle and tenor,
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object and percept, language and mind, levels of narrative—that characterize a
metamorphosis. I call this knot a “psycho-ecology.” Concepts are possible because
they are systemically linguistic; language is possible because it is systemically
conceptual. A variety of diegetic level-crossings—between vehicle and tenor, object
and percept, language and mind—characterize this kind of metamorphosis. Selfreflexive literary experiments are possible, in this sense, because they transform
language in a structurally self-similar manner to a transformation in the conceptual
system of the mind; or, creative use of metaphor, to speak of one thing using the
terms of another, results in metanoia, a change of mind. Here, there is a kind of
structural and conceptual self-similarity between the reflexivity of Modernist
literature, phenomenology, and cognitive linguistics in the sense that a transformation
of language is equated with a transformation not only in perception, but in the way
one affectively experiences everyday living. That is, language engagement is, at its
root, an affective enterprise. In this way, I suggest that Modernist literature,
phenomenology, and the cognitive sciences share the feature of being selfrepresentational theories; a consequence of this, is that these processes are manifest in
our everyday experience.
As a result, establishing a literary interpretive mode based on diegetic levelcrossing between a work of literature and other self-reflexive conceptual systems
should produce interpretations. This project emphasizes that the human mind is
linguistic and yet language is a product of the human mind. The underlying logic
behind this self-reflexive conceit—that we can learn much about the mind by
speculating upon language and vice versa—extends itself to interpretive experiments.

2

That is, if the self-similar structures of mind and language reveal much about one
another, then it stands to reason that an interpretive recombination of language and
literature with other self-reflexive conceptual systems may yield productive results.
The interpretive mode here is paratactic and synthetic more than it is reductionistic
and analytic. This methodology aims at synthesizing two structurally self-similar
systems without claiming any conjunctive permanence. That is, the project does not
aim to express that, for example, mathematics and language operate according to selfsimilar grammars or conceptual structures at the smallest level suggesting that the two
systems share a kind of syntactic relation. Rather, the method involves structurally
self-similar systems that are juxtaposed—not unlike a collage—upon which one can
then meditate and comment. In a sense, it takes for its philosophy the
Deleuzoguattarian maxim to make “use of everything that [comes] within range, what
[is] closest as well as farthest away” (Deleuze and Guattari 3).
The Flower’s Coleridge: Platonism and Cognitive Linguistics
In 1945, Jorge Luis Borges wrote a short essay, “Coleridge’s Flower,” that
examines the real and its relation to the imaginary. The piece suggests, though
without strictness, Platonism: the intellect and imaginative reign over the empirical.
Thought belongs to a realm of archetypes; imagination accesses this realm and
intelligibility results from accurate translation. For Borges, fine thoughts may be
those beautiful expressions that recur in disparate time, location, and media. His
interest in the piece is with the possibility that reality may be a reflection of the
imaginative. This overturns the more orthodox Aristotelian response to the
conundrum: that the imagination is the ornamentation of the real, thought is the effect
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of sense stimuli. The piece opens with Paul Valéry’s consideration: that the history
of literature should be “the history of the Spirit as the producer and consumer of
literature” (Borges 240). This position is echoed by Percy Bysshe Shelley and takes
the following shape: “that all the poems of the past, present, and future were episodes
or fragments of a single infinite poem, written by all the poets on earth” (240).
Martin Heidegger intimates something similar in his 1936 lecture course on
Nietzsche: “all great thinkers think the same. Yet this ‘same’ is so essential and so
rich that no single thinker exhausts it” (Heidegger The Will to Power as Art 36). It
recurs twenty years later across the Atlantic in Emerson’s “Nominalist and Realist”:
“I am very much struck in literature by the appearance that one person wrote all the
books” (Borges 240). Borges’ speculative project is to carry out a “history of the
evolution of an idea through the diverse texts of three authors” (240). He begins with
the great poet and aesthete, Samuel Taylor Coleridge.
The recurring idea has its first appearance in Coleridge’s famous reflection: “If a
man could pass through Paradise in a dream, and have a flower presented to him as a
pledge that his soul had really been there, and if he found that flower in his hand
when he awoke—Ay!—and what then?” (240). The next appearance of Coleridge’s
flower is in H.G. Wells’ The Time Machine (1895) in the guise of a wilted flower
brought back from a journey into the distant future, a “future flower, the contradictory
flower whose atoms, not yet assembled, now occupy other spaces” (241). The flower
appears a third time, this time in the work of Henry James. In the unfinished novel,
The Sense of the Past (1917), James establishes a fantasy that symbolically links the
real and imaginary as the present and the past. The flower here has evolved, like the
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Eloi in Wells’ novel, beyond immediate sensibility, yet it remains the flower
rationally and imaginatively; now, the flower is an eighteenth-century portrait that
puzzlingly has the twentieth-century protagonist as its subject. The hero journeys
back in time; he meets the artist, who then paints the subject from the future. What is
interesting here is that the protagonist visits the eighteenth-century because he is
fascinated by the portrait; yet, without his return to the past, the portrait could not
exist. So, James—like Coleridge and Wells—reverses the intuitive logic that
stimulus precedes imaginative expression; or, as Borges comments, “the cause
follows the effect, or the reason for the journey is a consequence of the journey”
(242). Significant here, is that the quasi-Platonic reason as imaginative archetype
enters the world in some form: that Coleridge’s flower appears as multiple kinds, in
various media, and is relayed recurrently from the imaginative to the real. Rather
than an emphasis on the self-reflexivity of text and intertexts—or, the failure of
language to represent anything outside itself—this dialogue between the two realms
proves to be self-reflexive in that the two-directionality of intellect and world engages
in a kind of diegetic level crossing. That is, like Coleridge’s dreamer, aesthetic
engagements require a movement, in conceptual and narrative terms, between the
diegetic space of imagination and an alternate diegetic space of world.
This self-reflexive dialogic operates in language itself. Such level-crossing is an
inherent quality of the phenomena of self-reference and self-reflexivity. From the
work of physicist and professor of cognitive science and comparative literature,
Douglas R. Hofstadter, stems some observations on the self-reference in language.
The first four essays in Hofstadter’s collection, Metamagical Themas: Questing for
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the Essence of Mind and Pattern (1985), examine self-referential sentences, viral
sentences, and self-replicating linguistic structures. For Hofstadter, “self-reference is
ubiquitous…it happens every time anyone says ‘I’ or ‘me’ or ‘word’ or ‘speak’ or
‘mouth’…writes a book about writing, designs a book about book design, makes a
movie about movies, or writes an article about self-reference” (Hofstadter 7). Many
systems inherently represent themselves or refer to themselves within the parameters
of their own symbolism. Some instances of linguistic self-reference are paradoxical
as in the case of the Epimenides paradox: this sentence is false. However, the quality
of paradox here is not axiomatic. Hofstadter provides a series of examples of selfreferential and self-replicating sentences, some paradoxical, others not: “I am
simultaneously writing and being written (11); “I am the meaning of this sentence”
(11); “Say, haven’t I written you somewhere else before?” (12); “I am going twolevel with you” (17); or, “This inert sentence is my body, but my soul is alive,
dancing in the sparks of your brain” (11). Hofstadter offers a structure to aid in
conceptualizing self-reflexivity and self-reference—he calls it the strange loop—in
Gödel, Escher, Bach (1979). Hofstadter remarks that the “‘Strange Loop’
phenomenon occurs whenever, by moving upwards (or downwards) through the
levels of some hierarchical system, we unexpectedly find ourselves back where we
started” (Hofstadter 10). He elucidates this abstraction in I am a Strange Loop
(2007): with the logic of a strange loop, “despite one’s sense of departing ever further
from one’s origin, one winds up, to one’s shock, exactly where one had started out.
In short, a strange loop is a paradoxical level-crossing feedback loop” (101-102).
Ultimately, Hofstadter makes the reader ask amusing questions of the following
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variety: what is a signifier that can serve as its own referent? What is a destination
that can serve as its own departure? What is an effect than can serve as its own
cause?
This way of regarding language has fascinating implications. If language and
ideas are implicated in a bidirectional, level-crossing loop, the reader is in the
territory of, not formalism, but functionalist semantics and linguistic determinism. In
the 1920s and 1930s, Polish-American philosopher Alfred Korzybski pioneered the
theory of general semantics with the publication of two major works, Manhood of
Humanity (1921) and Science and Sanity (1933). Korzybski’s system is a “discipline
which explains and trains us how to use our nervous systems most efficiently…In
brief, it is the formulation of a new non-aristotelian system of orientation which
affects every branch of science and life” (Korzybski 7). At the heart of his antiessentialist project is Korzybski’s insistence that structure is the only content of
knowledge; that is, we cannot know things in themselves, the human mind—the
brain, an organ that abstracts—cannot transcend itself. Language derives from
functions of the brain, Korzybski suggests; reciprocally, the brain is a function of
language. The following three maxims are most effective for expressing Korzybski’s
general semantics: the map is not the territory, no map can represent all of its
presumed territory, and maps are self-reflexive and can be mapped indefinitely (Pula
ix). General semantics is a system of uncertainty that promotes habitual nonelementalism, anti-essentialism, and non-aristotelian modes of thought. Korzybski’s
concern is not aesthetic so much as it is the formulation of non-essentialist language
use: he wishes to eliminate from education the “inadequate aristotelian types of
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evaluation” (Korzybski 181). By systematically changing habitual thought and
language patterns, general semantics suggests that humans can actively resist the
linguistic determinism of an a priori epistemology by actively engaging with the
parameters of language use.
Though Korzybski was to have an influence on some twentieth-century thinkers
and artists, the writings of Benjamin Lee Whorf popularized the idea of linguistic
determinism and linguistic relativity in the 1940s. Yet, while the hugely influential
work of Ferdinand de Saussure—and from Saussure, the work of Roland Barthes and
Jacques Derrida, and the psychoanalysis of Jacques Lacan—suggest that there is a
historical a priori of language that determines and constitutes thought from within
language, what makes Whorfian linguistics striking is its apparent absolutism. In its
strong version, the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis—which integrates Whorfian
functionalism with the linguistic theories of Edward Sapir—claims that language
determines thought totally. Perhaps its most controversial suggestion is that of
cultural relativism, which argues that communication between different cultures is
uncertain due to difficulties in finding common ground through translation. The
following is from Edward Sapir, and is characteristic of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis:
“Human beings do not live in the objective world alone…We see and hear and
otherwise experience very largely as we do because the language habits of our
community predispose certain choices of interpretation” (Whorf “The Relation of
Habitual Thought and Behavior to Language” 134). Whorf, like Korzybski, was a
non-aristotelian: for traditional Western thought belongs to “materialism,
psychophysical parallelism, [Newtonian] physics…and dualistic views of the
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universe in general” (152). Whorf is writing in a post-Einsteinian epistemology; he is
concerned with how monistic, holistic, and relativistic interpretations of reality “must
be talked about in what amounts to a new language” (152). Speech habits are not
personal or subjective, but are rather “systematic, so that we are justified in calling
them a system of natural logic” (“Science and Linguistics” 207). Though
provocative, Whorf is certainly productive in his implications: “We dissect nature
along lines laid down by our native languages. The categories and types that we
isolate from the world of phenomena we do not find there because they stare every
observer in the face; on the contrary, the world is presented in a kaleidoscopic flux of
impressions which has to be organized by our minds” (213). The Korzybskian and
Whorfian self-reflexive loops may be that language determines thought through a
system of natural logic while thought expresses itself within and through that logic,
determining language habits. The implications for reading literature are fascinating:
we simultaneously bring back Coleridge’s flower from the dream and create Wells’
“flower whose atoms, not yet assembled, now occupy other spaces.” Perhaps James’
painting is the finest metaphor for the act of reading.
The influence of functionalism of this variety waned with the rise of formalist and
poststructuralist modes of analysis in the 1950s and 1960s. One notable and
influential exception is the work of Michel Foucault, particularly in the early work
The Order of Things (1966). In Foucault (1986), Gilles Deleuze describes aspects of
Foucault’s work as “new functionalism” (Deleuze 24). In the preface to The Order of
Things, Foucault discusses linguistic and cultural relativity; appropriately enough, he
writes that The Order of Things “arose out of a passage in Borges, out of the laughter
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that shattered…all the familiar landmarks of…our thought, the thought that bears the
stamp of our age” (Foucault xv). To demarcate these familiar landmarks of thought,
Foucault introduces the episteme, an analytical tool for historically demarcating shifts
in the constitutive rules of thought. It concerns the historically specific
epistemological environments that inform, if not determine, modes of inquiry; or, in
his own words: “the total set of relations that unite, at a given period, the discursive
practices that give rise to epistemological figures, sciences, and possibly formalized
systems” (Foucault Archeology of Knowledge 211). What the Borges tale offered to
Foucault was a kind of wonderment that recalls Whorf’s way of thinking “in what
amounts to a new language” and Borges’ introduction of a new idea: “the thing we
apprehend in one great leap, the thing that, by means of the fable, is demonstrated as
the exotic charm of another system of thought, is the limitation of our own, the stark
impossibility of thinking that” (Foucault The Order of Things xv). The determinism
here is not, of course, bleak; rather, it is productive.
In Greek, the term metaphor means “transfer.” Aristotle’s definition is descriptive
rather than operative: “metaphor is the application of an alien name by transference
either from genus to species, or from species to genus, or from species to species, or
by analogy, that is, proportion” (Aristotle Poetics 41). Metaphors consist of two
parts, one of which is momentarily transformed into the other. Simply put, a
metaphor is to speak of one thing using the terms of another; it suggests the
separation between demonstration and truth. Thus the terms fuse, and then separate
according to a kind of oscillating movement of perpetual transformation. In this
sense, a metaphor is the aggregate of a paradoxical and unending operation: one that
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is self-negating while simultaneously self-propagating through a process of selfreflexive transfer. In short, a metaphor cannot master its reference, yet it operates
effectively. This tension is what makes the metaphor a notably fecund analytical
model. As a unit of meaning, a metaphor is a closed system that balances itself
through the logical recursion of a paradoxical process, yet it is also engaged in
systemic level-crossing: the tenor is transformed into the vehicle, which, in turn, is
transformed back into the tenor, ad infinitum.
Metaphor is a self-reflexive linguistic unit. The transfer of one conceptual
category to another, a kind of oscillating transformation or mutation of meaning, is
the semantic trajectory of a metaphor. Its function is not simply ornate, however, but
one that is productive in reconfiguring the way we think about and perceive the
world. Over the past few decades the emerging field of cognitive linguistics has been
instrumental in new ways of studying the level-crossing between language and the
mind. In cognitive linguistics, there is particular emphasis placed on the function and
operations of meaning, conceptual processes, and experience. Karol Janicki, in
Toward Non-Essentialist Sociolinguistics (1990) provides an excellent discussion of
the work of both Whorf and Korzybski, with emphasis on the latter, as prototypes for
the contemporary scene of non-essentialist linguistics. Concepts, here, are the
primary unit of understanding; concepts aid in comprehension and knowledge
through systemic modes of categorizing and conceptualizing. Influential within
cognitive linguistics is conceptual metaphor theory. Conceptual metaphors are
metaphors because their structural logic is based on the association of one domain
with another. Rather than being purely linguistic, metaphor is conceptual because the
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“motivation for the metaphor resides at the level of conceptual domains” (Evans and
Green 295). Proposed by George Lakoff and Mark Johnson in Metaphors We Live By
(1980), the fundamental premise of conceptual metaphor theory is that “metaphor is
pervasive in everyday life, not just in language but in thought and action. Our
ordinary conceptual system, in terms of which we both think and act, is
fundamentally metaphorical in nature” (Lakoff and Johnson 3). In short, Lakoff and
Johnson suggest that “metaphors as linguistic expressions are possible precisely
because there are metaphors in a person’s conceptual system” (6). In this sense,
linguistic expressions that are metaphorical are “reflections of an underlying
conceptual association” (Evans and Green 295).
Lakoff and Johnson wish to express that conceptual metaphor theory is primarily
concerned with regular use of language. So, much of the research in this area is more
concerned with common modes of expression rather than with poetic metaphor. The
study of poetic metaphor, instead, constitutes a particular trajectory of cognitive
linguistics: cognitive poetics. In More than Cool Reason: A Field Guide to Poetic
Metaphor (1989) Lakoff and Mark Turner examine a series of poetic metaphors.
These kinds of metaphors are understood through “The Grounding Hypothesis;” here,
“metaphorical understanding is grounded in nonmetaphorical understanding” (Lakoff
and Turner 113). The source term of the metaphor is not understood metaphorically
but experientially; that is, the source term is “grounded in the habitual and routine
bodily and social patterns we experience” (113). In short, poetic metaphor is not an
inaccessible manner of elite expression, but is deictic in the sense that its logical
substratum is grounded in common cognitive structures of understanding phenomena;
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furthermore, poetic metaphor “exercises our mind so that we can extend our normal
powers of comprehension beyond the range of metaphors we are brought up to see the
world through” (214). In 2002, Peter Stockwell published Cognitive Poetics: An
Introduction as an introductory textbook to cognitive poetics. The general aim of the
book is pedagogical: to establish modes of association between the study of literature
and the study of cognitive linguistics thus situating literary discourse within
contemporary linguistic theories concerned with broad modes of meaning
construction. The following year, editors Joanna Gavins and Gerard Steen compiled
Cognitive Poetics in Practice (2003). A companion piece to Stockwell’s
introduction, the collection includes a series of ten essays that demonstrate the scope
of the field. Perhaps the theme behind cognitive poetics and poetic metaphor can be
revealed in the following statement about cognitive linguistics: “language not only
reflects conceptual structure, but can also give rise to conceptualization” (Evans and
Green 101).
Incidentally, conceptual metaphor theory complicates the myths of objectivism
and subjectivism; these two ways, one typically absolutist while the latter typically
Romantic, constitutes a conceptual structure that limits categorical modes of
knowledge to two constructed ontological polarities. The theory offers a third choice
that of “an experientialist synthesis.” Lakoff and Johnson remark that metaphor
unites reason and imagination:
Reason…involves categorization, entailment, and inference.
Imagination…involves seeing one kind of thing in terms of another kind of
thing…Metaphor is thus imaginative rationality. Since the categories of our
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everyday thought are largely metaphorical and our everyday reasoning
involves metaphorical entailments and inference, ordinary rationality is
therefore imaginative by its very nature. (Metaphors We Live By 193)
This is a particularly exciting proposition for the study of literature as it suggests the
level-crossing of two diegetic domains, that of language and mind. What is
interesting here is how this logic operates when the transfer from the aesthetically
treated language is directed to the level of the mind. This logic is semantically
accessible and linguistically rational, yet the imaginative dimensions are certainly
excessive for artistic effect. The significance here is that, in this self-reflexive loop,
literary language can change the very way we perceive and experience the world.
The diegetic level-crossing of metaphor is that transformation in language is a
transformation of mind; or, metaphor allows the flower to be held in the reader’s
hand.
One virtue of the work of Hofstadter, Korzybski, Whorf, and cognitive linguistics
is that each, in some way, insist that metaphors as linguistic expressions are possible
because there are metaphors in the conceptual system of the mind. This suggests that
in any symbolic system the cause of the system follows its effects; self-reflexive
systems operate according to laws of self-similarity. Certainly, the language of
literature is not the same as the language of painting or the language of mathematics.
Yet, the logic operates according to laws of structural approximation. As a result, the
juxtaposition of one language with another—since both languages must operate
according to laws of the mind—should yield productive, if not amusing, results. In
2001, Vladimir Tasić published the book Mathematics and the Roots of Postmodern
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Thought; the study’s objective is to intervene in the colloquial antagonism between
two entities, vaguely labeled “science” and “postmodernism.” Tasić avoids broad
categories of definition and rather looks into “the possibility of reconstructing some
aspects of postmodern thought…from a mathematical point of view” (4). What Tasić
achieves is a lucid comparison between mathematical developments and the trajectory
of thought in the humanities. His principal concern is to suggest that mathematics
“could have been a formative factor in the rise of postmodern theory” (6). In this
speculative examination, Tasić raises notable similarities and discursive crosscurrents between mathematics and the major theoretical projects of structuralism,
functionalism, and deconstruction. However, there are two points in Tasić’s book
that are of particular interest here. The first is with Kurt Gödel’s self-referential
mathematics and incompleteness theorem; the second with the epistemological
intimations that chaos and information theory have on the study of language and
literature. These two systems reaffirm the logic of functionalism. Gödel had a
considerable influence on the musings of Hofstadter, so it is no shock that the
incompleteness theorem is itself a mathematical version of a strange loop and selfreflexive grammar; for Gödel, it was not possible “to establish the truth or falsity of
the statement ‘this statement is false’ in terms of computations” (75). The result is an
apparent paradox: either mathematics is a contradiction, or the concept of truth cannot
be defined mathematically. Unlike truth, Gödel notes, demonstration or mathematical
proof, can be defined formally. Gödel’s conclusion, however, is remarkable: he
writes, the “concept of truth of sentences of [a language] cannot be defined in [that
language]” (76). Rather than eschewing objective truth and intuition in the formalist
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fashion, Gödel concludes that mathematical truth is objective and even intuitively
knowable, but cannot be fully expressed in language. Tasić’s take on this observation
is fascinating: “it seems that Gödel defended a strongly Platonist understanding of
mathematics, that is, regarded abstract mathematical objects and objectively existing
things and mathematical theorems as expressing objective truths about them” (76). A
similar conclusion is made from the point of view of conceptual metaphor theory.
Raphael Núñez, in “Conceptual Metaphor, Human Cognition, and the Nature of
Mathematics,” writes that “the most abstract conceptual system we can think of,
mathematics(!), is ultimately embodied in the nature of our bodies, language, and
cognition” (Núñez 356); and mathematics “is one of the greatest products of the
collective human imagination” (359). Whatever truth is, it is not the direct referent of
mathematics or any other linguistic system.
Much of what formalism and postmodern theory have in common is a
denunciation of the Enlightenment conceit that rules are universal. Gödel’s findings
complicate this dismissal; more recent mathematical developments in chaos theory
and information theory disrupt this project to an even more pronounced degree.
Chaos theory has been misleadingly labeled as a “postmodern mathematics;” N.
Katherine Hayles points out this false label in her work on chaos theory and its
permeation into literary studies in the 1990s, notably in Chaos Bound (1990) and
How We Became Posthuman (1999). In Chaos Bound, for example, Hayles is both
descriptive and prescriptive in her application of the fundamental concepts of chaos
theory to the study of literature. The most admirable aspect of Hayles’ critique lies in
the differentiation between how postmodernist theory and chaos/information theory
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understand meaning: postmodernism wishes to deconstruct semantic value
assumptions inherent in language while chaos and information highlight the asemic
nature and structure of language. Hayles is always sober in her analysis and is never
tempted by overdetermined wishful thinking. Warren Weaver, in “Recent
Contribution to the Mathematical Theory of Communication” (1949), remarks that
“information must not be confused with meaning. In fact, two messages, one of
which is heavily loaded with meaning and the other which is pure nonsense, can be
exactly equivalent” (Weaver 8). James Gleick’s The Information: A History, A
Theory, A Flood (2011) examines the theory and history of information theory in
lucid depth for the non-specialist; he is, however, not overly concerned with the
implications of information on literary studies. Philip Kuberski in Chaosmos:
Literature, Science, and Theory (1994), like Hayles, is fascinated by the larger
epistemological effects of chaos and information theory on the humanities.
Kuberski’s study is excellent in its emphasis on the simultaneity of aberrant and
deterministic tenets of much postmodernist thought. Like Hayles and Tasić, he traces
the paratactic formation of deconstruction and post-Einsteinian science. Kuberski
notes a tendency in Modernist literature he identifies as chaosmos: a paradoxical
venture to achieve a kind of transcendent order by writing intense complexities.
Núñez correctly remarks that mathematics, like all conceptual systems, is “not
monolithic...[and] is every bit as conceptually rich as any other part of the human
conceptual system” (360). In this sense, the juxtaposition of one conceptual system
with another is speculative and imaginatively productive.
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Indeed, chaos and information offer an explicit complication for postmodern
thought: points, systems, sets, structures, quasi-teleological infinite limit, and “system
states that are described as Platonist points in a Platonist infinite-dimensional
universe” (Tasić 156) are some of the metaphysical idealizations that chaos and
information theory pose as major challenges to postmodernist and formalist thought.
And with these metaphysical conceits come abstract functions, totalizing logic of
identity and grounds of justification, and a multitude of dichotomies. Tasić suggests
that the most common version of postmodern thought, as it circulates in both cultural
and academic discourse, appears to be a series of permutations on the famous
logocentric maxim: “To be is to be the value of a variable” (156). While this play on
copulae is now random and chaotic, the axiom remains: “Languages speak, structures
mean, and changes occur courtesy of a mysterious ‘power-in-general’ that belongs to
no one in particular, which is to say that we are dealing with a kind of functionalism”
(156).
This complication intimates a certain heritage of Foucault’s work closely linked to
his “new functionalism” that, Mark G.E. Kelly suggests, largely goes overlooked: that
of his “happy positivism.” If reality is chaotic, historical habit would tell us that this
would be epistemologically incompatible with scientific positivism. Vincent
Descombes writes that “on the one hand, Foucault’s approach is that of a
positivist…Yet, on the other hand, Foucault as a reader of Nietzsche does not believe
in the positive notion of fact” (Kelly 27). So, Descombes condemns Foucault’s work
as no more than “a seductive construct, whose play of erudite cross-reference lends it
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an air of verisimilitude” (27). The accusation that Descombes directs at Foucault’s
work is that of the classic relativist paradox. Kelly writes,
the relativist says truth is relative, but then this statement is itself relative—so
he cannot be sure of it. Happy positivism avoids this criticism…because it
asserts the necessity of putting forward underdetermined statement in view of
the impossibility of full determination. There is no need for provisos that this
is not really how things are, since there can be no description which does
cleave to how things actually are. (27)
Of course, the relativist paradox is a translation of the Epimenides/liar’s paradox;
Gödel’s incompleteness theorem is brought to mind. Or, as Hofstadter writes,
“Gödel’s famous Incompleteness Theorem in metamathematics can be thought of as
arising from his attempt to replicate as closely as possible the liar paradox in purely
mathematical terms” (Hofstadter “On Self-Referential Sentences” 7). For Gödel,
demonstration and mathematical proof can be formally expressed, truth cannot. For
Foucault’s “happy positivism,” demonstrations, likewise can be defined formally, but
do not constitute truth. So, language speaks and structures mean; self-reflexive
structures eschew truth statements, yet necessitate diegetic level transfer between
subject and object, statement and reference, etc., as a means to demonstrate operative
semantic possibilities. If to be is to be the value of a chaotic variable within the
parameters of a determined system, then the cause and effect of the conceptual system
is chaotic. To address this, a return to Borges and metaphor.
In 1951, Borges composed a short piece titled “Pascal’s Sphere.” He frames the
essay with the repetition of a Platonic proposition: “Perhaps universal history is the
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history of a few metaphors” (351). Borges remarks that this metaphor is variously
repeated throughout history: the metaphor is an infinite sphere whose center is
everywhere and whose circumference is nowhere. Indeed, Borges aestheticizes selfreflexive conceptual systems of metaphor and language; emphasis is placed on two
major historical figures and their use and response to the metaphor. For Giordano
Bruno, the universe thus became “all center,” or “the centre of the universe is
everywhere and the circumference nowhere.” This was a great intellectual and
imaginative liberation; the paradox, for Bruno, expressed ecstasy. Yet what proved
blissful to Bruno was for Blaise Pascal an abyss of anxiety. Facing the changing
understanding of the cosmos, Pascal felt confusion, anxiety, and isolation. He
expressed it as follows: “Nature is a frightful sphere, the center of which is
everywhere, and the circumference nowhere.” The statement is complex; the
concrete subject is an abstract, which, in turn, is concrete, ad infinitum. That is, a
history of a single metaphor expressing a “mysterious power-in-general”; or, the
single metaphor is the conceptual system itself.
By making the language user the tenor of the metaphor, one finds a remarkably
unique analytical mode with which to examine construction/interpretation selfreflexively. So, the working definition of reading here: the language user is an
infinite sphere, the centre of which is everywhere, and the circumference nowhere. In
this sense, the language user, a definite and concretized noun is abstract, a
paradoxical sphere unending its constant force moving outwards in any direction, and
yet occupying neither space nor time. So, a concrete is an abstract which is, selfreflexively concrete. That is, the subject and the predicate, the vehicle and the tenor,
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negate one another. Whether the subject is the cosmos, Nature, or language user, the
formulation establishes a structural conundrum in which the subject and predicate,
tenor and vehicle, concrete and abstract cyclically affirm their constitutive potency
through their negation: this statement is false. Thus the subject is at once present and
absent. So, the reading subject is in each of its constituent parts, but cannot be
reduced by any one of them. Language constitutes the reading subject and the
reading subject constitutes language.
Self-reference and self-replication is thus the nature of metaphor, but so is
transformation; the corresponding conceit is that the mind operates accordingly.
Language is at the centre of the mind, yet its circumference is nowhere; the mind is at
the centre of language, yet its circumference is nowhere. Linguistic metaphors for
conceptual systems are possible because they are structurally self-similar to the
conceptual system of the mind. As a result, establishing a literary interpretive mode
based on strange loop relations—level-crossing transfer—between a work of
literature and another self-reflexive conceptual system should produce interesting
speculations. This logic offers unique speculations through its eccentricity, yet is
made possible because the interrelation between one reflexive system (mode of
critique) and another (literary work) itself is that of an extended and extending
strange loop. Or, as Hayles remarks, such reflexivity is “the movement whereby that
which has been used to generate a system is made, through a changed perspective, to
become part of the system it generates” (Hayles How We Became Posthuman 8).
Hofstadter, likewise, writes that indirect self-reference, that which involves a kind of
transformation, “suggests the idea of indirect self-replication, in which a viral entity
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[the self-reflexive unit], instead of replicating itself exactly, brings into being another
entity that plays the same role as it does, but in some other system” (Hofstadter 60).
Such odd combinations, made possible through merging reflexive systems, yield
interesting speculative results. This mode of analysis reveals how unusual words,
syntax, and diegetic structures in literature are made possible by self-similar
structures of the mind; simultaneously, it reveals how the self-reflexive transfer of
these unusual structural units involve a transformation of mind. In short, new and
unusual language yields new ways of perceiving the world.
Coleridge’s Flower: Phenomenological Engagement
The shift from the embedded Platonism in cognitive linguistics and its
predecessors to phenomenology may seem abrupt. Yet, as we have noted, metaphor
is a self-reflexive linguistic unit. The movement of metaphor is the transfer of one
conceptual category to another: from one level of diegesis to another. Metaphor in its
very emphasis on level-crossing demands an analogous mode of analysis. We cannot
simply assert that language structures mind; we must also approach this conundrum
from the perspective of the site of these processes: the body. The operation of this
paradoxical interaction is more than structurally elaborate in its strange loopiness;
that is, it establishes the strange and tangled path to looking at modernist literature as
that which explicitly reconfigures the way we understand the world. This process,
then, is one that is active on behalf of the reader—as opposed to the linguistic
determinism that seems to lurk not very far beneath the surface of cognitive
linguistics—and is intimately bound with the conviction that phenomenological
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approaches to reading and language engagement foster collaborative, dynamic
partnerships about learning itself.
Indeed, etymologically, phenomenology derives from the Greek phainomenon, to
show, and logos, reason or study. So, phenomenological investigation is the study of
things shown; and, it can also be the study of things set before us. From this premise,
reading unusual modes of literature establishes is a dynamic learning experience
founded upon authentic participation. More generally, an authentic mode of
phenomenological engagement is that in which the external (another level of diegesis)
is observed in such a way as to make one’s own consciousness emerge as
consciousness before oneself. Dan Zahavi writes that the phenomenological line of
thought on self-representational consciousness is
Not merely something that comes about the moment one scrutinizes one’s
experience attentively…Rather, self-consciousness comes in many forms and
degrees. It makes perfect sense to speak of self-consciousness as soon as I am
not simply conscious of an external object—a chair, a chestnut tree, or a rising
sun—but acquainted with the experience of the object as well, for in such a
case my consciousness reveals itself to me. (Zahavi 274-275)
In our discussion, then, we must note the distinction between language or an external
object being given and where consciousness itself is set before us as a result of
language engagement. “In its most primitive (and fundamental form),” Zahavi
suggests, “self-consciousness is taken to be a question of having first-personal access
to one’s own consciousness; it is a question of the first-personal givenness or
manifestation of experiential life” (275). And, since we are limiting our discussion to
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language, we may add that this first-personal access follows a conceptual movement
that is structurally similar to metaphor: one thing is transformed into another, which,
in turn, is transformed back into its original (though now different) state making itself
manifest as itself. One virtue of this trajectory of thought is that it insists that
metaphor is a fundamental structure that repeats itself, or operates as an effective
analogue, to the role language and consciousness are distinct and yet the same as
diegetic levels. Tim Murphy suggests of Nietzsche’s metaphor, Übertragung “is not
understood as one trope amongst the other traditional tropes…übertragen is the figure
of tropology itself” (Murphy 2). Again, in a symbolic system such as this the cause
of the system follows its effects; the self-reflexive system functions according to
analogy and self-similarity. That is, “unusual impressions…produce unusual brainchanges; hence their summary…is of unusual kind.” In this sense, in examining the
texts that follow, it is both fitting that Lakoff and Turner suggest that “to study
metaphor is to be confronted with hidden aspects of one’s own mind and one’s own
culture” (Lakoff and Turner 214). Indeed, it is, for phenomenologists, this
confrontation with that which is hidden that is the source of, not only selfrepresentational consciousness, but the diegetic level crossing between mind and
language that makes this self-manifestation possible.
This shift to an agential engagement with language—a shift that posits the body as
the mover of interpretation—is as much an engagement with skeptical relativism as it
is with phenomenology. Truth or interpretive positivism as an analytical goal is itself
a constructed cultural narrative and therefore, like literature, is subject to engaged
reconfiguration. Furthermore, Modernist skepticism towards both eccentric modes of
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thought as well as those of the dominant industrial capitalist or military culture of the
early twentieth century is integral to the concept of a plastic, agential reader. Indeed,
the Platonic desire to subsume the anatomical self to the mind by extending the
central nervous system beyond the body finds a parallel in one of Nietzsche’s most
famous concepts: the Will to Power. In Beyond Good and Evil (1886), Nietzsche
writes,
My idea is that every specific body strives to become master over all space
and to extend its force (-its will to power) and to thrust back all that resists its
extension. But it continually encounters similar efforts on the part of other
bodies and ends by coming to an arrangement…with those of them that are
sufficiently related to it: thus they then conspire together for power. And the
process goes on. (Nietzsche s.636)
For Nietzsche, the Will to Power suggests the fundamental execution of creative
forces that drive the individual to their potential greatness. The individual driven by
the Will to Power, therefore, may “thrust back all that resists” its progress.
Ultimately, when various individuals encounter one another in the Will to Power,
they come to an “arrangement” and “conspire together for power” whereby all
resistance is overruled. For Nietzsche the Will to Power implies that one must
transcend good and evil and proceed resolutely without any heed to ambivalent moral
convention. However, we are not concerned with morality here. Rather, what is of
note here is how Nietzsche emphasizes the extension of the self into all space. Here,
we see the Will to Power as a counter-force not only against dominant cultural
systems but that which moves upward in a paradoxical hierarchy against the means of
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dominant cultural narrative: language itself. Though it is implied by Nietzsche that
not all people acknowledge the Will to Power the result of those who do acknowledge
and proceed with the concepts should not find themselves at odds with one another:
they strive for uniqueness and an authenticity of experience. Therefore, Nietzsche’s
philosophical concept gestures towards an expression of order and unity, though one
that is bi-directional, loopy, and tangled. That is, Nietzsche intended his concept of
the Will to Power to ultimately act as a theory for everything, such as an explanation
for the laws of nature (and, thus, the nature of language). Yet, the Will to Power
itself is a metaphor, or, Übertragen. And if Übertragen is the figure of tropology
itself, we may remark that metaphor is also the figure of tropology. The tropology
here—a multi-diegetic one between two levels—is reflexive: the linguistic or
narrative space over which the Will to Power wishes to be dominant is that which is
simultaneously already embedded within the body (the central nervous system); that
is, the movement of the Will to Power-as-extension begins and ends in the same
conceptual locale yet is semantically transformed. What is worth stressing here,
however, is that the extension here—unlike that in linguistic determinism—is one
founded upon the Will—that is, agency—of an individual.
One of the major criticisms of linguistic determinism is that the field succumbs to
the unqualifiable claim that the role of human agency in thought is secondary and that
the thought of an individual is a vehicle animated by language. There is a kind of
objectification at work here; that is, linguistic determinism in this sense understands
the thinking human being as that which exists as an object galvanized by an a priori
linguistic system. Both Whorf and Korzybski, as well as later cognitive linguists of
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the Platonic tendency, suggest that our engagement with language is typically
habitual, uncreative, and uncritical. Their solution, in a nutshell, is to learn more
languages (alternative grammar and enhanced vocabulary extend the parameters of
the determinism) or to at least self-reflexively recognize that the system we use to
structure our thoughts is the system that allows such recognition to take place. The
drama here, however, is one of the mind: we can extend the mind but the mind must
always be linguistic. The human being in this mode of thought is fundamentally
inanimate and is only animated by linguistic systems. The embodied extension of the
Will into the space surrounding it—whether physically or intellectual—is, at best,
largely not the concern of linguistic determinists. So, the human being here exists
much in the same way as any other object. Yet, the physical presence of the body
existing in the world is an undeniable fact of perception. After all, even the mind-asbrain is, in the most basic sense, a physical structure situated in the material here and
now.
This is where we must turn to the work of Martin Heidegger since his thought
permeates this study both implicitly and explicitly. First, for Heidegger, the human
being exists here. His famous term Dasein literally means being here/there or being
in the world. For Heidegger, because we are worldly-tuned, self-consciousness or
self-acquaintance is that of a self both immersed and embedded in the world. “I
neither experience myself as a bundle of experiences and processes,” writes Zahavi,
“nor as a detached I-object, rather I experience myself in what I do and suffer, in what
confronts me and in what I accomplish, in my concerns and disregards. Selfacquaintance is indeed only to be found in our immersion in the world” (283-284).
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Human beings, like inanimate objects, exist. However, existing and being are not
synonymous. Inanimate objects exist but they cannot be. Individual humans both
have both existence and being. What makes the human being unique is that, as that
which exists, it also has the capability to be; or, the human being is able to recognize
being and to engage with what that means. The human being has an existential
choice in its being in that he or she is able to recognize that at some time in the past
their existence was not yet and that at some point in the future they will no longer be.
The finitude of existence is, then, critical to the condition of being able to recognize
what it means to be. This process is made possible by thought. Thought, for
Heidegger, is intimately embedded within language. Thought makes knowledge
possible and so the human must know what he or she is, what possibilities he or she
has for action, and how one may be directly engaged in making choices as a means of
affecting reality. Indeed, while Heidegger also suggests that the thought and the mind
are both largely linguistic, what makes his oeuvre in contradistinction to linguistic
determinism is the marked emphasis on agency and choice. To be self-reflexively
concerned with the possibility of choice and the actual choices one makes is to be
actively involved in one’s being.
The ability to choose, for Heidegger, is more than an instance of selection. Choice
is to consider something absolutely. So, the choice to consider being demands that
we understand being as a whole. Yet, being is temporal: it once was not and will
some day not be. So long as one is alive to consider—to think linguistically—being,
one’s being is not complete. We are thrown into the world and we are never
completely manifest before ourselves. Instead, we exist as an opening towards
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existential possibility. This is where temporal directionality comes in: as long as one
is one must succumb to the possibility of futurity. That is, as long as one is capable
of choice and thought, one is in the strange position of being something that is not yet
manifest and therefore is incapable of recognizing being as a whole. The paradox is
that to know, to make a choice to know what it means to be, can only be made
possible after the moment of death, the point at which being as a whole attests to its
finitude. To consider being as a whole, this suggests, can only be understood by
others. The problem, then, is that we are tempted to understand ourselves from the
perspective of others. From this logic, we also understand the finitude of existence as
that which takes place for other people and so we are again tempted to treat death as
an abstraction from lived experience. And this logic has its analogues: we may also
treat language as something abstract from ourselves. That is, this mode of thinking
directs human beings towards the acceptance that we are animated and made
meaningful only from the perspective of other things whether people and language.
And so existence is not unique but typical: one analogous example among many. So,
this assumption of typicality is what seduces the individual into habitual ways of
behaving and being. However, Heidegger claims that our temporality directs us to be
concerned and to care for our own being: our mode of being is, then, that which must
be concerned with our individual being. Like linguistic determinists, Heidegger
suggests that the individual must confront unconscious habit. However, unlike the
linguistic determinists, he believes that being can be actively engaged and, rather than
being understood as something of varying degrees of typicality, is something
radically singular. To live habitually—to understand being from the perspective of
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others—is what Heidegger calls inauthentic.1 There is a way to live authentically,
however, Heidegger claims. That is, there is a way to possess the flower rather than
being its possession. To do so is to live towards, to project into the possibility, of
nothingness.
So, the possibility for this authentic understanding of being is intricately
embedded within the relation between nonexistence (death) and temporality. Because
we are always not yet, in Heidegger’s thought we are determined not by language but
through the possibilities that are set before us in the future. Being is, in a sense,
always becoming until the moment of nothingness; at this moment of nothingness,
being can be—though paradoxically—understood in its wholeness. In order to live
authentically, then, one needs to understand oneself as temporal, impermanent, and
fundamentally transient. In this sense, the past and future take on specific
meaningfulness: the past determines what one is. Rather, it is our projection of
thought and desires into the future that denotes being in relation to the present. The
relation between being and time is not one of linear abstraction, of clocks, or lives of
others, but a tangible and literal transience of our own existence from birth until death
and this singular concrete temporality establishes how an individual is radically
unique. Death is where experience breaks off. It is strange and unique because it is
for the individual the possibility of impossibility: the end of possibility as an absolute
negation. In this sense, death is both the limit and the source of possibility. Like
Hofstadter’s strange loop, we move towards something only to end up at its source: a

1

Inauthenticity in Heidegger’s work does not carry any negative moral assumptions, however.
Linguistic determinism, we may suggest, from this point of analysis would be considered inauthentic
since it implies that something other than the human being itself provides the possibility for
knowledge.
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body without life, a thing without the ability to be. In short, our strange loopy
existence is being-as-time, or, being-for-death.
It is in this context that we understand Heidegger’s link between mind and
language. To be more specific, the relation of concern here is between thought and
language. Just as being is to be fully understood only through the recognition of
death—being-towards-nothingness—language becomes a kind of tool for striving for
authenticity in being. To be brief, Heidegger claims that we need to learn to think, to
let ourselves and others learn. Heidegger suggests that we must encourage ourselves
to interrogate those instances of language that he identifies as causing explicit angst:
that which tears one from common experience and lays bare one’s concerns and
prejudices. This experience unveils a new context-specific space of discussion
characterized by negotiation and dissent; ultimately, this space is what makes critical
investigation possible for both thought and language. Authentic thought, for
Heidegger, is that which has yet to be thought in the sense that it allows thought to
arrive. This mode of thought is also future directed: towards that which is yet to
exist. Yet, the temporal locale of this possibility is, at present, nothing. To think is to
think in a kind of openness, to think in nothingness, to think in an abyss. Thoughts
come to us, just as the future offers itself to us. Tellingly, Heidegger asks “what
could be more worthy of thought for the saying one than the word’s being veiling
itself, than the fading word for the word?” (Heidegger “Words” 155). The fading
word for the word is, here, poetry. It is primarily through poetry that the link between
language and thinking-in-nothingness be bridged. It is with poetry that we “let
ourselves be told what is worthy of thinking” (155) and so we are able to think in a
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future-directed void: to think with disregard to habitual use of language and to think
possibility. Indeed, he writes that “poetry and thinking belong together. Their
coming together has come about long ago. As we think back to that origin, we come
face to face with what is primevally worthy of thought, and which we can never
ponder sufficiently” (155). Our striving towards the future is, then, also a loop into
the past: both are, however, concretely inaccessible. Indeed, a change in language
ultimately metamorphoses the way we understand and experience the world: “the
word’s rule springs to light as that which makes the thing be a thing. The word
begins to shine as the gathering which first brings what presences to its presence”
(155). So poetic articulation—or what Heidegger calls “saying”—is the key to
existing authentically. “The same word,” he writes, “that word for saying, is also the
word for Being, that is, for the presencing of beings. Saying and Being, word and
thing, belong to each other in a veiled way, a way which has hardly been thought and
is not to be thought out to the end” (155). Indeed, for Heidegger, agency is rather
different from Nietzsche’s will to power. Yet, there is again a kind of extension of
the mind into other spaces. Heidegger, rather than forcing the self to make space for
the Will, suggests that we submit and allow thoughts to strike us. We become almost
as if we are a medium for poetry and thought. Our extension into unknowable
horizons comes to us rather than the other way around. He continues:
In order that we may in our thinking fittingly follow and lead this element
worthy of thought as it gives itself to poetry, we abandon everything which we
have now said to oblivion. We listen to the poem. We grow still more
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thoughtful now regarding the possibility that the more simply the poem sings
in the mode of song, the more readily our hearing may err. (155)
We are asked to wait: being-as-patience, being-as-nothingness, being-towards-death,
being-as-clearing that accepts and welcomes the radiance of new thought to the
openness of authentic existence. So, again in contradistinction to linguistic
determinism, Heidegger asks us to submit and succumb to language towards the end
of thinking that which cannot be thought in the present because it is always yet to be
thought. It is language towards possibility in an existential state of openness and
nothingness. Coleridge’s flower comes to us and we endure it; it changes us as an
instance of simultaneous submission and choice.
What Heidegger does not discuss, however, is alternative modes of poetry. That
is, how does being-as-openness towards poetry endure itself when confronted with an
alternative mode of grammar that does not lend itself temporally and cognitively to
the primeval reaching-back and stretching-towards futurity? Perhaps Coleridge’s
flower is of multiple genera. Czech phenomenologist and media theorist, Vilém
Flusser, interrogates this possibility most fully in his provocative 1987 book Does
Writing have a Future?, only recently published in English. The book engages with
methodologies that aim to move beyond teleological approaches to science2 from the
perspective of the humanities. The work is complex, enigmatic, and provocative and,
so, it is also controversial. Here, I wish to simply focus on a single, though major,
argument from Flusser’s study. To Flusser, a major shift in the horizon of reading

2

Similar to Paul Feyerabend’s famous Against Method (1975), Flusser is highly critical of the
teleological claims of science; that is, he is skeptical over the enterprise as one of progress.
Furthermore, Flusser’s critique aims to identify science as equally a flexible “fiction” or a cultural
narrative as it is a methodology of inquiry.
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and organizing thought will take place with the gradual dominance of digital code
over alphanumeric code: that is between digital code and writing. This transition will
revolutionize critique, he argues, by gesturing towards more intense modes of
interdisciplinary inquiry. Moreover, it will radically change the way the mind and
thought are reflexively structured. “Writing seeks a way out of dizzying circular
thinking,” he writes, “and into a thinking arranged in lines.” He continues:
Now this can become: out of the magic circles of prehistoric thinking into
linear, historical thinking. Writing is a transcoding of thought, a translation
from the two-dimensional surface of images into a one-dimensional linear
code: out of compact, blurred pictorial codes into clear, distinct written codes;
out of the imaginary into the conceptual; out of the scenes into processes; out
of contexts into texts. Writing is a method of tearing imaginary things apart
and making them clear. (Flusser Does Writing Have a Future? 15).
This transcoding of thought is also thought transcoding. Writing fundamentally
structures the mind; it is what ultimately leads to fallacies in interpreting the
teleological trajectory of methodologies of inquiry like the scientific method.
Writing, on the page, is read in linear sequence: it is set before us and we follow it. It
stands to reason, then, that this directionality of the page aims towards an end: the end
of a clause, a sentence, a paragraph, a line of argument. In making thought clear,
writing is also a great illusionist: the magic circles of prehistoric thought are
noumenally still there, hidden behind an artificial system of transcoding.
The further writing advances, the more deeply the writing incisor penetrates
into the abysses of imaginary things stored in our memory, tearing them apart,
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to “describe,” to “explain,” to recode them into concept. This advance of
writing along lines toward the abysses of memories…and toward an objective
world, stripped of imaginary things, is what we call “history.” It is
progressive understanding. (15)
Writing fools us into experiencing progress as something inherent to the nature of
thought and knowledge.
Yet, Flusser, like Heidegger, is intent to demonstrate that our engagement with
language—or codes—is one of active agency so long as we are able to learn to think
in new ways by using codes towards new avenues. These avenues, for Flusser, are bidirectional and tangled, however. The means to new thought, he suggests, will be a
result of the predominant cultural code shifting from alphanumeric (writing) to digital
code. While writing moulds the plasticity of thought patterns towards linearity and
progressiveness digital code, Flusser argues, urges the thinker to interpret in images
and non-linear patterns. He explains that digital code “can proceed in multiple
directions” (146) and that we do not read code or mathematical equation in a linear
fashion but in a looping, multidirectional directionality as we interpret quanta, parts,
sub-parts, and whole.3 In a sense, digital code allows us to think what is unthought; it
permits us to stand on the horizon of nothingness so we may now, not simply learn to
think, but learn to think differently. In his very emphasis on non-teleological modes
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One thing Flusser neglects to examine is digital information illiteracy. That is, nearly a few decades
after Flusser wrote his study, digital media has proliferated almost exponentially. While vast number
of people use digital interfaces—that operate on digital code—relatively few people are literate in
coding and programming. In a sense, the population is being used, coded, and programmed more than
they are using, coding, and programming. In recent years, this has become a more pressing concern in
media studies, cultural studies, and pedagogy; that is, there is more direct emphasis on making the
population of the digital age turn literate in code and programming. Douglas Rushkoff’s book,
Program or be Programmed (2011) is the most concise and penetrating study forcefully and lucidly
confronting this conundrum.
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of thought, however, Flusser is certainly not gesturing towards some kind of utopia of
thinking. Instead, while he recognizes the shift from writing to digital code as
something profoundly significant, he also identifies this shift as that which will,
though different, lead to similar biased distortions of experience that we see with
writing. He writes, in a comment that confronts all systems of thought that deal with
the reflexive relation between mind and representational codes, that “projecting brain
function onto apparatuses raises exactly this question, whether this ontological
distinction between real and fictional…is possible at all, and if it is possible, whether
it is meaningful” (147). That is, thought is a simulation of language (or, perhaps in
the future, digital codes) and yet language and codes are simulations of brain
function. But “simulation is a kind of caricature,” Flusser writes, because “it
simplifies what is being imitated and exaggerates a few aspects of it” (147). So, if
writing exaggerates linearity, then code may not only exaggerate multi-directional
modes of thinking but also a new kind of rigidity that is remarkably unlike the poetry
that Heidegger suggests is the path to existentially responsible thought.
Coding apparatuses are, nevertheless, explicit in the way they address the selfreflexive loops that establish the relation between mind/brain and systems of
representation. “Appartuses incorporate the 1-0 structure because they simulate the
structure of our nervous system,” Flusser writes, “there, too, we are dealing with a
mechanical (and chemical) turning on and off of streams of electrons between the
nerve synapses. From this standpoint, digital codes are a method…of giving meaning
to quantum leaps in the brain from the outside. We are faced with a self-concealing
loop” (145). The self-concealing loops are, indeed, strange loops. They are also
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indicative of the relation between the mind and any mode of representation—here we
are concerned primarily with aesthetic and literary work—and the accuracy or fidelity
an apparatus has in relation to thought itself. For Flusser, though, new computer
codes are unique “because they are using simulated brains [computers] to simulate the
meaning-giving function of the brain” (145). In a way, digital code, as rigid as it is at
this moment in history, is also more analogous to the operations of the brain, Flusser
suggests. The brain is an apparatus that allows quantum leaps to occurs as a means of
meaning-making and the non-linearity of digital code operates analogously. As a
result, code “is about to turn this meaning-giving function over to apparatuses of its
own accord, then to reabsorb what they project” (145). That is, code allows for a
more effective reflexivity. Code is here, yet it is radiant on the horizon. Digital code
is set before us and offers itself to us to engage in new modes of thinking. It is not
unreasonable to suggest that code itself offers narratives unique to its own logic, as
does writing. Indeed, just as the fading word for the word gives us an apt metaphor
for poetry and thought on the edge of the abyss, the fading of code for the code allows
us to project a kind of speculation on a new kind of poetry based on digital code. The
self-concealing loop here suggests that embedded in Coleridge is the flower and,
simultaneously, embedded in the flower is the dreamer; that is, thought and language
are embodied as a means to embody thought and language.
Psycho-Ecology
So, our relationship to language is language’s relation to ourselves. To say this
relation is bi-directional is to simplify the conceptual structure. Instead, we may
consider the structure what I am here calling psycho-ecology: a multi-directional and

37

tangled series of interactions amongst thought and linguistic systems of representation
that determines the necessity that the totality of the mind lies unpredictably within
and without. Psycho-ecologies, like natural ecologies, are remarkable both in their
fecundity and in their complexity. And our relationship to these tangled
environments is a self-representational relationship. This relationship is, like a
natural ecology, also equally intricate in its delicacy. “The environment is that which
we experience and we, in turn, are that in which the environment is experienced,”
writes Flusser. He continues:
Reality is a web of concrete relations. The entities of the environment are
nothing but knots in this web, and we ourselves are knots of the same sort. We
are linked to these entities; they are there for us. And the entities are linked to
us; we are there for them. Both the environment and the organism are abstract
extrapolations from the actuality of their entwined relations. An organism
mirrors its environment; an environment mirrors its organisms; and if the
arena of their relations is altered in some way, neither the environment nor the
organism will be left unchanged. (Flusser and Bec Vampyroteuthis Infernalis
31)
And so by considerating a psycho-ecology we may add that a reader mimics its texts
and the texts its reader; we are linked to text because the text is there for us. The two
levels adapt to one another and, as a result, transform and mutate one another: that is,
this double, feedbacking mimesis lends itself to poesis. Indeed, poetry, as Flusser
remarks, “is usually understood as a language game whose strategy is to creatively
enlarge the universe of language” (Flusser Does Writing have a Future? 71). If
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mimesis is imitation and representation then self-representation is creative and
mutative. “Poetry in this sense,” Flusser continues, “is that source from which
language always springs anew and, in fact, overall in literature, even in scientific,
philosophical, or political texts, not only in poetic ones” (71). So, the entwined
relations that establish mutations between a reader and texts are remarkably
ubiquitous though poetry discloses itself only when language and thought spring
anew. If we are to recognize that, like language, “the agenda of life is inexhaustible,”
then what “we are appreciating is the blind chance of the ‘game of life’”
(Vampyroteuthis Infernalis 25) a game that is both biological and poetic. Psychoecology is the lived experience of reading, the experience of the processes that
constitute the mutative plasticity. Such experience discloses itself as temporally
finite, yet semantically infinite in possibility: it is paradoxically inward and outward,
within and without. Psycho-ecology is what makes the relation between thought,
poetry, and possibility possible.
The Chapters
The first chapter examines the diegetic level-crossing in Oscar Wilde’s novel The
Picture of Dorian Gray (1890). The relationship between the narrative level of
Victorian London and that of Dorian’s painting is examined against the backdrop of
the self-reflexive, hierarchy defying conceptual structure that physicist and cognitive
scientist Douglas Hofstadter calls a “strange loop.” This diegetic relationship is then
considered in terms of its narcissistic qualities—that of narcosis and numbness—as a
means of interrogating the affective quality of multi-diegetic narrative structures. The
second chapter analyzes Virginia Woolf’s To the Lighthouse (1927) through the lens
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of Martin Heidegger’s claim that human existence is that which is agential in its
ability to be. Furthermore, this able to be-ness is, above all else, temporal. While
Woolf scholars have intimated Heideggerian readings of her fiction, there is yet to
appear an extended analysis in this mode. I suggest that the reader extends an
affective physicality into the text and becomes both the prime mover and the vicious
cycle that animates the novel’s narrative directionality thus establishing an analogue
to the reader’s lived experience as directional, finite, and temporal. In my argument,
the reader extends an affective physicality into the text and becomes both the prime
mover and the vicious cycle galvanizing the novel, thus making manifest the reader’s
lived experience as temporal. The third chapter shifts the critical lens to the
“Nuvoletta” episode of James Joyce’s Finnegans Wake. Responding directly to the
recent reprint of Clive Hart’s 1967 article, “James Joyce’s Sentimentality,” in the
James Joyce Quarterly, this chapter examines the ambient and ambivalent
sentimentality via information theory, Linda Hutcheon’s memetic theory of
adaptation, and language as the phenomenological center of being. Ultimately, I
suggest that both Nuvoletta’s and the reader’s transformation is, to borrow Joyce’s
word, “motamourfully” successful in the work: both undergo a metamorphosis of the
word (mot)—and thus perception—through sentimentality (amour). Theodor Adorno
comments that in the work of Samuel Beckett “poetic procedure surrenders…without
intention.” The final chapter examines Beckett’s Endgame (1957) as a zero-player
game: a simulation or game that plays itself without interaction with a gamer. Taking
Beckett’s phrase, “something is taking its course,” as its central conceit, this chapter
is a meditation on the status of the extra-diegetic—the reader—as not simply finite,
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but nonexistent. Ultimately, I trace a trajectory in how these texts (and other
twentieth-century texts) may offer themselves to us as a means to meditate on the
encroaching shift in what is becoming the predominant cultural narrative code in the
developed world: the increasing dominance of programming and digital code over the
narratives of alphanumeric code.
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Chapter One

monstrorum artifex: Diegetic Level-Crossing and
Uncanny Narrative Contexture in The Picture of Dorian Gray
___________________________
Among the sacred objects belonging to a sultan of Menangcabow named Gaggar Allum was the cloth
sansistah Kallah, which weaves itself, and adds one thread yearly of fine pearls, and when that cloth
shall be finished the world will be no more.
-W. W. Skeat
This disturbing, full-length portrait of a Dorian Gray will haunt me, as writing, having become the
book itself.
-Stephan Mallarmé

The relationship between the mutating painting as a narrative and the fictional
world of Victorian London raises particularly interesting questions regarding multiple
ontological levels of diegesis in The Picture of Dorian Gray. The novel’s created
world and the parallel narrative that is revealed through Dorian’s metamorphosing
portrait constitute two levels of diegetic reality. The association these different levels
share with one another radically disrupts a reading that privileges one narrative reality
over another; consequently, such a structure upsets the stability of representing a
consensus reality. The different ontological levels in The Picture of Dorian Gray
relate to one another according to a tangled hierarchical form; that is, a structural
relationship of reflexivity and metonymy. This relationship governing the complex
structural logic of the novel’s diegesis establishes the ambivalent and ambiguous
relationship between the narrative divisions of Wilde’s novel. In other words, the
inherent conceptual instability of any given ontological level of diegesis
simultaneously establishes, and becomes part of, the aggregate of multiple diegetic
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levels. Yet, despite the oddity of this structural conundrum that links multiple planes
of narrative, the diegetic eloquence of Wilde’s novel suggests that its strange form
can be examined as being in a state of structural homeostasis. In other words, there is
an inclination in the relationship between the multiple diegetic levels of the novel to
gesture towards a complex kind of textual stability through constant reorganization
and loopy level-crossing of alternative narrative spaces.
The novel’s diegetic structure strives for internal equilibrium despite its constant
state of conceptual reorganization. Such a metonymic metamorphosis of the differing
diegetic levels establishes preexisting conditions of quirky logic which, in turn,
generates those logical conditions for the foundation structuring the novel. Following
this chain of structural metonymy leads to an examination of the metonymical
relationship between the “living” painting and the novel itself. In 1946, Jorge Luis
Borges wrote, “to speak Wilde’s name is to speak of a dandy who was also a poet; it
is to evoke the image of a gentleman dedicated to the meager proposition of shocking
by means of cravats and metaphors. It is also to evoke the notion of art as an elite or
occult game…and the poet as a laborious ‘monstrorum artifex’ [maker of monsters]”
(Borges 314). If the novel itself is governed by reflexive internal textual forces and
processes—the looping homeostatic relationship between different ontological levels
of diegesis—it may be simulating a kind of textual organism. That is, since the
structural eccentricity of the novel is metaphorically akin to the autonomic, internal
dynamics of an organism, the reflexive relationships that constitute the novel’s
diegesis may operate as a literary proxy for the processes associated with affective
responses normally associated with the biological. As such, the internal textual-
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dynamics relating the multiple ontological levels of diegesis in Wilde’s novel,
certainly in an abstract sense, give birth to a monstrosity.
However, the monstrous nature of the text may not be immediately acknowledged.
There is a remarkable difficulty associated with the study of Wilde’s novel. Jerusha
McCormack aptly remarks that “it is hard to say anything original about The Picture
of Dorian Gray, largely because there is so little that is original in it. As if in two
facing mirrors, the novel and its analogues seem to multiply towards a possible
infinite, in a kind of self-perpetuating critical machine” (McMormack 110). He
further suggests that “Wilde has tapped a root of Western folklore so deep and
ubiquitous that the story has escaped the literary and returned to its origins in the oral
tale” (McCormack 111); that is, Wilde’s narrative crosses from one diegetic level,
print, to another, that of the storyteller and listener. This, an instance of those
analogues that multiply towards infinity, also operates in the opposite direction. The
novel itself contains this process. Not only is the novel like two facing mirrors, it is a
diegetic expression of the phenomenon of such iterative mimesis. The novel in both
form and content escapes from one mirror into the other, back again, and so on,
oscillating ad infinitum. This split, for McCormack, between the literary and the oral,
“explores the fault line that, in itself, defines modernity” (111). He continues:
“modernity…entails the blurring of the boundary between the human and the artifact”
(111). It is this blurring, this reiterative analogue of analogue itself that constitutes
Wilde as a maker of monsters. Furthermore, it is the artifact that makes the human
and the human who makes the artifact. “Wilde saw that the ‘self’ was not inevitably
indubitable, rational and progressive,” writes Reginia Gagnier, “but was socially
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constructed. It was constructed through language, which is why he waged a life-long
subversion of conventional speech patterns. It was constructed through social
institutions, which was why the school, marriage and family, medicine, the law and
the prison…so exercised his critical faculties” (Gagnier 20). That is, the self is a
product of society; the self is formed according to social artifact. Because, the
constructed individual also constructs according to his or her reflection, the construct
already determines his or her constitutive environment. Both artifact and individual
are self-perpetuating critical machines. Or, as Wilde himself suggests, such criticism
“treats the work of art simply as a starting-point for a new creation” (Wilde “The
Critic as Artist” 1029); that is, the artifact and the individual are equally creative
entities. Wilde thus “draws on the deep structure of a kind of tale which pretends to
order sequentially, in a narrative, what is actually the destruction of all sequence”
(McCormack 111). That is, Wilde’s narrative, as a conceptual architecture or
structure, is that which defies linearity, directionality, and sequence. It is, as a selfperpetuating critical machine in the logical sense, a kind of monstrosity.
McCormack’s argument, however, gestures towards the exterior, to the diegetic
level of the reader and storyteller, and to the oral and the mythological. Indeed, there
is even a biographical element to this gesture, he suggests, in that, with the novel
“Wilde makes and unmakes himself in the imagine of three aesthetes [Hallward,
Wotton, and Gray] who are themselves incorporated into a picture” (114). Moreover,
Russell Jackson writes that Wilde’s “Stance as a dandy, a performer and (as an
Irishman) and an outsider gave him a particular use for the machinery and
connections both of the social world and of the society drama of the theatre” (Jackson
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169). Here, however, we are not interested in biography. Rather, we are interested
the monstrous self-perpetuating logic internal to the novel’s multi-diegetic knots; that
is, between Dorian Gray’s environment—London, England—and the diegetic level of
the portrait embedded within the novel. If Lord Wotton is “what the world thought
him: one of the new aristocracy, a dandy who lives by his wits, mocked as ‘Prince
Paradox’” (McCormack 112) then the novel and its tangled diegetic architecture is the
paradoxical palace appropriate for its tenants.
The abstract nature of mediating between unstable parts of a plural structure of this
kind demands some sort of conceptual spatiality. That is, establishing a spatial
construct as a means of provisionally imposing order upon an abstract system can
serve to make it meaningful. Tom Lloyd, in Crises of Realism (1997), makes
wonderful use of spatial metaphor in his analysis of representation in nineteenthcentury realist fiction. “Novelists,” Lloyd remarks, “create the realistic middle space
generated by what Michel de Certeau…terms the two poles of the ‘real,’ the
‘productive activity and the period known.’ This middle space is fluid, its tropal
structures not so confining that open-ended suggestiveness is closed off by abstract
and other transfixions, or by mere escapes into idyllic univocalities” (9). In Lloyd’s
analysis, the middle space marks a spatial conceptualization in which modes of
representation and mimesis mediate between history—which “is messy, chaotic, and
not easily given to organization” (11)—and idealism. Ultimately, such middle space
accommodates the chaotic representation of the inherent disorderliness of history.
However, it is in Wilde’s novel, Lloyd suggests, where realism’s middle space
dissolves and the accommodation of chaotic history disappears with it: “the
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possibility of verbal stability collapses into metaphorical-allegorical…and
ironic…alternatives, verbal enemies of the middle space where realism thrives at the
intersection of visual field, written word, and concept” (157). Perhaps what is most
interesting about Lloyd’s argument is not how Wilde’s novel instigates the demise of
the representational schematics of the Realists but in the very notion of the collapse or
dissolution of the middle space. This phenomenon of collapse observed in The
Picture of Dorian Gray signals the need to reconceptualize, not only the
representational and mimetic apparatus at play in the novel, but also the narrative and
diegetic structure. On the level of representation, the dissipation of the middle space
signifies the impossibility of reconciling Dorian’s idealism with historical flux—and
historical consciousness ultimately gets the better of the idealized sitter. However,
Lloyd’s analysis does not demonstrate an interest in the rhetorical and diegetic
implications of such a collapse in the novel.
The result of this collapse necessitates a spatial conceptualization that may account
for the phenomenon of the embedding of one ontological level of diegesis within
another. The relational tangle of alternate narratives of the painting and the fictional
world in Wilde’s novel does not assert itself through mediation—as in the
complexities of representation upon which Lloyd comments—but is, instead, best
conceptualized as a radically interwoven contexture, a “novel…as lovely as a Persian
carpet, and as unreal” (Wilde 45). Furthermore, it is tempting to analyze this knotted
structure hierarchically by privileging the diegetic level of the fictional Victorian
world over the fantastic narrative in the metamorphosing painting. Michael Patrick
Gillespie attests:
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This willingness to acknowledge multiplicity without succumbing to
diffusiveness reflects a particular cultural/historical context that has led to the
ontological duality facing contemporary readers of Oscar Wilde’s The Picture
of Dorian Gray: the novel clearly situates itself in a deterministic Victorian
context. At the same time in a decidedly postmodern fashion it repeatedly
introduces elements into its discourse that disrupt prescriptive interpretive
impulses without clearly signaling the primacy of any alternative point of
view. (Gillespie 44)
Refocusing Gillespie’s observation, which concerns both Wilde’s Irishness and his
homosexuality, to the perspective of interrelated and embedded narratives, the
significance of tangled hierarchical relations among narrative levels in The Picture of
Dorian Gray is more readily pertinent. The problem here is due to the difficulty of
uniting multiple levels of diegesis that are characterized, paradoxically, by
simultaneously being separated by different ontological levels yet reflexively
occupying the same textual space.
What may be called the “originary” ontological level of narrative is the fictional
created world of late Victorian England that occupies the majority of the novel’s
diegetic space. This is the world—the “deterministic Victorian context”—which
opens the book: “The studio was filled with the rich odor of roses, and when the light
summer wind stirred amidst the trees of the garden there came through the open door
the heavy scent of the lilac, or the more delicate perfume of the pink-flowering thorn”
(Wilde 18). Here
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the fantastic shadows of birds in flight flitted across the long tussore-silk
curtains that were stretched in front of the huge window, producing a kind of
momentary Japanese effect, and making [Lord Henry Wotton] think of those
pallid jade-faced painters of Tokio who, through the medium of an art that is
necessarily immobile, seek to convey the sense of swiftness and motion. The
sullen murmur of the bees shouldering their way through the long unmown
grass, or circling with monotonous insistence round the dusty gilt horns of the
straggling woodbine, seemed to make the stillness more oppressive. The dim
roar of London was like the bourdon note of a distant organ. (18)
This is the ontological plane which bored men experience “through the thin blue
wreaths of smoke that curled up in such fanciful whirls from…heavy opium tainted
[cigarettes]” (18-19) as they lie on couches; where Basil Hallward paints his
magnificent “full-length portrait of a young man of extraordinary personal beauty”
(18); in which the young and beautiful Sibyl Vane is found “lying dead on the floor of
her dressing-room” after swallowing “some dreadful thing they use at theatres”
composed of “prussic acid or white lead” (83); where “the wretched boy in the
Guards” and Alan Campbell each commit suicide (117, 159) and where Sir Henry
Ashton, Adrian Singleton, Lord Ken, the Duke of Perth, and Lady Gwendolen are
shamed, broken, and scandalized as a result of their association with Dorian (117118); and where Dorian murders Basil by digging a “knife into the great vein that is
behind the ear, crushing the man’s head down on the table, and stabbing again and
again” (123). Indeed, this ontological level is where Dorian puts his new hedonism
into practice with neither—until the novel’s conclusion—the physical consequences
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of a life of excess nor of the ravages of time. This is the ontological level of diegesis
in which a fictional London is hyperbolically and ornamentally represented, created,
and established as a literary proxy for the extra-diegetic London; in short, this
narrated world is where the characters of The Picture of Dorian Gray exist.
Yet, embedded within, and directly affected by and effecting, this ontological level
of diegesis is another narrative plane: Hallward’s mutating portrait of Dorian.
Because the portrait itself reports according to its own narrative level, it involves a
manifestation of Dorian as its sole character and progresses and mutates in
accordance to changing sequence of events—though affected from a different
ontological plane of diegesis—it should be characterized as a narrative in its own
right. The portrait, however, is embedded within the originary diegetic plane—of
London in which Basil, Lord Henry, Dorian, etc. exist—which is itself inserted into
the extra-diegetic level occupied by the reader in the form of a material book.
However, unlike the originary and extra-diegetic planes in which sequences of events
presumably precede and then proceed with the experience of the text itself, the
narrative nature of the painting exists ab ovo. Indeed, the moment of the portrait’s
completion marks a diegetic fissure:
The sweep and dash of the brush on the canvas made the only sound that
broke the stillness, except when, now and then, Hallward stepped back to look
at his work from a distance. In the slanting beams that streamed through the
open door-way the dust danced and was golden. The heavy scent of the roses
seemed to brood over everything… Hallward stopped painting, looked for a
long time at Dorian Gray, and then for a long time at the picture, biting the
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end of one of his huge brushes, and frowning. ‘It is quite finished,’ he cried, at
last, and stooping down he wrote his name in long vermilion letters on the
left-hand corner of the canvas. (33)
Wilde’s tropally ornate style here is reminiscent of Christian teleology; that is, after
tasting the vinegar, Jesus utters his final words on the cross: “It is finished: and he
bowed his head, and gave up the ghost” (KJV, John 19:30). Yet, this also expresses a
kind of creation mythology. A primordial act of painting establishes “the only sound
that broke the stillness” while “slanting beams” of light stream into the room to reveal
golden dust dancing in the air: an abyss is filled, a new narrative world comes into
being, a grammatical ghost or structural double materializes and haunts. The act of
producing new worlds through art, for Dorian“as if awakened from some dream”
(Wilde 33), is an act of both aesthetic and ontological magnitude:
It was the creation of such worlds…that seemed to Dorian Gray to be the true
object, or amongst the true objects, of life; and in his search for sensations that
would be at once new and delightful, and possess that element of strangeness
that is so essential to romance, he would often adopt certain modes of thought
that he knew to be really alien to his nature. (105)
First, Dorian’s recognition that these worlds—those created aesthetically—are “true
objects” suggests a conceptual collapse of the ontological level of the artist and the
work of art; indeed, this logic extends its relation to that which links mind and
language. Secondly, and perhaps more significantly, this recognition signifies the
blurring between multiple diegetic levels that compose the novel itself.
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The narrative status of the portrait, however, is not necessarily firmly established
until Dorian first notices a physical change it its composition. Dorian, after Sibyl
Vane’s disastrous performance at the theatre, grossly and irrationally mistreats the
young actress and thus instigates the vertiginous ontological level-crossings that
propel the supernatural intrigue of the remainder of the novel. Leaving the theatre,
and the weeping actress, Dorian returns to his home:
As he was turning the handle of the door, his eye fell upon the portrait Basil
Hallward had painted of him. He started back as if in surprise. Then he went
on into his own room, looking somewhat puzzled. After he had taken the
buttonhole out of his coat, he seemed to hesitate. Finally he came back, went
over to the picture and examined it. In the dim arrested light that struggled
through the cream-coloured silk blinds, the face appeared to him to be a little
changed. The expression looked different. One would have said that there
was a touch of cruelty in the mouth. It was certainly strange…the strange
expression that he had noticed in the face of the portrait seemed to linger
there, to be more intensified even. The quivering, ardent sunlight showed him
the lines of a cruelty round the mouth as clearly as if he had been looking into
a mirror after he had done some dreadful thing. (77)
That the “portrait had altered” (80) signifies the confusing shifts between ontological
planes: although the “great events of the world take place in the brain” (29), the
actions of one narrative level manifest their effects in another ontological plane. For
Dorian, “This portrait would be to him the most magical of mirrors. As it had
revealed to him his own body, so it would reveal to him his own soul” (88).
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However, Dorian must keep this magical mirror—this object that signifies the levelcrossing of traditionally Cartesian ontological divisions of the body and soul—as he
feels the portrait will “bear the burden of his shame” (88).
As Dorian’s excesses become increasingly extreme so too do the effects on the
narrative of the painting. The collapse and blurring of these different ontological
levels is intensely experienced by a reaction of surprise and shock, not solely by
Dorian, but also by Basil, the creator of the narrative world manifest in the painting:
“The surface [of the portrait] seemed to be quite undisturbed, and as [Basil] had left
it. It was from within, apparently, that the foulness and horror had come. Through
some strange quickening of inner life the leprosies of sin were slowly eating the thing
away. The rotting of a corpse in a watery grave was not so fearful” (122). Basil’s
experience of the ontological level of the painting—and his curious understanding of
its reflexive relationship with his own level of narrative—ultimately prompts Dorian
to murder the portraitist. That is, because the two ontological planes are confused,
Dorian’s reaction is not altogether an unfitting passionate act of a paranoiac since the
incriminating evidence of his behavior in either the painting or the fictional London
holds equal ontological status within the novel’s diegetic knot. The assumed
unidirectional relationship between the two planes—the consequence of Dorian’s
actions marking change in the portrait—ultimately undergoes a strange reversal at the
novel’s conclusion. Dorian, determined to free his conscience and “kill the past”
(167), reasons to destroy the painting: “He looked round, and saw the knife that had
stabbed Basil Hallward. He had cleaned it many times, till there was no stain left
upon it. It was bright, and glistened. As it had killed the painter, so it would kill the
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painter’s work, and all that it meant” (166-167). Yet, the attempted destruction of the
painting famously leads instead to Dorian’s death. The diegetic level of the painting
remains intact, looping back to its original unsullied state: “hanging upon the wall, a
splendid portrait of their master as [others] had last seen him, in all the wonder of its
exquisite youth and beauty” (167). The mutations the painting underwent abruptly
relocate into the originary ontological level leaving Dorian “lying on the floor…in
evening dress, with a knife in his heart…withered, wrinkled, and loathsome of
visage” (167). It is this startling shift at the novel’s conclusion that absolutely
disrupts the ontological status of a sole consensus reality.
Indeed, the sentence “the terrible portrait whose changing features showed
[Dorian] the real degradation of his life” (111) emphasizes the collapsing of the
diegetic reality of the portrait into that of a consensus reality. The “real degradation”
committed in one level of narrative is, paradoxically, manifest in another. The reader
may presuppose that the diegetic level of Victorian London—composed of a
sequential network of signifiers and representational strategies—to be constant,
consistent, and analogous to the extra-diegetic world. Yet, the logical reorganization
of the manifestation of cause and effect—by having the destruction of the painting
lead to Dorian’s unintentional suicide—disorders the spatial logic connecting the two
narratives by asserting a multi-diegetic continuity.
Because the correlation between the diegetic level of the painting and the narrative
world inhabited by the characters is a continuum of ontological level-crossings rather
than one of mediation, the surprising relational reconfiguration of the two levels of
narrative at the end of the novel raises particular difficulties in envisioning such a
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quirky spatial relationship. Brian McHale, in Constructing Postmodernism (1992),
writes that many narrative strategies associated with creating multiple diegetic worlds
involve
juxtaposition among microworlds occupying the same ontological plane and
[are arranged] along the same horizontal axis. It is also possible, however, to
foreground the “worldness” of world by juxtaposing worlds not…in series, on
a horizontal axis, but rather in parallel, on a vertical axis; that is, it is possible
to juxtapose worlds occupying different ontological planes—worlds and metaworlds, or world and inset world (worlds-within-worlds). (McHale 251)
McHale is forced into the difficulty of spatially conceptualizing these diegetic
abstract assemblages. Wilde’s novel, however, complicates the horizontal relation as
well as the vertical relation of different ontological levels of diegesis in that the
effects of what occurs on one level are spontaneously displaced, ultimately affecting
another level. As Dorian’s excesses on one ontological level of narrative increase in
intensity, the effects are manifest in another level according to a logic that is not one
of predictable oscillation but one more akin to a complex tangle. Consequently, the
relationship between the ontological level occupied by Dorian and that occupied by
his portrait is not one that can be satisfactorily interpreted as either horizontal or
vertical. That is, the spatial conceptualization of the tangled relationship between
these two levels must accommodate the logic of reflexivity and metonymy.
This reflexive structure found in the relationship of multi-diegetic levels in the
novel may be best examined according to the structural phenomenon of reflexivity
called a “strange loop.” The concept of the strange loop was created by Douglas
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Hofstadter in Gödel, Escher, Bach: An Eternal Golden Braid (1979), a fascinating
meditation on the self-referential logic underlying structures of consciousness,
artificial intelligence, Zen Buddhism, nonsense, mathematics, genetics, and music.
Indeed, the subtitle to Hofstadter’s book reads “A Metaphorical Fugue on Minds and
Machines in The Spirit of Lewis Carroll”; the book’s aesthetic zaniness and delight in
paradox certainly appeals to the Wildean sentiment. While Hofstadter does not
address literature itself, the study offers a playful indication that the book itself is
representative of how the strange loop phenomenon is metonymically and reflexively
manifest in writing. The relationship between the multiple ontological levels of
diegesis as it is represented in The Picture of Dorian Gray is, as a tangled hierarchy,
ripe with apparent spatial paradox: the embedded presence of one level of diegesis
that becomes part of another level of diegesis—while either level of narrative may be
representative of the whole structure.
As a spatial concept a strange loop is, though certainly an example of reflexivity,
rather more abstract. Yet, the structural phenomenon is also a fruitful way of
examining the relationship between multiple ontological levels of diegesis that cannot
be worked out as relating to one another according to vertical or horizontal
conceptualizations. Hofstadter writes in Gödel, Escher, Bach that
[t]he “Strange Loop” phenomenon occurs whenever, by moving upwards (or
downwards) through the levels of some hierarchical system, we unexpectedly
find ourselves back where we started…Sometimes [a strange loop] will be
hidden, other times it will be out in the open; sometimes it will be right side
up, other times it will be upside down, or backwards. (Hofstadter 10)
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Hofstadter revisits the concept in his later work I Am a Strange Loop (2007) partly
with the agenda of clarifying the elusive concept. Here, he elaborates upon his earlier
definition:
What I mean by “strange loop” is…not a physical circuit but an abstract loop
in which, in the series of stages that constitute the cycling-around, there is a
shift from one level of abstraction (or structure) to another, which feels like an
upwards movement in a hierarchy, and yet somehow the successive “upward”
shifts turn out to give rise to a closed cycle. (101-102)
In The Picture of Dorian Gray, the sense of movement from one diegetic level to
another may feel like movement in a well-defined spatial hierarchy but is ultimately
deceptive: “soul and body, body and soul—how mystersious they were…The senses
could refine, and the intellect could degrade. Who could say where the fleshy
impulse ceased, or the physical impulse began?” (Wilde 56). Rather, the relationship
between the diegetic ontology of the characters and that of the painting gives rise to a
fluctuating and tangled closed cycle: the relationship between the multiple levels of
narrative are representative of the text’s internal dynamics. “What bothers us,”
Hofstadter writes, “is perhaps an ill-defined sense of topological wrongness: the
inside-outside distinction is being blurred…Even though the system is an abstraction,
our minds use spatial imagery with a sort of mental topology” (Gödel, Escher, Bach
691); apparently, Hofstadter’s inclusive “us” includes Wilde’s narrator and the
latter’s fascination with the inside-outside distinction: “Was the soul a shadow seated
in the house of sin? Or was the body really in the soul, as Giordano Bruno thought?
The separation of spirit from matter was a mystery, and the union of spirit with matter
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was a mystery also” (Wilde 56). With such self-reflexive systems, the movement
along a continuum composed of multiple narrative levels conforms to the peculiar
spatial pattern of the strange loop: “Despite one’s sense of departing ever further from
one’s origin, one winds up, to one’s shock, exactly where one had started out. In
short, a strange loop is a paradoxical level-crossing feedback loop” (I Am a Strange
Loop 102). That is, the diegetic level of the painting is embedded within the diegetic
level of Victorian London; yet, the narrative level of the latter is simultaneously, in
what seems to conceptually be a topological absurdity, embedded within the narrative
level of the portrait. The narrative contexture is, to borrow Hofstadter’s phrase,
precisely a paradoxical level-crossing feedback loop.
The significance of the strange loop phenomenon to narrative is examined by
McHale in Postmodernist Fiction (1987); however, McHale prefers Gérard Genette’s
use of the term “metalepsis” to Hofstadter’s terminology. Metalepsis is simply
defined as “the violation of narrative levels” (McHale 120) or as a kind of “recursive
embedding” of ontological dimensions; in short, metalepsis is a narratological term
not unlike Hofstadter’s strange loops and tangled hierarchies. McHale lists Alain
Robbe-Grillet’s Topologies d’une cité fantôme (1976) and Maison de rendez-vous
(1965), Julio Cortázar’s short story “Continuity of Parks” (1978), Claude Simon’s
Triptych (1973), and Christine Brooke-Rose’s Thru (1975) as works emblematic of
metalepsis though of differing degrees of complexity. Certainly these narrative
structures are ripe in postmodern fiction. The appearance of metalepsis occurs even
earlier in the twentieth-century in drama. This should not be surprising since, as
McHale remarks,
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the fundamental ontological boundary in theatre is a literal, physical threshold,
equally visible to the audience and (if they are permitted to recognize it) the
characters: namely, the footlights, the edge of the stage. As theatre develops
self-consciousness in the modernist period, this ontological threshold becomes
and obvious resource for aesthetic exploitation, much more so than the
equivalent boundaries (between narrative levels, for instance) in prose texts,
which must be made visible, palpable, before they can be exploited. (121)
That Wilde’s novel is situated outside this timeline is interesting; perhaps what marks
The Picture of Dorian Gray as unique is that its loopiness seems to gesture towards a
kind of organicism. While Genette’s metalepsis is most effective as a narratological
tool, Hofstadter’s strange loops and tangled hierarchies have connotations of both
ontological hesitancy and of biological processes. So Hofstadter’s terminology here
is perhaps more appropriate since not only does Wilde’s text tangle different
narratives together but these narratives are remarkable in that they are, in an
amusingly Wildean sense, living.
This conceit, however, should not necessarily come as a surprise. There is good
reason that Hofstadter’s strange loop conjures a sense of fascinating unease and
familiarity: he suggests that the strange loop is an apt conceptual structure for
thinking about consciousness itself. It is important, however, to not take Hofstadter
too literally here; that is, this meditation is not a totalizing analysis but is rather an
intervention into a particular trajectory of artificial intelligence research. Stefano
Franchi and Güven Güzeldere rightly remark that
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because of its historical roots in the logical and mathematical tradition…AI
research has traditionally interpreted thinking as a manipulation of
propositions, and has more or less systematically disregarded the complex
activities involved in the recognition of a sentence’s constituent elements—
words, syllables, letters—as essentially nonintelligent…the quest for truth
exemplified by mathematical theorem proving represents just a small, not
quite characteristic, subject of human cognitive abilities. (Franchi and
Güzeldere 9)
So, Hofstadter’s aim is to consider the mechanics of the mind as including to a large
degree processes perhaps best characterized as fluid, plastic, and self-regulating. The
phenomena of our minds for Hofstadter are based on the structural concept of the
strange loop in that there are interactions between different levels of the physical
structure of the brain “in which the top level reaches back down towards the bottom
level…while at the same time being itself determined by the bottom level”
(Hofstadter GEB 709). Like autological language or self-referential sentences, the
“self comes into being at the moment it has the power to reflect itself” (709) upon
itself.
Considering this on the narrative level of Dorian Gray a diegetic world comes into
being—a true object of life—the moment it has the power to reflect itself. The
establishment of the two embedded diegetic realms in the novel, reflecting and
influencing one another according to “various types of ‘causality’” (709), implicates
according to a structural analogue narrative architecture with mental processes. The
narrative structure of Dorian Gray, a strange loop, is a representational analogue of
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the structural processes governing consciousness itself thus invoking a sense of
unease and fascination at both the highest and deepest levels of causality. In his
discussion of cyberpunk fiction, David Porush suggests a lineage of aesthetic
expression that is a “consequence of the human nervous system itself; the impulse to
invent a hyperreality and then live there is hardwired in our cognitive habits by the
genetic code” (Porush 331 emphasis in original). Though certainly a familiar
sentiment among cyberpunk enthusiasts, Porush’s statement remains provocative. It
is a cognitive habit, determined by genetics and the “inherited disease” of language
(331), for human beings to map and extend consciousness beyond itself:
There is a war fought in the gap between every nerve. On one side is the
endocrine system, which creates the hormonal homeostatic ecology for the
transmission of signals across the synapse. On the other side is the nerve net
itself, with its imperial manifest destiny to extend itself in the form of
cybernetic media, communication, and control. (331)
For Basil, the nerve net onto which he makes visible the extension of his desire is the
painting itself. This act is, however, more complex as it acts as more than simply a
material proxy of Basil’s longing in both the sense of desire and media elongation, “I
am afraid,” writes the painter, “that I have shown in it the secret of my own soul”
(Wilde 21); rather, in the very impulse to both inhabit and “invent a hyperreality” he
creates an alternative diegetic realm that is inextricably and circularly linked to that of
his own. Porush, citing cyberneticist and neurophysiologist Humberto Maturana,
suggests that “the urgent biological grown vector of the CNS [central nervous system]
is in the direction of autopoeisis, growing feedback loops of self-organization and
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complexity…the natural, biological necessity of the human nerve net is to imperialize
nature through artifice” (Porush 332). David Punter provides an excellent comment
on Hallward’s surprising quip about marriage: [the married couple] “are forced to
have more than one life. They become more highly organised, and to be highly
organised is, I should fancy, the object of man’s existence” (Wilde 66). For Punter,
this witticism becomes an eloquent meditation upon the emergence of modernity.
“Absorbed into the silence of the portrait, Basil exemplifies the unutterable longing
which saturates the book—the longing for beauty, for youth, for immortality,” writes
McCormack, “it is the quality of that desire which lends the book greatness; but it is
the strategy by which that desire is accomplished that makes it modern” (McCormack
112). Punter, moreover, suggests that Wilde’s organization should be thought of in
terms of the cyborg: “the evolution of the human into some further creature which can
manage a more complex interaction with the world around, an interaction of the
‘self’, as traditionally conceived, is not fully in control” (Punter 157). Moreover, the
idea of becoming more highly organized, like that of autopoesis, engages in “a higher
level of technology, and at the same time the paradoxical removal of the self from the
realm of transparency and behind a veil of secrecy, such that the information which
would be needed to decode human interrelationship becomes ever more difficult to
obtain or disentangle” (157). Indeed, the difficulty of disentangling the relationship
between the self/mind and the art/grammar is a central concern of the structural
narrative peculiarity of the novel. As Hofstadter notes, the logic of such autopoesis—
feedback loops of self-organization and complexity—is not simply that of human
colonization of nature through art, but also the reverse: “But you don’t mean to say
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that you seriously believe that Life imitates Art, that Life in fact is the mirror, and Art
the reality?” (Wilde “The Decay of Lying” 982).
Two particular and related aspects of the strange loop phenomenon are, first, the
element of surprise and, second, unpredictable changes in the direction of the cycle’s
movement. Dorian’s reaction—he “started back in surprise”—to the slight changes in
the portrait, after his mistreatment of Sibyl, is indicative of this feature of the strange
loop. Here, Dorian’s shock is in response to the sudden “shift from one level of
abstraction (or structure) to another;” that is, the sudden shift from the consensus
reality of Dorian’s level of diegetic reality to the level of the portrait. While Dorian’s
own face should display “a touch of cruelty in the mouth,” these features are bizarrely
shifted to another level of diegesis thus affecting the portrait. Dorian’s misbehavior
in one ontological level of diegesis produces an upwards movement that effects
another level of diegesis; the diegetic level of the portrait then loops back giving rise
to the closed cycle, and the aesthete is physically unaffected, exactly where he “had
started out.” Hofstadter writes that “a Tangled Hierarchy occurs when what you
presume are clean hierarchical levels take you by surprise and fold back in a
hierarchy-violating way. The surprise element is important; it is the reason I call
Strange Loops ‘strange.’ A simple tangle, like feedback, doesn’t involve violations
of presumed level distinctions” (Gödel, Escher, Bach 691). Dorian’s recognition that
the hierarchical relationship between the ontological level of the painting and that in
which he situates himself operates according to hierarchy-violating principles that
prove, however, to be fatally imperfect.
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Hofstadter’s remark that sometimes a strange loop “will be hidden, other times it
will be out in the open; sometimes it will be right side up, other times it will be upside
down, or backwards” is an ardent reminder that hierarchy-violating principles may
violate absolutely. Among the many flaws Dorian harbors, one of particular
importance here is his misunderstanding of the logic relating the mutating painting to
his own level of reality:
when winter came upon [the portrait], [Dorian] would still be standing where
spring trembles on the verge of summer. When the blood crept from its face,
and left behind a pallid mask of chalk with leaden eyes, he would keep the
glamour of boyhood. Not one blossom of his loveliness would ever fade. Not
one pulse of his life would ever weaken. Like the gods of the Greeks, he
would be strong, and fleet, and joyous. What did it matter what happened to
the coloured image on the canvas? He would be safe. That was everything.
(Wilde 88)
Dorian’s theory that he will be safe so long as his excesses are manifest in the
painting through a mysterious displacement of cause and effect through ontological
level-crossing rests largely on his assumption that the loopy hierarchical relationship
is unidirectional. This is, of course, false in the diegetic worlds of The Picture of
Dorian Gray. “Language does create strange loops,” Hofstadter writes, “when it talks
about itself, whether directly or indirectly. Here, something in the system jumps out
and acts on the system, as if it were outside the system” (Hofstadter 691). The
system, in this case, is a multi-diegetic aggregate. Dorian, as a representational
construct from within the system, “jumps out” and attempts to tame the system as if
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he can maintain an objective point of observation from without. His gross
misunderstanding is that the structure itself can, unexpectedly, reverse or change
configuration; indeed, the most significant change in the strange loop structure of the
text ultimately leads to Dorian’s self-murder.
What is rather remarkable about the conceptual configuration of the multi-diegetic
structure of The Picture of Dorian Gray is how, despite the chaotic and unpredictable
nature of the structure, the tangled narrative levels maintain a kind of eloquent
stability. The reflexive strange loop relating the different ontological levels of
diegesis in the novel establishes a structural feature that is indicative of a kind of
internal textual equilibrium. To recapitulate the reflexive logic of the novel’s multidiegetic structure, the diegetic level of the painting is, after all, embedded within the
diegetic level of Victorian London—simultaneously, the narrative world of Victorian
London is, paradoxically, embedded within the narrative world of the portrait. The
consequence of an action enacted in one diegetic level is discarded and displaced
while its logical cause is resurrected in another narrative space. Indeed, the manner in
which these two diegetic levels may reflexively occupy the same textual space is not
unlike the biological processes organisms use to achieve states of homeostasis
through metabolism.
In her book How We Became Posthuman (1999), N. Katherine Hayles writes
“homeostasis had been understood as the ability of organisms to maintain steady
states when they are buffeted by fickle environments. When the temperature soars,
sweat pours out of the human body so that its internal temperature can remain
relatively stable” (Hayles 8). Indeed, according to the logic of reflexive systems, an
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organism can maintain homeostasis with feedback loops. As such, organisms
maintain a state of equilibrium by mutual exchange of certain elements with their
environment; in The Picture of Dorian Gray one diegetic level maintains stability
“metabolically” by casting off certain narrative elements and redistributing them,
through ontological level-crossing, in another diegetic level thus maintaining a state
of textual equilibrium: “What the worm was to the corpse, his sins would be to the
painted image on the canvas. They would mar its beauty, and eat away its grace.
They would defile it, and make it shameful. And yet the thing would still live on. It
would be always alive” (Wilde 97). However, the portrait itself is not alive, though it
appears to have “a life of its own” (95), it is the metabolic and homeostatic
relationship—the strange loopiness—between these different ontological levels of
diegesis that metonymically stands in as a surrogate for the internal dynamics of the
text that signify basic biological processes.
What homeostasis suggests, however, is a complete reconsideration of the very
idea of hierarchy. The strange loop or tangled hierarchy serves as a conceptual
structure or metaphor to make understandable abstract relations that exist amongst
two topoi. At first glance, these two locales appear to be separate but, at a closer
examination, become increasingly perceptible as a complex reconfiguring whole. In
the novel one narrative activates the other narrative; both interact with one another in
a heterarchical fashion. Heterarchy is perhaps a more precise word for a tangled
hierarchy. The term makes its first appearance in the Bulletin of Mathematical
Biophysics with cyberneticist Warren McCulloch’s short 1945 paper “A Heterarchy
of Values Determined by the Topology of Nervous Nets.” What makes McCulloch’s
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term noteworthy to the study of Modernist fiction is that he offers a structure that
procures the opportunity of conceptualizing structural models with alternative
patterns of organization. The heterarchy of which McCulloch speaks is that of the
organizational structure of the human brain; in short, that the brain is not organized
hierarchically.
In the paper, McCulloch simulates choice and circularities of preference in which
a mind must choose—make a value judgment—between three ends. He begins by
mapping a hypothetical neuron circuit without any level-crossing. This results in a
hierarchical structure in which there appears an order where one end is preferred over
others. In short, “if a first is preferred to a second and a second to a third, then the
first is preferred to the third” (McCulloch 92); the substratum of this logic,
McCulloch suggests, is that this mode of analysis asserts a “hierarchy of values” (92)
and that values can be measured according to some recognizable magnitude.
McCulloch is intent to demonstrate that there is, instead, “no common scale” with
which to measure values of this kind. So, next, McCulloch offers a more complex
simulation to establish a heterarchical topology of the nervous system: “Consider the
case of three choices, A or B, B or C, and A or C in which A is preferred to B, B to C,
and C to A” (92). What is taking place in this simulation is a kind of level-crossing
not dissimilar to the narrative loopiness in Dorian Gray. While “paradoxes are all
very well in their way” (Wilde 43), McCulloch suggests, this is not paradoxical;
instead, “Circularities in preference, instead of inconsistencies, actually demonstrate
consistency of a higher order than had been dreamed of in our philosophy”
(McCulloch 93); that is, “to test Reality we must see it on the tight-rope. When the
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Verities become acrobats we can judge them” (Wilde 43). McCulloch continues: an
“organism possessed of this nervous system—six neurons—is sufficiently endowed
to be unpredictable from any theory founded on a scale of values. It has a heterarchy
of values, and is thus interconnectively too rich to submit to a summum bonum
[highest good]” (McCulloch 93). Hofstadter suggests that a heterarchical system of
this sort is a “program which has…a structure in which there is no single ‘highest
level’” (GEB 134). Verity is certainly tested on the tight-rope here, yet it also
redefines the processes of value judgment. Because of this and other reasons, the idea
of heterarchy garnered much attention in the scientific community. David Stark
writes that McCulloch’s work
led to the development of artificial networks as a new computing technology,
which, in turn, fed back to the computational modeling of the brain. His idea
of redundant network ties was important for the conception of reliable
organization built from unreliable parts, laid the basis for the new field of
“automata theory,” and contributed to the fertile concept of “selforganization.” “A Heterarchy of Values” is cited as an inspiration for nonTuring, or non-Euclidean, computing, most recently in efforts to develop
biology-based computing. (Stark 29-30)
Yet, what makes the conceptual structure of the heterarchy particularly fecund is how
it offers alternative modes of conceptualizing interrelationships of different levels in
complex systems while maintaining neutrality with regards to the status of each level.
In the humanities, speculation upon heterarchical organizational principles remains
notably sparse, though there are exceptions.
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Anthropologist Carole L. Crumley and economic sociologist David Stark give two
separate accounts of how the concept of heterarchy may be theorized in their
respective fields. In her essay, “A Dialectical Critique of Hierarchy” (1987),
Crumley offers an analysis of the underlying assumptions that govern typical
understanding of structure in state societies. As an anthropologist, she is concerned
with certain linguistic abstractions based on the binary opposition—between chaos
and order, for example—that inform and, as a result, mentally configure our
perception of social patterns of organization. Binary opposition typically lends itself
to privileging one semantic pole over the other; in short, binaries establish semantic
hierarchies predicated upon by both subjective and socially negotiated value
judgments. Crumley suggests that these hierarchical structures are deformations of
complex and abstract patterns, habitually reiterated via the repetition of metaphors.
Her analytical mode is poststructural; not only does Crumley wish to reveal the
hidden metaphysics and metaphors behind these binaries towards a kind of
denaturalization, she also offers a new conceptual structure, that of the heterarchy, as
a possible entry point into thinking differently about social levels of organization.
For Crumley, “structures are heterarchical when each element is either unranked
relative to other elements or possesses the potential for being ranked in a number of
different ways” (Crumley 158). Climate, vegetation, topography, and geology, she
suggests, are possible physical structures that may be easily studied as nonhierarchical. It is common in ecocriticism to refer to, for example, the “patchiness”
or “patterned mosaics of vegetations” found in nature (158). It is more difficult,
however, for a historian to break with the traditional metaphor regarding the Western
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European Dark Age, after the fall of the Roman Empire, as a “descent into hell”
(158). The ultimate concern of Crumley’s paper is appropriate for the study of
complex society: that “hierarchy is a controlling model in complex society” (159).
Indeed, this algorithm can quickly adapt into any variety of species: hierarchy is a
controlling model in any complex system. Heterarchy, on the other hand, is a
reconfiguring model with no highest or lowest level that operates according to
shifting level-crossing principles in complex systems.
Stark’s recent book, The Sense of Dissonance (2009), employs the concept of
heterarchy in the context of economic and organizational sociology. Here, Stark
employs heterarchy as an organizational principle that prioritizes the production of
perpetual innovation so as to remain relevant in the information age. Whether
Hungarian tool manufacturers in the 1980s, the establishment of new-media business
in New York’s Silicon Alley in the late 1990s, or amongst arbitrage traders at an
international investment bank on Wall Street—these are the three major studies with
which Stark and his colleagues engage—each profession flourished as a result of their
disregard for hierarchy. Or, the workers consulted amongst themselves for increased
success rather than with those who ranked above them in the professional hierarchy.
This heterarchical mode of organization is becoming the basis of business
organization in the late-twentieth and early twenty-first century. For Stark,
heterarchy “represents an organizational form of distributed intelligence in which
units are laterally accountable according to diverse principles of evaluation” (Stark
19). He notes two key features at play: first, “heterarchies are characterized by more
crosscutting network structures, reflecting the greater interdependences of complex
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collaboration. They are heterarchical, moreover, because there is no hierarchical
ordering of the competing evaluative principles” (19). The second feature is what he
terms the “organization of diversity enacted through the friction of competing
performance principles” (19). In short, Stark suggests that heterarchies “flatten
hierarchy.” Yet, he is careful not to simply label heterarchies nonhierarchical; rather,
such
new organizational forms are heterarchical not only because they have
flattened reporting structures but also because they are the sites of
heterogeneous systems of accounting for worth. A robust, lateral
collaboration flattens hierarchy while promoting diversity of evaluative
principles. Heterarchies are complex adaptive systems because they
interweave a multiplicity of performance principles. They are heterarchies of
worth. (25)
Beyond the leveling of value or worth based on a multi-tiered model, Stark suggests
that heterarchy may prove to be the organizational metaphor for the twenty-first
century. Finding its root in Dionysius the Areopagite’s fifth-century work, Celestial
Hierarchy—the work describes celestial and ecclesiastical hierarchy (28)—the
hierarchical model of organizational principles has simply ran its course. Stark
suggests that “as a metaphor for organization in the twenty-first century, heterarchy
has its provenance at the intersection of extraordinarily generative sciences” (31).
McCulloch’s organizational mode has remarkable applicability over a large array of
disciplines from computer science, biology, organizational analysis, and informatics.
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In the case of Wilde’s novel, hierarchy as a controlling model in the complex
relation between a model and his painted image—between a mind and a grammar—is
acutely challenged. The narrative level-crossings that structure the novel’s complex
diegesis allow the possible worlds in the novel to be simultaneously the cause and the
effect of the other. What the diegetic peculiarity of The Picture of Dorian Gray
enacts is a reconfiguration of both linguistic and spatial abstractions that allow an
interpretation of a hierarchical relationship between the individual spectator and a
work of art. This act of reconfiguration is one that makes the spatial and linguistic
abstraction of the strange loop as a conceptual structure as concrete as possible
towards the end of resituating two apparently distinct locales—mind and art—in a
tangled, non-hierarchical relation. What Wilde establishes here is a kind of narrative
structure that lends itself to alternative inferences and a kind of dissonance between
levels of narrative. “Heterarchy,” Stark writes, “is neither harmony nor cacophony
but an organized dissonance” (27). He continues:
Dissonance occurs when diverse, even antagonistic, performance principles
overlap. The manifest, or proximate, result of this rivalry is a noisy clash, as
the proponents of different conceptions of value contend with each other. The
latent consequence of this dissonance is that the diversity of value-frames
generates new combinations…Because there is not one best way or single
metric but several mutually coevolving yet not converging paths, the
organization is systemically unable to take its routines or its knowledge for
granted. (27)
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The heterarchical, strange loop conceptual structure of the novel’s narrative carries
with it a kind of indeterminacy in which processes move in all directions
simultaneously: the spectator apprehends art because he creates the art while art
apprehends the spectator because it creates the spectator. Or, nothing on behalf of the
status of a perceiver or percept can be taken for granted. Speculating upon the multileveled diegesis of the novel in terms of strange loops, tangled hierarchies, or
heterarchy is certainly valuable in that it challenges the hierarchical assumption that
holds certain diegetic levels as precious over others. If one diegetic level—say, that
of Dorian and Victorian England—is sought after as having a more concrete reality
status than that of the shifting colors and figures in the painting, it is because the
habitual process of value judgment here is that the individual is somehow in control.
Strange loops, tangled hierarchies and heterarchies, however, can be regarded as
thought modalities that rupture habitual modes of thinking. Stark writes that
heterarchy “refers to an organizational structure in which a given element…is
simultaneously expressed in multiple crosscutting networks” (31); resultantly, such
crosscutting networks disrupt linear or hierarchical modes of examining multi-leveled
narrative. This results in a kind of wishful thinking that eschews the possibility of bidirectional necessity of representation; that is, both narrative levels are mutually
coevolving simultaneously crossing and converging. That is, here there is an urge to
supplement a kind of chronology or historicity to the multi-leveled narratives as
crosscutting networks in that the painting is simply a shifting representation of
Dorian. To suggest that Dorian is also a shifting representation, effectively mucking
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about with crisp chronology, is simply too monstrous; however, this is precisely what
Wilde’s narrative enacts.
This peculiar loopiness that establishes the relationship between the two diegetic
levels of the novel ultimately demands a reconsideration regarding the operational
mode of traditional representation. For Hofstadter, a strange loop is “the lifelong
loop of a human being’s self-representation” (193); yet, by extension, a strange loop
may also be the loop of a multi-leveled narrative’s self-representation. The brain,
according to Hofstader’s model, consists of multiple levels: at its most base it is a
conglomeration of cells and chemicals; at its most complex level, the brain is an
elegant dance of symbols in which the pattern and production of semantics
continuously loops back upon itself. Furthermore, “it is almost impossible to imagine
moving down, down, down,” Hofstadter suggests, “to the neuronal level of our
brains, and slowing down, down, down, so that we can see…each and every chemical
squirting in each and every synaptic cleft” since no meaning resides at this level,
there is no “sticky semantic juice” (202). It is the higher level on which he suggests
humans must focus in order to meaningfully discuss matters of the mind. Yet, there
is something topsy-turvy about this: “we automatically,” Hofstadter remarks, “see our
brains’ activity as entirely symbolic” (196). Symbolism, being a grammatical
product, again reaffirms the difficulty of such a model: that we automatically
understand our mind with the selfsame systemic mode. This kind of
symbolism/grammar is not recognizably present. Consider Chomsky’s deep
structures: the speaker of a natural language is not immediately aware of the linguistic
and grammatical system on which any given utterance depends. Hofstadter’s
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symbolism operates in a similar way. Dorian himself becomes intrigued by the topsyturvy relation between chemicals and the non-chemical:
he found himself at first gazing at the portrait with a feeling of almost
scientific interest. That such a change should have taken place was incredible
to him. And yet it was a fact. Was there some subtle affinity between the
chemical atoms, that shaped themselves into form and colour on the canvas,
and the soul that was within him? Could it be that what the soul thought, they
realized? (Wilde 81)
Yet all these levels of symbolism may be regarded with a different, and more
accurate, terminology: rather than talking about a system that has a symbol level,
Hofstadter suggests that “we might instead say, ‘it is a representational system’” (The
Mind’s I 192). What Hofstadter means by representational system here is “an active,
self-updating collection of structures organized to ‘mirror’ the world as it evolves”
(192). Self-regulating and dynamic, a representational system is distinguished from
traditional mimesis in that the latter does not mutate in regard to that which it
represents but is rather a static and passive pattern; in short, representational systems
operate much the same as Maturana’s autopoesis. Hofstadter notes that “a painting,
no matter how representational, would thus be excluded, since it is static” (192). Of
course, the portrait in Wilde’s novel is a notable exception in that it indeed is a
representational system: what the soul thinks, the canvas realizes.
The activity of a system “mirroring” the world as it adapts begs whether the mirror
itself is a site of mimesis or systemic representation. There resides a further
complication in this logic: if the feedback loop between language and mind is a
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kinetic pattern that results in self-reference and the concept of “I,” should not this
movement also create a kind of simulation of conscious self-reference in non-living
feedback loops? Hofstadter remarks that an electronic feedback system, such as
video feedback, “no matter how swirly or intricate or deeply nested...no matter how
many pixels or colors it has, develops no symbols at all, because a video system does
not perceive anything. Nowhere along the cyclic pathway of a video loop are there
any symbols to be triggered—no concepts, no categories, no meanings—not a tad
more than in the shrill screech of an audio feedback loop” (I Am a Strange Loop 203).
Consider Hofstadter’s self-referential sentences: “I am simultaneously writing and
being written,” “I am going two-level with you,” and “I am the meaning of this
sentence.” Such sentences in themselves may simulate a nonliving conceptual logic
that unsettlingly wiggles about stable understanding; Wilde’s novel, a structural
analogue to these sentences, rehearses a kind of monstrous narrative logic that will
simply not sit still. What makes the brain able to develop an “I” and not an electronic
feedback loop such as video feedback, is that the brain is able to think via selfperception. Yet, at the higher levels of the mind in which we automatically perceive,
we think with and through symbols. The cause (the mind) of perception follows the
effect (language); in other words, the problem is where the ability to think and
perceive resides, or in language itself which must be activated and semantically
infused by the mind. Once Dorian has gone “two-level”—“the terrible pleasure of a
double life” (Wilde 134)—we recognize this problem of the conceptual locale of a
kind of monstrous narrative animation. Dorian acts and perceives; this is what largely
propels the plot. Yet, his perceptual, psychological, and physical experience
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accumulates in another diegetic locale. In short, these two diegetic spaces, at once
distinct, are intertwined in a kind of immanent loopy whole as a homeostatic
representational system. In this sense, Dorian’s relationship with the painting enacts
in fantastical terms the human relationship with, and is indistinguishable from,
systems of representation. To smash the self-reflecting mirrors and jar the feedback
loop—to deny the materiality of the mind from the grammar of representational
system—leads only to the abyss, non-system, Dorian’s death, absolute nonrepresentation. Or, as Basil remarks, “there is a fatality about all physical and
intellectual distinction” (Wilde 19).
Hofstadter notes two reasons why a mirror itself cannot be a representational
system. First, like a static painting, a mirror cannot make any distinction between
reflections of differing objects; that is, a mirror reflects “the universe, but sees no
categories” (The Mind’s I 192). A mirror simply reflects one image, the
differentiation and categorization of objects from that image can be said to take place
in an individual who perceives those object distinctions; simply, a mirror is not an
“active, self-updating collection of structures” (192), instead it is a reflecting surface.
Secondly, the reflection or image upon the surface of the mirror is not an
“autonomous structure with its own ‘life’” (192). The reflection depends entirely
upon the external world. If the mirror is denied a light source, the reflection ceases to
exist. Just as Wilde’s portrait is a challenge to the static mimetic property of painting,
so is his mirror/portrait a challenge to the impossibility of a reflection as an
autonomous structure. Even as Dorian draws “a large screen right in front of the
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portrait, shuddering as he glanced at it” (Wilde 79), the portrait proceeds as a
representational system, it would be always alive.
In this function, there is no passing through the looking glass into a fantastical
fiction; rather, two looking glasses—Dorian/mind and the painting/language—are set
facing one another, dynamically reflecting and establishing one another while
simultaneously generating the image of infinitely recursive spiral corridors. The
reflection that these two surfaces provide for and of one another is, in a sense, a kind
of an ostensive or recursive definition; that is, it appears to be the case that language
and mind are being defined in terms of language and mind. Hofstadter remarks that
this phenomenon is, however, not necessarily a case of paradoxical circular logic and
infinite regress. “A recursive definition (when properly formulated),” argues
Hofstadter, “never leads to infinite regress or paradox. This is because a recursive
definition never defines something in terms of itself, but always in terms of simpler
versions of itself” (GEB 127). Language is made up of levels of grammar and
linguistic procedures, the body of cells and chemical processes; likewise, Dorian’s
portrait is an aggregate of color, line, and shape while Dorian the man is, at least on
his diegetic level, presumably a body made up of tissues, fluids, and squirting
chemicals. Yet, in the loopy organizational principles that constitute the novel’s
narrative both the portrait and the body are dynamic representations of one another.
A representational system being a dynamic and self-updating proxy—a simpler
version—of its referent, while simultaneously being constituted by that mutating
system which is signified. At the higher level of self-representation via a
representational system one finds that no matter how far one goes down the corridor
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of spiraling reflections, one is inevitably back at the point of departure: the looking
glass of language and the mind, between Dorian and the picture, is everywhere and
nowhere; that is, ambient and anesthetized.
All this complicates the discussion regarding Dorian’s narcissism, a discussion
largely dominated by psychoanalysis and stemming from Freud’s foundational 1914
paper “On Narcissism: An Introduction.” Marshall McLuhan’s discussion of the
Grecian Narcissus story offers an alternative interpretation that is more explicitly
concerned with homeostasis, level-transfer, and self-regulating dynamics. The word
Narcissus, he notes, is from the Greek word “narcosis, or numbness” (McLuhan 63).
McLuhan is pointing attention to the common misrepresentation of the Narcissus
story in which Narcissus is said to have fallen in love with himself by admiring his
own reflection in the water. Indeed, it is this focus on the idea and activity of vanity
which plays out in some ways between Dorian and his portrait. But the fact of human
experience that constitutes Dorian’s engagement in the novel is that which is at the
centre of the myth: narcosis and numbness. The tale of Narcissus, like Wilde’s
novel, is not one primarily concerned with vanity. Indeed, Narcissus, in seeing his
own reflection, took this image to be another person. This reflection is, for McLuhan,
a medium, an extension; the reflected image effectively numbed Narcissus’
perceptions until he “became the servomechanism of his own extended or repeated
image” (63). Now, Narcissus can no longer hear the voice of Echo because he, by
becoming servile to the medium (his reflection), is anesthetized. Adapting to this
extension of himself, Narcissus becomes a closed system. In other words, the
reflection as a medium/technology becomes an extension of his body, he adapts and
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mutates in the way he experiences his own body and his environment as a result of his
extension; Narcissus is numb because his experience of his own body is transferred
into the reflected image. Because the transfer between body and extension in this
myth is complete, Narcissus becomes completely anesthetized: this act of transfer and
level-crossing maintains the equilibrium within the closed system: “Art has no
influence on action. It annihilates the desire to act. It is superbly sterile” (Wilde
163). Any extension of the body, for McLuhan, can be regarded as a kind of
“autoamputation” (McLuhan 63). Like Narcissus, whose mind and senses are
numbed through their extension and reconfiguration as alternative levels of
organization, Dorian “watched with listless eyes the sordid shame of the great city,
and now and then he repeated to himself the words...‘To cure the soul by means of
the senses, and the senses by means of the soul.’ Yes, that was the secret. He had
often tried it, and would try it again now. There were opium-dens, where one could
buy oblivion” (Wilde 140). So, in this sense, Narcissus amputates his whole body
and Dorian seeks oblivion by being transferred completely to the extension; yet, the
extension itself is entirely dependent upon the body. The story of Narcissus and his
narcosis is, then, about human fascination with new extensions of human wetware. It
is also a meditation upon art and mind as self-updating and dynamic systems of
representation.
“When Dorian Gray,” writes Christopher Craft, “stands before his portrait, therein
to consider both himself and his difference from himself, he requires a prosthesis”
(Craft 109). A response to absolute autoamputation, the prosthetic in question here is
that of a complete double of Dorian’s body. The prosthesis Dorian requires is, Craft
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writes, “so familiar it hardly seems like one. Dorian requires a mirror” (109). Craft
analyses the significance of two mirrors—that of mirrors proper and the portrait—
since this dipartite reflection is the only way Dorian can place his enduring beauty
and developing monstrousness in contradistinction. The “Gothic technology” (114)
or medium that Wilde implements here, that of a supernatural mirror/portrait, is for
Craft a formal meditation upon the alienation-effects experienced by the individual
when encountering his own reflection. Like McLuhan’s Narcissus, Craft comments
on Dorian’s “silent delirium” (114) upon his first encounter with Basil’s painting.
Craft’s Dorian is an exemplar of Lacanian psychoanalysis: while “Wilde insists that
disclosive moments of self-recognition entail a complex semiotic interchange
between the one who apprehends himself in an image and the visual image that has
already apprehended the ‘same’ him over there” (113). However, Wilde insists, Craft
adds, on focusing extensive attention upon the “visual technology [the portrait, rather
than Dorian the character] that generates the flux (and reflux) of information” (113).
Furthermore, this logic of flux and reflux places a marked emphasis upon, not simply
the technology or the character, but upon the loopy dynamics of reflection. “As that
‘most magical of mirrors,’” Craft suggests,
the portrait effectively conjoins Wilde’s lazy gothic plot with the formal
dynamics of self-regard. This, in turn, enables Wilde to map the saturated,
irreal space that intervenes between a self-apprehending subject and the
mimetic apparatus that returns this subject to himself, but always in the guise
of objectal or phantasmal other. (114)
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A viewing subject when reflected in a mirror may, according to the circular
momentum of reflection, return from the reflection to where one began. However,
upon this return the viewing subject is not the same as where one began. Beginning
as a complete and present human being, the viewing subject returns from the
reflection as an “image-being devoid of precisely this presence” (110). The
complication of Narcissism is that it simultaneously provides an image of the viewing
subject and all that the viewing subject is not. In short, as Manganiello suggests,
Narcissism “distorts as it reflects” (Manganiello 31). The return effect establishes an
illusion of unity yet simultaneously provides processes of “perpetual disintegration”
(Craft 110). In short, this complex process of spatio-temporal dislocation between the
subject and the image of the other—the reflection or imago—results in alienation.
Such a reading brilliantly engages with concerns of the subject and an “erotics of selfidentification” (114); however, if speculating upon the loopy possibilities of multidiegetic level-crossing from the perspective of narrative systemics, the logic of selfreference operates somewhat differently. That is, while Lacanian identification with
the imago leads to alienation and the “perpetual disintegration” of the subject,
Hofstadter’s heterarchical strange loops do, indeed, bring one back precisely to one’s
departure. That is, rather than analyzing the misidentification between two spatiotemporal topoi, the multi-leveled diegesis of the novel upsets the habitual assumption
regarding the directionality and temporality that link two locales by effectively
making these apparent opposites a single unit. Certainly, Gothic doubling and the
complication of the viewing subject with the other occurs time and again in the novel;
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however, this case of the uncanny also takes place on the level of narrative itself via
the logical monstrosity constituting the loopy structure of the novel.
The monstrosity of the novel’s structural diegetic paradox, between maker and
artifact, individual and object, is an instance of familiarity and the strange. “From the
moment he speaks of his desire” McCormack suggests, “Dorian himself becomes an
artefact, neither alive nor dead: one of the fabulous undead, such as Dracula, who
must draw life from others” (113). But Dorian’s victims are not only the obvious
ones—the scandalous events beyond the periphery of the plot—but that of another
diegetic level: the painting takes from Dorian, and thus gives to Dorian. Dorian takes
from the painting, and thus gives to the painting. The economy here is homeostatic.
Again anesthesia: “Dorian anaesthesises himself with things,” McCormack writes,
“inventing himself by means of his own collections. His relationship with himself, as
with others, is dictated by an object; but which Dorian is now the artefact?” That is, a
doppelgänger without a primal individual of whom to copy; or, two doppelgangers,
like mirrors, reflecting one another, multiplying to infinity. Declan Kiberd suggests
that “the self and the doppelgänger have the makings of a whole person” (Kiberd
292), and, so it seems, the novel supports this claim fully both as it is and in its
reverse.
Freud’s “The Uncanny” is a fascinating piece largely because it does not succeed
in satisfying the reader’s expectation for a precise definition of the “conceptual term”
(Freud 930), uncanny, while simultaneously establishing a semantic and structural
matrix which justifies this failure. A peculiar aspect of the work is the implication of
the first of the three parts of Freud’s essay: the denotative and etymological
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elucidation of the strange relationship between the words heimlich and unheimlich.
Heimlich denotes both one thing and its opposite; if we follow this logic, the
morphological negation of that word, unheimlich, establishes an oscillating semantic
relationship between these two terms. This semantic matrix governing the complex
logic of the essay’s subject functions metonymically establishing the ambivalent
relationship between the three divisions of Freud’s essay. In other words, the
inherent conceptual instability of the subject of Freud’s essay—the uncanny—
establishes, and becomes part of, the form. Indeed, Freud, like Basil, projects the
content “into some gracious form, and [lets] it tarry there for a moment” (Wilde 41).
While Freud purports to describe “the uncanny” in the psychoanalytic experience, he
rather succeeds in representing it in the structure of his analysis.
The etymological examination that opens Freud’s analysis is, not only fascinating
in itself, but also leads to a conclusion that is remarkable in that it is innately
inconclusive. Freud’s investigation into the word heimlich in Daniel Sanders’
Wörterbuch der Deutschen Sprache introduces the reader to the inbuilt strangeness of
the term. While, Freud demonstrates, heimlich denotes “belonging to the house, not
strange, familiar, tame, intimate, friendly” (931), its secondary definition is,
“Concealed, kept from sight, so that others do not get to know of or about it, withheld
from others” (Freud 933). Freud concludes:
What interests us most…is to find that among its different shades of meaning
the word ‘heimlich’ exhibits one which is identical with its opposite,
‘unheimlich.’ What is heimlich thus comes to be unheimlich…In general we
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are reminded that the word ‘heimlich’ is not unambiguous, but belongs to two
sets of ideas, which, without being contradictory, are yet very different. (933)
Freud links this strange etymological relationship with the psychoanalytic experience
through Schelling’s suggestion that “everything is unheimlich that ought to have
remained secret and hidden but has come to light” (934) and is the pressing anxiety
that forces Dorian to keep the portrait “hidden away at all costs” (Wilde 96) while, at
the same time,
Creep upstairs to the locked room, open the door with the key that never left
him now, and stand, with a mirror, in front of the portrait that Basil Hallward
had painted of him, looking now at the evil and ageing face on the canvas, and
now at the fair young face that laughed back at him from the polished glass.
The very sharpness of the contrast used to quicken his sense of pleasure. He
grew more and more enamoured by his own beauty, more and more interested
in the corruption of his own soul. (102-103)
That is, the uncanny, for Freud, supports the psychoanalytic theory regarding the
return of the repressed, while, for Wilde, the uncanny supports the strange loop
structure of multi-diegetic haunting.
Psychoanalytic concerns aside, however, it is the complex relationship between
the content and structure of Freud’s essay that is of immediate interest. If the knotted
relationship between the two words, as Freud suggests, is as follows: “heimlich is a
word the meaning of which develops in the direction of ambivalence, until it finally
coincides with its opposite, unheimlich” (Freud 934) then it is precisely the unsettling
semantic implication of this ambivalent logic that both establishes and constitutes the
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structure of the rest of the analysis. The form of Freud’s argument, though the whole
is framed within “the specialist literature of aesthetics” (930), is tripartite: a thorough
etymological study of the word unheimlich, a psychoanalytic reading of Hoffmann’s
story “The Sandman,” and finally a differentiation “between the uncanny that we
actually experience and the uncanny that we merely picture or read about” (948).
What is striking about the latter two parts of the essay—Freud’s reading of
Hoffmann’s story and the incongruity between the aesthetic uncanny and the uncanny
of actual experience—is that these sections do not seem to follow the etymological
study by means of causal logic.
Rather, these arguments are more like permutated variations upon the significance
of the term; in other words, variations on a concept that do not tell the reader anything
new about “the uncanny” but, instead, become—more akin to Wilde’s narrative
structure than to the three works he examines—a specialist literature of aesthetics
itself. The logical relationship between these three sections seems hidden from the
reader, yet all three divisions of the argument simultaneously reveal the unsettling
nature of attempting to deal with the concept. The implications of the uncanny build
in intensity by having the term loop back upon itself. Becoming self-updating
reflections of itself, the argument operates by forcing the reader to ask “which
uncanny?” much in the same way the reader of Wilde’s novel is constantly asking
“which Dorian? The one who is pouring out tea for us, or the one in the picture?”
(Wilde 36). But never is the concept brought to rest in a stable and conclusive way.
If the meaning of heimlich “develops in the direction of ambivalence” until it is
indistinguishable from unheimlich, the same process must apply if we begin with
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unheimlich. In this sense, the subject of the essay is absolutely ambivalent and is
therefore a convenient metonymy to justify the disjointed and inelegant structure of
Freud’s argument. And what becomes even more captivating about this essay is the
way in which both the conceptual term and the constituted structure of the essay
simultaneously both peak, like Wilde’s narrative, in a state of homeostasis and of
reflexivity.
The denotative ambiguity of the word heimlich suggests that its meaning, like the
structural narrative peculiarity of Wilde’s novel, can be examined as being in a state
of semantic homeostasis. In other words, there is a tendency in the semantics of this
term to gesture toward a complex kind of stability through constant oscillation and
feedback between its two conflicting meanings. The term attempts an internal
equilibrium despite the fact that it is in a state of constant conceptual reorganization.
Heimlich may be used to signify one of either two opposing signifiers, yet this
internal semantic structure of the word asserts that it covertly constitutes both one
thing and its opposite. To think about this logic as metonymic for the form of Freud’s
essay is of particular interest: that the denotation of the term uncanny is subject to two
ambiguous meanings simultaneously thereby demanding a structural analysis
appropriate in representing this strange phenomenon. Again, like the metonymical
strange loop structure of Wilde’s novel, Freud’s mode of writing seems “to be able to
give a plastic form to formless things” (Wilde 30).
Homeostasis, however, as a metaphor for the function of the word heimlich is not
entirely satisfactory on its own. It is to what homeostasis gives rise which is critical
in understanding the metonymic function of the term in relation to the essay structure
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as a whole and that is particularly intriguing; that is, self-reference. In this sense, the
constantly oscillating logic of the relationship between the conceptual terms heimlich
an unheimlich is used by Freud to generate a representational system, yet also
becomes representative of both part and the whole of the argument. The intriguing
status of heimlich and unheimlich in Freud’s paper, consequently, functions as an
indicator of how the overall analysis operates. In other words, the metonymic
function of the etymological study establishes preexisting conditions of vertiginous
logic which, in turn, generates those logical conditions for the foundation structuring
the essay.
If the conceptual term, heimlich, is inherently semantically ambivalent, then any
formal investigation into it is subject to representing a similar effect. Freud attempts
to explain the uncanny in terms of the psychoanalytic experience, Wilde in terms of
an aesthetic experience; yet in some ways both seem to, rather than describe the
concept, represent it in both the structure and content of their respective works. It is
in this sense that Freud’s essay itself is uncanny; in the same way, this is the
structural logic, as much as the content itself, that makes Wilde’s novel an essentially
uncanny experience. If “The Uncanny” seems to provide an unsettling—even
unsatisfactory—study that is more akin to variations and permutations on an
ambivalent conceptual theme than a formal argument proceeding by logical
consequence, this is perhaps the brilliant point of both Freud’s essay and Wilde’s two
Dorians. Perhaps, however, Hofstadter and McCulloch are correct to remark that
strange loops and heterarchy are indeed pertinent models of that structure which
constitutes the processes of the reader’s own mind; in this sense, the reader
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experiences the structure governing his or her own mind embedded within narrative
forms of this kind. This is why a narrative of this form “has a life of its own” (Wilde
95); it mimics autopoetically as a representational system and becomes the invented
hyperreal extension of the structural peculiarity of a mind itself. A strange loop is
strange because it is the quasi-perceptible, quasi-familiar structure of the mind itself;
the “idea [is] monstrous” (121).
Needless to say, like the portrait, the text itself is not an organism; however, the
quirky structural apparatus governing the relationship between the multiple levels of
diegesis in the novel does share some similarities with the most basic functions of a
life form. Constantly fluxing and reorganizing itself through internal textual
dynamics, the multi-leveled diegesis of Wilde’s novel, as it is governed by the
topographical conceptualization of the strange loop, paradoxically maintains and
equalizes itself. The multiple ontological levels of diegesis, through the strange logic,
refuse to remain stable and fixed—rather, the textual aggregate consists of an evermoving tangled hierarchy in which any diegetic locale paradoxically occupies the
same textual space as an alternative narrative space. These features may constitute
the rules—the aesthetic principles and regulations—behind the “elite or occult game”
through which Wilde animates the multi-diegetic contexture of his novel. Indeed,
perhaps Borges is eloquent in describing Wilde as a laborious monstrorum artifex.
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Chapter Two

“Something Profoundly Intimate”: The Reader as Time,
Heidegger, and Virginia Woolf’s To the Lighthouse

___________________________
Poetry, as the institution of Being, is the grounding manifestation of intimacy.
-Martin Heidegger
Life can only be understood backwards; but it must be lived forwards.
-Søren Kierkegaard
The sentences you are reading seem to have the job of dissolving more than of indicating…this is why
the author piles supposition on supposition in long paragraphs without dialogue, a thick, opaque layer
of lead where I may pass unnoticed, disappear.
-Italo Calvino

In this chapter, I evaluate Virginia Woolf’s To the Lighthouse (1927) amidst an
assemblage of Martin Heidegger’s early speculations on the temporality of being. It
is Heidegger who “unearthed and examined the metaphysical roots of being,” notes
Heidi Storl, while “Woolf illustrated the nature and implications of being” (Storl
303). Heidegger’s project is massive; the focus of this chapter, however, is on
temporality. For Heidegger, time is a fundamental quality of being, while for Woolf
time is an essential aesthetic mode that observes the temporal metamorphoses that
make daily experience possible. The amalgamation of these two conceits permits for
an intense, yet strange, intimacy for the act of reading Woolf’s To the Lighthouse.
Indeed, this process is indicative of a psycho-ecological reading. The novel is famous
for offering insight into the author’s life experience and yet it is the author’s life that
sets such poesis in motion. In her 1932 essay, “How Should One Read a Book?,”
Woolf asks the following question: “We can watch the famous dead in their familiar
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habits and fancy sometimes that we are very close and can surprise their
secrets…How far, we must ask ourselves, is a book influenced by its writer’s life?”
With the very act of reading To the Lighthouse, the reader extends an affective
physicality into the text and becomes an organic activator, that which moves and
animates language. One does not decode Woolf, rather one encodes and is encoded,
experiencing the past and the future, temporality itself. This extension makes
manifest Heidegger’s claim that being is temporality. Here, the reader becomes
primum movens and circulus vitiosus simultaneously by acting as the sole agent
galvanizing the novel without significant impetus from the diegetic level of
character.4 The intense intimacy of this kind of activity lies in the ontological merger
of reader and text. The reader energizes the text thus agitating a kind of interpretive
and semantic movement while the text animates the reader by making manifest the
immanence of diegetic boundaries yet simultaneously enacting and defining these
narrative limits. Or, “a thing must offer itself to our representation if our
representation is to conform to it,” writes Christopher Fynsk (Fynsk 146). From such
a formulation, To the Lighthouse informs the reader in time and transforms the reader
as time, an act of reading as movement and change, of backwards and forwards
chronological movement, of loops and knots. How far, we must ask ourselves more
urgently, is a book influenced by—and, as language, an a priori influence upon—its
reader’s lived experience including the possible configurations that extend, and loop
back, as the reader’s future.

4

This is intensified in “Time Passes” where the diegetic level of the novel and the traditional role of
character is abstract.
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As the diegetic in-between of a tripartite narrative configuration, “Time Passes”
operates as a kind of ecstatic extension: that which crosses the diegetic level
perpetuated from the interiorization of the level of character and setting towards that
which proceeds via processes of change and movement without agential intervention.
This diegetic displacement is at once one of expansion and implosion. Borges notes
this tendency in Woolf’s fiction as early as Jacob’s Room (1922), where “there is no
plot, in the narrative sense of the word; the subject is a man’s character, studied not in
the man himself, but indirectly in the objects and people around him” (Borges 173174). Borges aptly notes that this effect is intensified in To the Lighthouse: the novel
“depicts a few hours in several peoples’ lives, so that in those hours we see their past
and future” (175). Moving away from the narrative level of, say, Mrs. Ramsay or the
lighthouse as an architectural object, the diegetic locus of “Time Passes” moves
beyond the realm of phenomenal everydayness into a kind of account by an
unknowable narrator. This movement metonymically acts as the compression of
movement, change, and eventful pulsation; or, a narrator that is temporality itself, that
thing that is “around,” operates as the quality that constitutes pasts and futures.
Movement from one narrative level to another is not only a radical change in
perspective, but a negation of the locus of perspective through the demonstration of
motion and change as both the content and the affect of “Time Passes.” Here, “Time
Passes” fulfills the role of change and transformation in the text and it radiates both
forward and backwards: such temporal logic arrives at and enlaces the novel as a
whole. The movement towards exteriorization and transcendence as the diegetic
gesture of the novel proves limited; the section’s epistemological and ontological
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depersonalization—that is, time as narrator and narrator as temporality—ultimately
lends itself to a more intimate engagement with the text on behalf of the extradiegetic reader.
In dealing with these processes, the novel is saturated with philosophical musing
both satirical and profound. That is, somewhat caustically, Mr. Ramsay remarks that
“Z is only reached once by one man in a generation” (39); unlike Mr. Ramsay,
however, Heidegger is a man who reaches Z likely because the latter does not
consider knowledge as linear as an alphabet, but rather as that which constellates
around a central abyss, a position more akin to Woolf’s: “‘What am I?’ ‘What is
this?’ and suddenly an answer was vouchsafed them (what it was they could not say)”
(Woolf 143). In this sense, the manner in which the reader may prove to be the
source of this motion and change in the novel is complex and finds a fruitful
examination in Heidegger’s existential phenomenology. In the same year Woolf’s
novel appeared, Heidegger published the paradigm shifting Being and Time (1927).
Storl remarks that the publication of these two masterworks in the same year—and
that they share some remarkable conceptual qualities—is not necessarily surprising:
Both writers were reacting to the commitments and costs of modernity: the
separation of subject and object that enabled the rise of scientific materialism
and various forms of philosophical realism, yet at the same time caused the
formation of an ever-deepening normative void. A clarification of the
presuppositions underlying the modern understanding of human being and
doing served as a focal point for Heidegger and Woolfs’ respective writings.
(Storl 303)
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That said, Heidegger’s intellectual lineage differs from that of Woolf.5 Equally
indebted to Kierkegaard’s existentialism as it is to the phenomenology of Heidegger’s
teacher, Husserl,6 Being and Time urges a shift from objects of knowledge to the
question of being. In a sense, Heidegger makes a major move from knowledge, or
that which we know, to the modes and motions that underlie the possibility of
knowledge; that is, his work shifts philosophical focus to thought itself as the very
pathway to the question of being. Much of the stylistic difficulty of Heidegger’s text
is in the manner through which it enacts his philosophical gesture by establishing
something akin to a new vocabulary through grammatical innovation. Rarely does
the inquiry stand still; rarer is the emergence of conclusive statements. The mode of
enquiry is intensely conflated with the subject of enquiry: argument and thought
situated in opposition to logical immutability. All is in a process of becoming; all is
in various modes of motion and change. Like Woolf’s fiction, Heidegger’s
philosophy is “about” knowledge insomuch as it is “around” knowledge: that which
patterns via circumscription. In this sense, Being and Time, by its style and subject
matter as we will see, situates itself temporally.

5

Borges sums up Woolf’s education eloquently: “From infancy, she was raised not to speak if she had
nothing to say. She was never sent to school, but her domestic training included study in Greek.
Sundays at the house were crowded: Meredith, Ruskin, Stevenson, John Morley, Gosse, and Hardy
were all frequently in attendance” (Borges 173). For more extensive discussion on Woolf’s biography,
see Quentin Bell’s Virginia Woolf: A Biography, 2 Vols. (1972); Julia Briggs’ Virginia Woolf: An
Inner Life (2005); Hermione Lee’s Virginia Woolf (1996); and Panthea Reid’s Art and Affection: A
Life of Virginia Woolf (1996).
6
Despite its severity, Heidegger’s infamous association with the Nazis will not be discussed here.
However, regarding the complexities of judging Heidegger’s political affiliations, Paul Virilio, in
conversation with Sylvère Lotringer, sums us this contentious issue accurately and eloquently:
“Caravaggio was a murderer, and this didn’t prevent him from being a great painter. You can be a
great philosopher and a real bastard too” (Virilio Pure War 234). For more on this debate, see The
Heidegger Controversy: A Critical Reader (1991), ed. Richard Wolin. Also, see Martin Heidegger’s
“Only a God Can Save Us”: The Spiegel Interview (1966) in Heidegger: The Man and the Thinker. Ed.
T. Sheenan. Chicago: Precedent, 1981. Print. 45-67.
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Critics identify much of the connection between thought, perception, and time in
Woolf’s writing through the lens of Henri Bergson. Indeed, Woolf’s distinction
between everyday modalities of experience and those moments of epiphanic
consciousness is perhaps more indicative of Bergson’s influence on modernist critics
than on Woolf herself;7 “Virginia Woolf,” writes James Hafley, “evidently never read
Bergson” (Hafley 174).8 With the existential phenomenology of Heidegger, the mind
“does not and cannot exist without its world, for the intelligibility of the world is its
essential feature. Thus it requires neither proof of nor bridge to the outer world
because it has no inner-outer dichotomy to start with” (Auyang 82); indeed, Kathleen
Wider writes that “Heidegger uses the German term Befindlichkeit, which is often
translated as “the state of mind in which one may be found,” although some scholars9
prefer to translate the German as ‘affectivity’ to avoid the connotation that a mood is
a characteristic of a disembodied mind, since Heidegger rejects such a Cartesian
view” (Wider 67-68). While Bergson is also in opposition to the “common cause
against that fluidity out there” (Woolf 106), he felt more specifically that
mathematicians had deformed the continuity of time by separating it into individual
pulsations or units, by giving a spatial conceptualization to time. For Bergson, time is
not a series of pulsations as moments, but instead he uses the concept of “duration” to
denote a flow of temporal indivisibility, of interpenetrating memories and
experiences. Bergson considered his mode of thought a “true empiricism” (Bergson
7

See Goldman, Kumar, Hafley
Hafley continues, “If she did not read Bergson himself, she must certainly have read Proust; and
Bergson’s ideas were so polular as to be everywhere around her at second and third hand” (Hafley
174). Of course, this is no stain upon these readings; Woolf did not read Heidegger.
9
See Eugene Francis Kaelin’s Heidegger’s Being and Time: A Reading for Readers (1988) and
Graeme Nicholson’s “Ecstatic Temporality in Sein Und Zeit.” in A Companion to Martin Heidegger’s
“Being and Time.” ed. Joseph J. Kockelmans (1986).
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The Creative Mind 175), and thus his thought may remind us of the instance of the
“table when you’re not there” (Woolf 28). Bergson’s empiricism is, however, distinct
from that of the Enlightenment project. As one more concerned with becoming,
metamorphosis, memory, the irrational, Bergson focuses upon experience and change
rather than rationality to establish the timbre of his enquiry. For Bergson, both the
intuitions of space and time were fundamentally different (a critique of Kant’s
stance10 that both are experienced as a priori qualities). Space, for Bergson, qualifies
and quantifies rationality; its conceptual and geometric shape can undergo the
autopsies and disassemblies of the natural sciences without losing the essential
qualities of the whole. Time, on the other hand, “is becoming and living
duration…Time, according to Bergson, is not accessible to rationality, Rationality
dissects, divides, counts and measure. Time as the realm of novelty and creation, of
the unique and the irreversible, of unbroken flow is not amenable to such
division…becoming was accessible only as a lived reality” (Adam 55-56), that which
needs to be intuited by everyday familiarities rather than by scientific analysis.
Gillian Beer writes that “Woolf’s preoccupations chimed in with those physicists who
emphasized the universe as waves, the porousness of matter…Yet is that abstracted
insubstantial world enough for a novelist? How to find and sustain story? emotion?
ordinary living without falling into the realist trap?” (Beer 118). Ann Banfield, in
The Phantom Table (2000), discusses the formalism of G.E. Moore and Bertrand
Russell as having a major influence upon the Bloomsbury aesthetic, thus establishing
10

For Kant, space and time are subjective experiences at the level of an individual’s sensory cognitive
faculties rather than objective realities. That is, space and time are phenomena rather than noumena:
tools organized and categorized by language towards the end of systematizing and arranging sensory
experience but not things-in-themselves. Space and time are, then, categorical means of making sense
of the raw data of sensory experience.
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Woolf’s fiction as informed by Cambridge philosophy in addition to the more
traditional claims for the influence of the aesthetic formalism of Roger Fry and Clive
Bell.11 Here, she comments on Russell’s critique of Bergson’s indivisible flow of
time on the grounds that “Bergson’s objections that physical, spatialized time fails to
explain how time passes…show a misunderstanding of the theory of continuity”
(Banfield 102). Banfield is certainly correct, and The Phantom Table is the strongest
study currently available that extends the discussion beyond the critical bias towards a
Bergsonian interpretation of modernist conceptualization of time in Woolf’s fiction.
“For Russell,” Banfield writes, “the experience of continuity is ‘easier to feel than to
define’” (102); and it is here that we pickpocket Russell and more or less leave him
behind.12 Time here, is indivisible, not from Bergson’s spatialization, but from being.
So, with this examination, we are concerned with both epistemology and ontology.
“Whence comes the perspective’s subjectivity if not from the subject?” asks Banfield,
“The answer is from its geometry. It is first of all bounded, its limits dividing it
absolutely from all others, creating thereby an outside and an inside. Without, its
boundaries form a circumference” (Banfield The Phantom Table 75). While Russell
suggests that the combination of temporality to spatiality of perspective as a modern
amendment of Leibniz’ monadism, his logic implicitly denies the loopy relation, the
hierarchy defying knots, that irrationalize the inside from the outside. From this,
Russell notes in Human Knowledge that “not only is a man private from other people,
11

See Jane Goldman’s “Modernist Studies” in Palvrage Advances in Virginia Woolf Studies (2007) ed.
Anna Snaith; Frank Gloversmith’s “Autonomy Theory: Ortega, Roger Fry, Virginia Woolf” in The
Theory of Reading (1984); Brani Koppen’s “Embodied Form: Art and Life in Virginia Woolf’s To the
Lighthouse” in New Literary History: A journal of Theory and Interpretation (2001); Allen
McLauren’s Virginia Woolf: The Echoes Enslaved (1973); John Hawkley Roberts’ “Vision and Design
in Virginia Woolf” in PMLA 61 (1946); and Marianna Torgovnick’s The Visual Arts, Pictorialism,
and the Novel: James, Lawrence, and Woolf (1985).
12
Perhaps for the best, since Russell is famously uncomfortable with paradox.
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but he is also private from his past and future selves” (Russell qtd. in Banfield The
Phantom Table 76). In our reading, however, we wish to unveil how To the
Lighthouse makes explicit the connection between ontological temporality and
existential locality. Existential philosophy concedes that there is no inside-outside
dichotomy; “Heidegger abolished the whole Cartesian scheme with its wordless
subject inside and unintelligible things outside” writes Sunny Y. Auyang. “He
scorned the notion of a mind inside the ‘cabinet of consciousness’ and refused even to
talk about consciousness, which he took to be something hiding inside” (Auyang 81).
Furthermore, Emily Dalgarno identifies “Time Passes” as a section of the book that
addresses the philosophical chances in the discussion of the nature of perception; she
aptly notes that the language of “Time Passes” is evocative of a formulation made by
Maurice Merleau-Ponty in The Visible and the Invisible:
Today we no longer believe nature to be a continuous system…a fortiori we
are far removed from thinking that the islets of “psychism” that float over it
are secretly connected to one another through the continuous ground of nature.
We have then imposed upon us the task of understanding whether, and in what
sense, what is not nature forms a “world,” and first what a “world” is, and
finally, if world there is, what can be the relations between the visible world
and the invisible world. (Merleau-Ponty 27)
Time is felt, and this affective experience is at the heart of one’s responsibility to
define, not the constitutive quality of time itself, but one’s potentiality in everyday
life. Here we see that Merleau-Ponty, writing after Heidegger, agrees with Russell on
the point of rejecting the continuity of nature. For Merleau-Ponty, Heidegger, and
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Woolf—but not Russell—we are pressed to experience the intimate affectivity of
ourselves in a world that is not nature. “There is no inner man,” writes MerleauPonty, “man is in the world, and only in the world does he know himself” (MerleauPonty xi). For Heidegger, as we will see, experience is not private. “Being open to
the world is the essential and most obvious characteristic of our mentality,” notes
Auyang: “It is impossible to characterize mental properties adequately without
invoking the world with which our mind is inextricably concerned. This is
Heidegger’s point” (Auyang 82). Rather than understanding experience as an
immediate matter, Heidegger suggests that experience is formulated both from the
past and the future self. Yet each temporal locale is embedded in a kind of tangle that
denotes something more akin to lived affectivity for the simultaneity of existential
inheritance and the possibility of futurity. In 1925, perhaps as a will to establish or
revisit a literary form capable of expressing such complexities of experience, Woolf
writes: “I will invent a new name for my books to supplant ‘novel.’ A new _____ by
Virginia Woolf. But what? Elegy?” (Woolf The Diary of Virginia Woolf 34).
Certainly, Woolf’s novel is effectively an elegy and a remarkably innovative one. “In
elegy there is a repetition of mourning and an allaying of mourning,” writes Beer.
“Elegy lets go of the past, formally transferring it into language, laying ghosts by
confining them to a text and giving them its freedom” (Beer 31). Woolf’s elegy,
however, is about the future as much as it is about the past. This tangling of memory
with potentiality is how Woolf may effectively find and sustain her story. Time is felt
and such intimate affectivity is activated by the reader. That is, the tangling of the
diegetic level of the reader with that of the novel is what gives the novel its quality of
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ordinary living as strange as it may seem. To the Lighthouse makes manifest our
living in the world; it is also an act of mourning, and so operates as both memory and
momento mori, between an elusive visible experience of the past and the pending
invisibility of possibility.
In his 1979 article, “Virginia Woolf and our Knowledge of the External World,”
Jaakko Hintikka addresses the “failure of almost all scholars to study in any real
depth the interplay of philosophical and literary methods, values, and doctrines in the
Bloomsbury group” (Hintikka 5). Hintikka’s assessment is one that suggests an
effective reading of Woolf’s fiction cannot be complete without recognizing that her
novels are largely “fictionalized epistemology” (6). Above all else, he calls for a
more profound reading of Woolf’s novels with particular consideration of Bertrand
Russell and G.E. Moore’s influence upon the intellectual landscape occupied by the
Bloomsbury group. “Russell, Moore, and Keynes,” and to a lesser extent,
Wittgenstein, Hintikka writes,
were subject to influences so similar to those that helped to shape the writers
and artists of the group and had so many opportunities to convey these
influences to their neighbors in Bloomsbury that comparisons between these
philosophers and the Bloomsbury group will be highly interesting to any
historian or other scholar who is looking for the general factors which shaped
all of them and which have shaped much of the rest of the intellectual history
of our century. (5)
Hintikka remains clear, however, to distinguish Woolf’s work from the novel of
ideas; while her novels contribute and promote certain philosophical doctrines, her
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work is equally dedicated to raising certain philosophical problems at times by the
characters, at other times by the author, “and sometimes indirectly by the author
through those subtle means she uses to induce us to take fewer things for granted than
we have done in the past” (6). Banfield’s study of the influence of impressionism and
the philosophy of Russell and Moore in “Time Passes: Virginia Woolf, PostImpressionism, and Cambridge Time”13 and the aforementioned The Phantom Table
address Hintikka’s critique and the two are certainly the most extensive studies in this
area of consideration. Banfield’s work also gestures away from the too oft repeated
and reductionistic claim that typically take the following form: in “Time Passes,” a
“brilliant subversion of realism is sustained throughout the passage, in which ‘history’
and ‘events’ (the First World War, deaths, and worldly achievements) are relegated to
brief addenda to the subjective passage of time in the consciousness of the abandoned
house” (Livesey 141). Yet, Livesey aptly remarks that
By 1931 Woolf’s aesthetic was no longer about marshalling six or six
thousand characters to walk in her authorial step, or constructing a web of
sympathy between characters and the implied reader, but flashing light out
through the desires and imaginations of her subjects in order to explore
individuation. In the “Time Passes” section of To the Lighthouse (1927), the
radical rejection of nineteenth-century sentimental narrative and temporal
13

The article describes the significance of “Time Passes” in terms of how the fragmented scenes
function to create the sense of a time continuum, a literary equivalent to the process used by the
impressionist painters to create a meaningful spatial continuum. Ultimately, “Time Passes” functions,
according to Banfield, as an “interlude” (employing Woolf’s own term) between “The Window” and
“The Lighthouse” to create a conceptual relationship between temporal moments thus transforming
scenes or short stories in a larger comprehensible time continuum; the aesthetic result, according to
Banfield, is a modern novel. However, its scope is one, like much professional academic studies, that
gestures inward as its significance is fundamentally important to the study of the modern novel and the
literary history of modernist fiction. Banfield’s essay is excellent and is highly recommended reading
for those interested in reading criticism regarding “Time Passes.”
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structure is paired with the sturdy constant of the charlady, Mrs McNab. The
death of Mrs Ramsay is famously bracketed off as an aside in this section,
imploding the nineteenth century literary convention of the deathbed scene.
(Livesey 141)
Woolf was, certainly, more concerned with the nature of social reality than with
metaphysical realities; however, Hintikka notes that “the two are inextricably
intermingled” in her fictional universe (Hintikka 6). Speaking after, rather than in
contrast to Hintikka, Banfield, and the mode expressed above by Livesey, here we
consider the passage of time in the novel as that of temporality itself: time as narrator.
Ultimately, however, Woolf’s To the Lighthouse is a fictionalization of
epistemologies that promotes as many philosophical ideas as it raises philosophical
conundrums. Here, the philosophical problems are raised indirectly by the author
and, simultaneously, induced in and by the implied reader through reflexive
heterarchical tangling of diegetic levels. “Philosophical ideas are not the subject
matter of her novels,” Hintikka writes, “but they are part of the parcel of their
texture” (6). The weaving from one diegetic level to another, from the level of the
reader, into the level of the text; the tangling of the reader as narrating agent with the
reader as time narrating itself, this is the precise parcel of the novel’s texture. In
short, the novel expresses both the ontological and the temporal since the two are
inseparable. As Woolf remarks, “all one’s perceptions, half-way to truth, were
tangled in a golden mesh…could the body achieve it, or the mind, subtly mingling in
the intricate passages of the brain?” (Woolf 57).

102

Indeed, philosophical conundrums are the texture, the tangled golden mesh, that
constructs To the Lighthouse. What Woolf and Heidegger have in common is the
assurance that everyday life and existence are topics that merit explicit discussion.
“Heidegger’s…philosophy, as well as Woolf’s fiction…have at their core an original
direct and person existential experience which is in equal measures intellectual and
emotional” writes A. O. Frank, “Their contribution to philosophy may be seen as but
an introduction of this personal and intimate, yet fresh and typically modernistic
perception into the body of knowledge amassed by the tradition, by filtering it
through and comparing it to this body and translating it into a language which at least
communicates with the language of that corpus” (Frank 81). From this, the
knowledge concerning life and existence operates both as something of a foundation
of the discussion and that which will consequently be gained by such discussion.
“Woolf and Heidegger,” Frank remarks, “are connected by an interest in the aspect of
philosophy which concerns life and by the requirement that life be brought back to
philosophy and philosophy guided back to the questions regarding life” (Frank 80).
Again, one difficulty in connecting the thought of Woolf and that of Heidegger is that
the former is much less concerned with metaphysics than with epistemology. For the
latter “epistemology is of secondary emphasis, implied or subordinated rather than
highlighted” (Frank 80); furthermore, for Heidegger, existential knowledge is the
substratum of knowledge itself. While Woolf may not herald this tangled logic in an
overt way, Lily’s revelation at the novel’s close proves noteworthy as an affirmative
statement both ontological and existential as she finishes her painting: “With a sudden
intensity, as if she saw it clear for a second, she drew a line there in the centre. It was
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done; it was finished. Yes, she thought, laying down her brush in extreme fatigue, I
have had my vision” (226). Lily’s epistemological admission operates not only as
deliverance from the tyranny of Mr. Ramsay’s Enlightenment modality but also as an
affirmative motion into a more affective source of knowledge. The extreme fatigue
that Lily experiences situates her knowledge in the very site of knowledge. Lily’s
painting is metonymical for the novel: the painting is finished, the novel is finished.
Of course, there’s more: Lily’s accomplishment is the feat of the reader; that is, her
intimate ontological connection to the painting begins much in the way the reader’s
hierarchy defying relationship to the novel operates. Frank suggests that “knowledge
which is unaware of its ontological foundation runs a risk of misconceiving its
epistemological foundation, its potentials, the types of utterance available to it, the
positioning and implications of the questions that it is asking and the answers it is
giving” (Frank 80). Just as Lily’s affirmative pronouncement, “Yes,” establishes her
recognition of the intense connection between ontology and epistemology, her own
critique of the metaphysics emblematized by Mr. Ramsay, the act of reading To the
Lighthouse as narrative level crossing, the movement from the extradiegetic to the
intradiegetic, activates the affirmative declaration of the reader. The reader then
integrates ontological assumptions, analytical positioning of experience in relation to
text, and the affective engagement with language as a means of reforming the
processes of speculation.
The process of knowledge and thought towards being correspondingly situates
being as temporal. Essential to Heidegger’s work is the concept of Dasein, being in
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the world;14 or, as Woolf remarks, “the lawn [is] very rough. Here sitting on the
world” (Woolf 210). Here, we employ Dasein in such a way that one may often
replace it with the term “self” or “I” without significant deformation of the syntactic
gesture of his sentence. On the level of syntax, however, Dasein is specific in its
meaning. “When properly understood,” writes Timothy Stapleton, Dasein
captures the unique being of the “I am”, one that gets misconstrued by such
terms, for example, as “self,” “ego,” “soul,” “subjectivity” or “person.” For
Heidegger, what constitutes the very “am” of the “I am” is that being is an
issue for it: is a question and a matter about which it cares. This entity that I
am understands this implicitly. More radically, it is this understanding, or the
place where this understanding of being occurs. Hence “Dasein” means the
self as the there (Da) of being (Sein), the place where an understanding of
being erupts into being. (Stapleton 44)
The concept is irreducible to a simple instance of reflexivity yet it is peculiar in its
strange loopiness—“it [is] awfully strange” (Woolf 18)—and as an analogue to a kind
of tangled hierarchy. “It [seems] to me…that the slippability of a feature or some
event (or circumstance) depends on a set of nested contexts in which the event (or
circumstance) is perceived to occur” writes Hofstadter:
We build up our mental representation of a situation layer by layer. The
lowest layer establishes the deepest aspect of the context—sometimes being
14

Kockelmans remarks that the world is also a site for a kind of existential semantics: “In Heidegger’s
view, world is the total meaningfulness into which a man with his contemporaries finds himself thrown
in each epoch of history. World is the concrete totality of meaning as which Being’s truth comes-topass to him as the ‘Da’ of Being in a given epoch, and which has its own destination, common to all
living in that epoch. What is called earth here is the totality of all that of which the totality of meaning
is the meaning” (Kockelmans 153).
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so low that it cannot vary at all. For instance, the three-dimensionality of our
world is so ingrained that most of us never would imagine letting it slip
mentally. It is a constant constant. Then there are layers which establish
temporarily, though not permanently, fixed aspects of situations, which could
be called background assumptions—things which, in the back of your mind,
you know can vary, but which most of the time you unquestioningly accept as
unchanging aspects. These could still be called “constants”…Finally, we
reach the “shakiest” aspect of your mental representation of the situation—the
variables. These are things…stepping out of bounds, which are mentally
“loose” and which you don’t mind letting slip away from their real values, for
a short moment. (Hofstadter GEB 643-644).
The entity, I am, is at once the understanding and the locus where this understanding
of being takes place: I am is a kind of variable and certainly mentally loose.
Allowing I am to slip away from its real value towards quantifiable and datable
presence establishes the possibility of being in the novel. Dasein can be grasped
immediately yet must “be mediated by explanation and interpretation…Dasein is in
such a way that it is capable of understanding its own Being; yet it has the tendency
to do so in terms of those beings towards which it comports itself proximally”
(Kockelmans 91). That is, Dasein is not so much a closed system so much as a
tangled system in which we understand ourselves in relation to others, that is, the
They, as an integral part of the world, are the “existential structure of Dasein, because
the world that opens up in daily existence does not derive its meaning from you or
from me…it already has the meanings that They take it to have” (Philipse 26).
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“According to Heidegger you and I are not the real actors of our daily existence-inthe-world,” Philipse notes. “The one who leads every life, Heidegger claims, is what
he calls das Man (the They, the One, the Anyone Self, or Everyman)” (Philipse 26).
Effectively, absent of the present, absent of the self but in relation to the They, always
looping between the past and prospective possibility of the future: being is time itself.
Building up representation or understanding layer by layer establishes the contentious
possibility of confusing within which layer of a tangled hierarchy one is positioned:
“Such [is] the complexity of things” (Woolf 111). Heidegger’s thought would situate
being at the multi-leveled layers that constitute the situation itself: time. Mrs.
Ramsay declares that “strife, divisions, difference of opinion, prejudices [are] twisted
into the very fibre of being” (12); the qualities here seem accurate enough, definitely
given the novel itself, yet the most informative declaration in the passage is that of the
temporal twisting of being from and into being; that is, reading takes place at the
mental level of variables: diegetic level crossing, stepping out of bounds, mental
looseness, slipping away from perception’s familiar values, for a short moment, as a
moment. The temporality of level crossing in To the Lighthouse is that which makes
bare the strife, divisions, prejudices as unities of Dasein. That is, these qualities that
are “twisted into the very fibre of being” are revealed by what Heidegger would call
explicit angst: that which “reveals Dasein in its unity” and that which—whether the
philosopher, writer, or reader—“detaches [one] from worldly concerns and
prejudices, making philosophy possible” (Inwood 17). This fibre of being, Dasein, is
temporal; and this temporality twists different levels of experience into a unity thus
revealing constitutive processes simply because, “the being of Dasein,” writes
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Heidegger, “finds its meaning in temporality” (Heidegger Being and Time 19). That
is, “persistency itself, trodden down but springing up again” (Woolf 142): no matter
how far the upward or downward shift may feel, Being (Sein) always ends up, to
one’s surprise, where one begins (Da).
Heidegger claims that his project can only be accomplished effectively by
establishing a concept of time that is “distinguished from the common understanding
of [time]” (Heidegger Being and Time 17). A commission such as this requires a shift
away from the “interpretation of time which reflects the traditional concept that has
persisted since Aristotle and beyond Bergson,” writes Heidegger. “We must thereby
make clear that, and what way, this concept of time and the common understanding of
time in general originate from temporality,” he continues: “in this way the common
concept of time receives again its rightful autonomy—contrary to Bergson’s thesis
that time understood in the common way is really space” (17). So, Heidegger, like
Woolf in “Time Passes,” complicates the distinction between temporal beings—
“natural processes and historical events” (18)—from atemporal beings—“spatial and
numerical relationships” (18). Ultimately, this common mode of thinking claims a
notable division: “the ‘timeless’ meaning of propositions from the ‘temporal’ course
of propositional statements” (18). Temporal, in Heidegger’s study, gestures towards
being in time: “the fact remains that time in the sense of ‘being in time’ serves as a
criterion for separating the regions of being” (18). He continues, suggesting a
contrast:
If being is to be conceived in terms of time, and if the various modes and
derivatives of being in their modifications and derivations are in fact to
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become intelligible through a consideration of time, then being itself—and not
only being that are “in time”—is made visible in its “temporal” [“zeitlich”]
character. But then “temporal” can no longer mean only “being in time” [“in
der Zeit seined”].” The “atemporal” and the “supratemporal” are also
“temporal” with respect to their being; this not only by way of privation when
compared to “temporal” beings, which are “in time,” but in a positive way
which, of course, must first be clarified. (18)
So, in Heidegger’s paradigm, temporality is an imperative of being: “the fundamental
ontological task of the interpretation of being as such thus seals the elaboration of the
temporality of being [Temporalität des Sein]” (18). In short, being is temporal; in the
context here, and more urgently for the reader of To the Lighthouse, there is a critical
turn from the intentionally willed conception of diegetic duality stemming from the
logic of cogito formulated as “being in time” to Heidegger and Woolf’s intensely
intimate “being as time.”
The inquiry into being is itself a process: recognition of being “understands its
own being as well,” writes Stapleton (45). Stapleton illustrates this contentious
process in lucid terms:
While gazing across the garden at the red leaves of the maple, I am at the
same time aware that I am seeing this. This self-awareness is not something
that emerges only when an explicit act of reflection takes place. A prethematic self-consciousness is an essential dimension of lived awareness. The
crucial question is: what sort of understanding of being accompanies or
“determines” this lived self-awareness as the sort of thing that it is?
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Heidegger claims that all too often the understanding of being that frees
objects within the world for their being gets reflected back on the being of the
experience itself. The “I” gets taken as a substance, although perhaps of some
special sort (ego, mind, res cogitans, soul), and the “seeing” as an activity of
this I-thing. (45)
That the “I” takes on a kind of substance via these processes is the ontological
conundrum with which Heidegger is concerned. Presence is thus assumed as a result
of the conceit of the essence of selfhood as a kind of substance. Dependent upon the
notion of the “I” as substance is the ontological position that this I-substance operates
as a temporal locus: the present. This, in part, establishes, not entirely unlike a levelcrossing strange loop, the circulus vitiosus from which there is no escape, the
“etcetera, etcetera, etcetera” (Woolf 63). That is, the understanding of being,
reflected back upon the “I” of experience marks the strange locus of knowledge that
proves paradoxical: the observer’s tendency for transcendence, going beyond in order
to get an objective view of both oneself and one’s theoretical apparatus, rests upon
the assumption of a temporally stable self in the present moment and as an I-thing
that can, as a kind of substance, critically observe. “Among the guiding ideas in the
Western tradition,” Stapleton notes, “is that the movement from seeming to being,
from appearance to reality, requires the assumption of the theoretical attitude. But
this move entails positing that understanding of being which is necessary for theory
itself” (Stapleton 46). In short, the recognition of knowledge of being in this tradition
is, as understanding, a thing. Dasein, in contrast, resists the circulus vitiosus that
permits the enlightenment and Romantic self by positing being in society, time, and
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history. Traditionally, one wants, as Lily thinks to herself “to be on a level with
ordinary experience, to feel simply that’s a chair, that’s a table, and yet at the same
time, It’s a miracle, it’s an ecstasy” (Woolf 218). Lily is yet to accept that the ecstasy
is not a move of conventional transcendence and objectivity, but an immanent
extension into the level of ordinary experience. As a tangled system, Dasein is
engaged in complex modes of level-crossing: the reflexivity, strange loopiness, or
tangled hierarchy in this case lies in the circular, heterarchical logic that gestures to a
mode of being that is social, historical, and temporal. It is the latter of these three that
is of immediate interest in the level-crossing processes of reading “Time Passes” and
positing the reader’s disappearance as a metamorphosis into time. “Nothing [makes]
up for the loss” (65) except the past and the prospect.
So, the reader of the novel is temporal; the reader is intimate with time. The
relationship between time and being, for Heidegger, is one of embedding: time is
situated within existence and existence is situated within temporality. For Heidegger,
time is not the arena for perceiving change and motion, rather change and motion are
the essence of being. His treatment of the embedded relationship between being and
time is one that aims to delimit an ontological privileging of the present. Concerned
with who we may wish to become, Heidegger’s logic of ontological temporality
implicates the primacy—and interconnected and interpenetrating, or, looping—of the
past and futurity. “The future [for Heidegger]—not simply a set of events that have
not yet been realized, but as the need to come to grips with our own existence—
generates time and, along with it, generates our interpretations of the world and all
that is in it” writes Richard Polt (69-70). It is from this stance that a being’s
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extension into the tripartite future, past, and present is primary to an ontological
dominance and primacy of objects and entities in the present. In short, Heidegger’s
enquiry is motion, change, and becoming. “Something,” Mrs. Ramsay wishes in
vain, “is immune from change, and shines out…in the face of the flowing, the
fleeting, the spectral, like a ruby; so that again to-night she had the feeling she had
had once to-day already, of peace, of rest. Of such moments, she thought, the thing is
made that remains for ever after. This would remain” (Woolf 114). That this
remainder is, unlike an eternal unchanging ruby, in fact the spectral past looping to
the night, looping forward to the day, always fleeting into the possible future.
Heidegger, like Woolf’s text, does not privilege the present or eternal as the locus of
knowledge, but rather establishes the embeddedness of being in temporality; or
Dasein as time. Again, to be is to be temporal.
“Time Passes,” as a diegetic locus connecting “The Window” and “The
Lighthouse” and, simultaneously, as a diegetic level-crossing proxy for the reader as
time, may be examined as that which is situated, not in terms of the reader as an
intimate presence, but rather as that which is located in-between and embedded
within the past (“The Window”) and the future (“The Lighthouse”). By situating
“Time Passes” as the central locus of this reading, “The Window” plays the role of
the past, the time in which James once sat “on the floor cutting out pictures from the
illustrated catalogue of the Army and Navy Stores, endowed the picture of a
refrigerator as his mother spoke with heavenly bliss” (Woolf 7); where Mr. Ramsay
questions whether “Shakespeare had never existed…would the world have differed
much from what it is to-day?” and, even though, “Ramsay is one of those men who
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do their best work before they are forty” (28)—and now “he was over sixty” (77)—
concludes “possibly not” (Woolf 48,49); the temporal realm where Mr. Bankes
claims that “the vegetable salts are lost” (55); where it is concluded that they “are not
going to the lighthouse to-morrow,” a denial James will “remember…all his life”
since “children don’t forget” (68, 70); where, like the stocking Mrs. Ramsay knits, the
concept and prospect of non-existence makes manifest that life is “ever so much too
short” (33). In other words, the tripartite structure of being as temporality in
Heidegger’s early thought offers a point of entry for a study of the analogous
structure of To the Lighthouse in which “Time Passes,” being the most difficult and
elusive section of the novel, operates as a proxy for the non-presence of being as time
on the level of the reader. Like “the residue of [Lily’s] thirty-three years, the deposit
of each day’s living, mixed with something more secret than she had ever spoken or
shown in the course of all those days was an agony” (Woolf 58), this residue of the
past informs and is intensely informed, “at the same time” by the “immensely
exciting” (58) prospective of future possibility. In order to effectively approach
“Time Passes” in this way, however, a consideration of both “The Window” as past
and “The Lighthouse” as futurity is in order. “To be human is to be temporal and
historical,” writes Polt; to be human is also to temporally carry along with it the
deposits and secret residues of history. “Conversely,” Polt continues, “time and
history can be understood only with reference to ourselves” (Polt 70). In framing the
reading in this way, an extrapolation of the reader as temporality becomes more
meaningful. In other words, in order to examine “Time Passes” in this way, one may
wish to examine the novel non-chronologically, beginning first with the past, moving
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to the future/possibility, and then, with this loopy framing technique, the nonpresence of the present.
So, the temporality of being, or the reader as time as posited in “Time Passes,”
relies heavily on both the past and the future. It is here, in the in-between of these
two temporal segregates, where the most intimate kind of diegetic level crossing—
both readerly and writerly identifications—transpires. The terms “readerly” and
“writerly,” here, are borrowed from Roland Barthes’ usage in his distinction between
“readerly” texts from the former in S/Z (1970):
The writerly text is a perpetual present, upon which no consequent language
(which would inevitably make it past) can be superimposed; the writerly text
is ourselves writing, before the infinite play of the world (the world as
function) is traversed, intersected, stopped, plasticized by some singular
system (Ideology, Genus, Criticism) which reduces the plurality of entrances,
the opening of networks, the infinity of languages. (S/Z 5)
The distinction Barthes makes is, however, too politicized and, consequently, rather
too reductionistic to apply effectively to the complexity of the formulation that arises
in Woolf’s writing. The readerly text, for Barthes, operates according to the
deterministic logic of the reader as that which is being constructed by the tradition of
language and writing—here, the tradition of the classical and traditional work is the
premium movens—and accords a perpetual present in which the very possibility of
reader’s agency is eclipsed. The writerly text, on the other hand, operates according
to a different conceptual architecture: the reader actively and freely creates the text, as
opposed to being the product of a priori language, and thus allows for a direct
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agential engagement. What Woolf’s novel achieves, in its unusual temporality and
what we may call Heideggerian temporality of the reader as time, conflates these two
terms: To the Lighthouse is, in a word, a readerly/writerly text. The reader is the
premium movens yet part of the readerly/writerly circulus vitiosus; concurrently,
“Time Passes” is the reader at the most profound kind of tangled diegetic intimacy.
The value of Barthes’ reading in this context is simply one of temporal emphasis: a
gesture away from the primacy of the reader existing in the present through the
reader’s re-situation in alternate temporal locales. The freedom of writerly texts
Barthes attests to is, for a reading of Woolf’s novel, partially illusory: the reader as
time (“Time Passes”) finds him/herself in a situation where texts and language
precede one’s coming into existence (“The Window”) and is predicated upon the
musing of future possibility (“The Lighthouse”). The embeddedness of non-being in
being is, through this paradigm, intensified, as Woolf expresses it:
a ghostly roll of drums remorselessly beat the measure of life, made one think
of the destruction of the island and its engulfment in the sea, and warned her
whose day had slipped past in one quick doing after another that it was all
ephemeral as a rainbow—this sound which had been obscured and concealed
under the other sounds suddenly thundered hollow in her ears and made her
look up with an impulse of terror. (Woolf 20)
Again, there is the melding of diegetic loci, the island and the sea, and the ephemeral
refraction of light expresses a kind of limit to the aestheticised paradigm of being.
Tradition precedes the reader and the future, and potential freedom, of possibility is
made meaningful only through the ineluctable fact of non-existence, the thundering in
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the hollow of the ears and the impulse of terror, the realization that “we perished,
each alone” (207), ultimately demonstrated by the sudden and almost distant death of
Mrs. Ramsay.
The interplay between past and future is implied in the structure of To the
Lighthouse in that the two are in collaboration in unintuitive ways. This preparation
calls for further examination into how the past and the present operate on the diegetic
level of the reader in both the tripartite structure of Woolf’s novel and in Heidegger’s
schema for being as time. For Heidegger, Dasein/being is past:
in its factical being Dasein always is how and ‘what’ it already was. Whether
explicitly or not it is its past. It is its own past not only in such a way that its
past, as it were, pushes itself along ‘behind’ it, and that it possesses what is
past as a property that is still objectively present and at times has an effect on
it. Dasein ‘is’ its past in the manner of its being which, roughly expressed, on
each occasion ‘occurs’ out of its future” (Being and Time 19).
The logical movement here is loopy in much the same sense as Hofstadter defines it.
Indeed, as Bret W. Davis remarks, Heidegger’s mode of thought may be best
characterized “in terms of a deepening spiral rather than a linear progression, a spiral
that always circles around the central question of being and its proper relation with
human being” (Davis 10). The contours of this deepening spiral are the past and
futurity. The past, here, includes that in which the individual already finds his or
herself to be; that is, the individual drags his or her past “along behind” him or herself
and is, in this sense, temporally “from the former.” Because, as Polt suggests,
“Heidegger insists that there is more at stake in time than the observation of passing
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events” and that “our very self is ineluctably temporal, because it is in time that we
discover or create who we are and where we stand” (Polt 80), “The Window” and
“The Lighthouse” serve as temporal demarcations—inherited experience and the
haunting of possibility—between which is situated a kind of being as reader, and
reader as time, in an aesthetically and experientially profound way.
While a reading of To the Lighthouse may suppose moving through the novel’s
sections in chronological order—the order through which Woolf chooses to express
the work—seems a productive way to approach the text, in this case, the imperative
shifts from the past to the future setting the present aside as a non-linear, everbecoming locus. As a result, for this reading, one must swing from a discussion on
the past and “The Window” to a brief examination of futurity and “The Lighthouse.”
Here, the reader enters “rooms where mourners [sit]” (Woolf 47). In this sense, there
is an intense temporal reflexive relation between the denial of the voyage to the
lighthouse in “The Window” and its eventual, at least apparent, fulfillment in the final
section of the novel. “There’ll be no landing at the Lighthouse to-morrow,” said
Charles Tansley, clapping his hands together as he stood at the window with her
husband” (11). Yet the future is characterized by possibility—“even if it isn’t fine
tomorrow…it will be another day” (31)—and such possibility is largely what
establishes being, and being as time, as instantaneously urgent. Though the stretching
out and looping into what the future entails is not an ontological concretization, it is
the logic of “the hoary Lighthouse, distant, austere, in the midst” (17) that establishes
the paradigm at hand. Mr. Ramsay’s refusal, pragmatically correct yet symbolically
oppressive, is embedded with the fulfillment of possibility, “they were going to the
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Lighthouse, Mr. Ramsay, Cam, and James” (159). This “extraordinary unreality” as
the fulfillment of the embeddedness of prospect and possibility “was frightening” yet
it is “also exciting” this “going to the Lighthouse” (161). The future in Heidegger’s
paradigm of being is intensely involved in the existential status of the individual. It is
in this sense that being is always extending toward the possibilities of what is yet to
be. This progression outwards—towards the future—is where the vagueness of
possibility is conceptually structured by agency. In short, being-as-time is also beingas-possibility, or as Heidegger puts it,
Dasein is always its possibility. It does not “have” that possibility only as a
mere attribute of something objectively present. And because Dasein is
always essentially its possibility, it can “choose” itself in its being, it can win
itself, it can lose itself, or it can never and only “apparently” win itself. It can
only have lost itself and it can only have not yet gained itself because it is
essentially possible as authentic, that is, it belongs to itself. (Heidegger Being
and Time 42)
The conflation of possibility and being ultimately attests to the potency of futurity in
the formulation of being. Being loops back upon itself, yet, it also loops forward into
itself: the task of being is the “interpretation of its being and the possibilities of that
being or…of the meaning of being in general” (Heidegger 85). This looping forward
into the essentially possible, as well as a series of loops from the past and towards
perpetual becoming, intensifies the status of being and a being’s recognition of being:
As a being, Dasein always defines itself in terms of a possibility which it is,
and that means at the same time that it somehow understands itself in its
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being. That is the formal meaning of the constitution of the existence of
Dasein. But for the ontological interpretation of this being, this means that
the problematic of its being is to be developed out of the existentiality of its
existence. However, this cannot mean that Dasein is to be construed in terms
of a concrete possible idea of existence. (Heidegger Being and Time 43)
That is, Dasein is not a precise or scientific concept; rather, it spirals around and
about. Also evident is the variations of reflexive iterations that constitute the
multifaceted denotation of being. That Heidegger’s paradigm cannot be “construed in
terms of a concrete possible idea of existence” is significant in the sense that it
gestures more towards a conceptual abstract topology rather than a perceptual
concretion. The future is not a space so much as it is temporal. In a large sense, the
lighthouse itself is not a concrete locale so much as it is a metaphor for possibility,
the possibility of eventually catching up with it and making it manifest while, at and
as the same moment, one is in the world: “[Lily] felt curiously divided, as if one part
of her were drawn out there—it was a still day, hazy; the Lighthouse looked this
morning at an immense distance; the other had fixed itself doggedly, solidly, here on
the lawn” (Woolf 171). Because Heidegger’s formulation is non-Cartesian, the
movement between consciousness and the world, or between the reader and “Time
Passes,” is one of level-crossing diegetic hierarchies and strange loops. Hofstadter
writes that “unlike a mere round trip, a strange loop feels like a paradoxical voyage in
an abstract space” (Hofstadter “What is it Like to Be a Strange Loop” 494) and thus
being and self-recognition is always already “[woven] into itself” (Woolf 141)
situated in a non-concrete possible idea of existence. Being is time and being is in the
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world; for Woolf’s text, the reader is time and the reader is in (thus animating and
animated by) the text. However, futurity of being, and the futurity of reading Woolf’s
novel involves a stretching out into possibility.
Consider Mr. Ramsay’s stretched out arms: not only do they operate as structural
metaphors for that which links minds in the first and third part of the novel, and that
which acts as corridors linking the sections proper, but Mr. Ramsay’s arms become a
demonstration for possibility itself under the anxiety of death, the alarm that we too
“shall be cut off” (Woolf 84). That is, being as text/being as time is largely
predicated upon the absence of being. Woolf articulates this best: the “sound which
had been obscured and concealed under the other sounds suddenly thundered hollow
in [Mrs. Ramsay’s] ears and made her look up with an impulse of terror. They had
ceased talking; that was the explanation” (Woolf 20). Remarkable is the manner
through which Woolf “poeticizes” (Roger Fry qtd. in Haule 272) “in an effort to
reach a statement about human achievement” (Haule 272) in the world that are
stylistically as potent as the affective and lived fears of existential or “intellectual
oblivion” (272) that make manifest the anxiety of such achievement. The nature of
Woolf’s poetic prose is integral to the project at hand. “Poetry is the act of
establishing by the word and in the word,” Heidegger remarks. “What is established
in this manner?” he continues: “The permanent…That which supports and dominates
the existent in its entirety must become manifest. Being must be opened out, so that
the existent may appear. But this very permanent is the transitory” (Heidegger
“Hölderlin and the Essence of Poetry 304). The recognition of absolute negation
makes manifest a striking impulse of terror that completes the formula. Poetry makes
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possible being in the world and the negation of the word is the negation of the world:
a cessation of talking. Roberta Rubenstein calls Woolf’s negative diction the “poetics
of negation,” a series of linguistic cues that establish the substratum of the thematic
concerns of To the Lighthouse. “What I term the poetics of negation,” she writes,
“may be understood in semantic psychological, historical and formal senses, not only
exemplifying Woolf’s close acquaintance with negation but further securing her
semantic links to modernist preoccupations” (Rubenstein 36). She continues by
suggesting that
such words as no, not, never, and, particularly, nothing—often clustered in a
series of phrases in close proximity—saturate the narrative…through such
saturation, negative locution delineate and, paradoxically, illuminated the
novel’s darker subtext. They also reinforce a central element of the narrative:
the “presence of absence,” figured as the recognition of someone lost or
absent, usually through death. (37)
Being gestures backwards in time as much as it does forward, it is a “voyage in an
abstract space,” that, in this case, manifests the possibility of future non-existence. In
other words, the presence of absence is a paradigmatic, though paradoxical, structure
that may be reformulated as the embeddedness of absence in presence. Like the
absence at which Mr. Ramsay grasps, the reader as time is made manifest more
absolutely by the gesture in question: the absence “[stays] in the mind almost like a
work of art” (Woolf 175). The reader in/as the novel may reach out towards the
possibility of not-being-there and thus, in the surprising loop backwards in the
cycling around becomes as imminent to him or herself as the imminence of the end of
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being. “Death is a possibility of being that Dasein always has to take upon itself,”
writes Heidegger. “With death,” he continues, “Dasein stands before itself in its
ownmost potentiality-of-being. In this possibility, Dasein is concerned about its
being-in-the-world absolutely [schlechthin]. Its death is the possibility of no-longerbeing-able-to-be-there. When Dasein is imminent to itself as this possibility, it is
completely thrown back upon its ownmost potentiality-of-being” (Heidegger Being
and Time 241). In short, “Death is the possibility of the absolute impossibility of
Dasein” (241); and, “what is striking,” Rubenstein notes, “is how central nothing is to
the novel” (Rubenstein 39). Being is revealed before itself through its absolute
concealment: the possibility of non-being. Likewise, the reader as time in “Time
Passes” is made manifest to itself by these looping possibilities. Mrs. Ramsay’s
absence is at its most intimate—variously more intimate than the stream of
consciousness narrative in “The Window”—when her presence ceases to be: “here
you can neither touch nor destroy. Upon which, wearily, ghostily as if they had
feather-light fingers and the light persistency of feathers, they would look, once, on
the shut eyes and the loosely clasping fingers, and fold their garments wearily and
disappear” (Woolf 138). This is made possible through the strange loopiness of being
as time and reader as time: the strange loop “is a kind of feedback loop in which, in a
series of stages that constitute the cycling-around, there is a shift in levels that feels
like an upward movement in a hierarchy, and yet, when the cycle closes, it turns out
that one winds up where one had started, in violation of the seeming hierarchy”
(Hofstadter 494). Such is Woolf’s golden mesh, the parcel of texture.
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This paradoxical movement amidst the golden mesh—or the “eternal golden
braid” as Hofstadter calls it—occurs in two ways in To the Lighthouse: first from the
diegetic level of the reader into the diegetic level of the text and, second, from the
temporal position of the reader as time into the reader, like Mrs. Ramsay, as a
simulation of non-existence. In this way, the intimate identification with both Mr.
Ramsay and Mrs. Ramsay is intensified. Not only is the reader as time stretching out
into future possibility only to grasp, in this case, a simulation of nothingness, but is
also stretching into the text and experiencing the negation immanently yet
simultaneously cycling back to the extra-diegetic level in violation of the hierarchy to
the apparent source of knowledge. In both cases, however, being as time in “Time
Passes” is made more severe by stretching out into emptiness: “a curious physical
sensation, as if [one] were urged forward and at the same time must hold [oneself]
back” (Woolf 172). The sensation is affective, a physical sensation, of being in
multiple narrative loci in a topos that is at once abstract and concrete. The tangling of
distinctions between temporal coordinates and orientational physicality is not so
much confusing as it is lived and experienced in a fluid kind of way. “We must wait
for the future to show” (137), as Mr. Bankes notes; “It’s almost too dark to see,”
Andrew adds; while Prue’s recognition is one more conclusive, that which performs
the final movement away from stream of consciousness towards the establishment of
differing conceptual locals blurring into on: time as the narrator and, in turn, the
reader as time; that is, “one can hardly tell which is the sea and which is the land”
(137) and, ultimately, “night and day, month and year ran shapelessly together” (147).
This gradual tangling of sea and land, of night and day, month and year, attests to the

123

gradual descent/ascent into the text and, ultimately, posits the reader as time itself.
Though Mr. Bankes suggests that we must wait for the future to show—more
specifically, we must distinguish this waiting from Prue’s tangling—our waiting is, in
fact, a looping into and back from possibility. Such looping is one into a most
intimate association with the text itself: the reader’s movement through the golden
mesh, into and as the temporal logistics animating the novel. Indeed, the movement
feels as if it “is unfathomably deep” (69).
This formulation ultimately continues Heidegger’s gesture away from Cartesian
paradigm—a radical move, for Heidegger, away from the phenomenological project
of his teacher, Husserl—towards a more temporal and historically oriented concept of
being. At the same time, the same shift takes place on the level of the reader of
Woolf’s novel: from the transcendent subject on the extra-diegetic reader to the intradiegetic level of reader as time. This shift Heidegger calls thrownness or the
thrownness of being. “The expression thrownness is meant to suggest the facticity of
its being delivered over,” writes Heidegger (Heidegger Being and Time 131-132).
This characteristic of the past of one’s being is one that throws “this being into its
there; it is thrown in such a way that it is the there as being-in-the-world” (131). Not
unlike Hintikka’s observation that in Woolf’s work the nature of the social and the
metaphysical are inextricably intermingled, Harold Fromm remarks that
Heidegger is little concerned with nature, society, politics, and other people,
the mass of whom he characterizes as the “They,” the mobile vulgus (not his
term) manipulated by popular culture, politics, and orthodox opinions.
“Thrown” into the world at birth, each individual experiences “anxiety” about
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meaning and death, which drives him to connect with the “They” for solace
while ignoring those “moments of being” (familiar as well from Nietzsche,
Proust, and Virginia Woolf) that reveal the essence of what it feels like truly
to exist, to be authentically in the world. “Everyone is the other, and no one is
himself,” writes Heidegger. (Fromm 684)
For the reader of To the Lighthouse, the gesture of thrownness of being, urgently
asserts itself most explicitly in “Time Passes;” in Heidegger’s sense of the term, the
individual finds him or herself, to their surprise, “thrown” into a situation/life/world
that they did not actively create, will, or even necessarily desire: being as temporality.
The notion of thrownness is particularly apt regarding the consideration of “Time
Passes” in question; Rubenstein remarks that Woolf thought of this section of the
novel as “the most difficult abstract piece of writing—I have to give an empty house,
no people’s characters, the passage of time, all eyeless & featureless with nothing to
cling to” (The Diary of Virginia Woolf 76). The section is indeed an abstract piece of
writing as well as an abstract act of level crossing thus conflating the reader with
temporality itself; certainly, the reader is thrown into a diegetic locale with “nothing
to cling to.” Through this strange positioning, the reader simultaneously animates not
only negativity and absence but physical objects in “Time Passes” and, furthermore,
the lives of characters, their deaths, the dramatization of class and social inequality,
and, ultimately, the failures and achievements of all that is involved in the section.
The shift from “The Window” to “Time Passes” marks a similar startling shift in
realization for the reader: a process from that of the dualistic—upon Cartesian
presumptions—diegetic separation of novel and reader to the reader being delivered
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over to the text itself, animating the text, and, yet, being animated by the language of
the text itself.
Process itself is essential to Heidegger’s reform of the manner in which we think
of being and knowledge. That is, being is temporal: “The meaning of being [Sein] of
that being [Seienden] we call Dasein will prove to be temporality [Zeitlichkeit]. In
order to demonstrate this we must repeat our interpretation of those structures of
Dasein that shall have been indicated in a preliminary way—this time as modes of
temporality,” he writes:
While it is true that with this interpretation of Dasein as temporality the
answer to the guiding question about the meaning of being in general is not
already given, the soil from which we may reap it will nevertheless be
prepared…Dasein is in such a way that, by being [seined], it understands
something like being…we must show that time is that from which Dasein
tacitly understands and interprets something like being at all. Time must be
brought to light and genuinely grasped as the horizon of every understanding
and interpretation of being. (Heidegger Being and Time 17)
Thus time, an essential quality of ontology, here, is conflated with epistemology. To
be is perpetually temporal; to know resists the inside-outside conceptualization of
time. This is the logic underlying Lily’s vision and that which acts as the logical
substratum of the reader’s descent into the text. Not only does the reader as time now
animate “the nights [that] are full of wind and destruction; the trees [that] plunge and
bend and their leaves fly helter skelter until the lawn is plastered with them and they
lie packed in gutters and choke rain pipes and scatter damp paths” but also the reader
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is that animation, the reader is “the sea [that] tosses itself and breaks itself” (Woolf
140). That the temporal reader is the prime animator of the text, he/she carries along
with him a strange responsibility, burden, and complicity in the deaths of Prue who
“died that summer in some illness connected with childbirth, which was indeed a
tragedy” (Woolf 144) and Andrew who, along with twenty or thirty young men, “was
blown up in France…whose death, mercifully, was instantaneous” (145).
Concurrently, the reader is also the victim, part of a vicious cycle that both moves and
is moved by the strange loopiness of time, being, and the heterarchy of textual
fluency. As a culprit, we are also the mourner; without animating the text, we are unanimated, yet the processes of the world continues to run its course: a play upon res
extensa, “subject and object and the nature of reality…think of a kitchen table
then…when you’re not there” (28). “There [is] a force working” (Woolf 151) in both
the text and the reader, “something not highly conscious; something that leered,
something that lurched; something not inspired to go about its work with dignified
ritual or solemn chanting” (Woolf 151). That hardly conscious force is both the
world and temporality, the implicit quality that grants the coalescence of diegetic
level crossing: “In the dark there is emphatically ‘nothing’ to see, although the world
is still ‘there’ more obtrusively” (Heidegger 183). As such, the reader limits the
interstice between the inner- and outer-narrative, moving into the text as the temporal
quality that animates the “ominous sounds like the measured blows of hammers
dulled on felt, which, with their repeated shocks still further loosened the shawl and
cracked the tea-cups” (Woolf 145). With this level crossing, the extradiegetic
remains somewhere else, under the assault of disappearance, the reader becomes the
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text, both constituted by waves of multi-directional change. The distinction between
reader and text amalgamates into time and thus Cartesian metaphysical biases fall
silent, “this silence this indifference, this integrity, the thud of something falling”
(Woolf 145). With this movement, time is brought to light as the reader/text
distinction soundlessly reveals that which underlies both knowledge and the
interpretation of being. Thus, process as temporality is as essential to ontology as it is
to epistemology. One comes to know the text as oneself; simultaneously, one knows
being because “it changed, it shaped itself differently; it had become… already the
past” (Woolf 121). And so, disappearance discloses process more obtrusively.
The title “Time Passes” proves fascinating in and of itself due to its polysemy; and
its polysemy, like the temporal process it expresses, affirms itself most obtrusively.
Expressing a kind of movement of time beyond human perception, “Time Passes” is
the “interlude” that establishes the sense of a continuum not unlike the brush
techniques of impressionist painters, as Banfield remarks. What is of specific interest
here, however, is how time itself “passes” from one diegetic level to another thus
merging with and making manifest the ontological quality of the reader as
temporality. That is, for Heidegger, lexical concepts perform the task of being
reaching out towards itself, the linguistic quality of “Time Passes”—both its title and
content since the two are metonymical for one another—is worth a moment of
consideration. Cognitive linguists Vyvyan Evans and Melanie Green suggest that
time is always mediated as a lexical concept that varies from language to language.
In English, the lexical concept is encoded through the schemas of four different
contexts: duration, moment, event, and instance (Evans and Green 79). Conceptually,
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duration has two main variants. The first is that of protracted duration, in which
“time drags” (79-80). “Protracted duration,” Evans and Green suggest, “is caused by
a heightened awareness of a particular stimulus array, either because the interval
experience is ‘empty’…or because the interval is very ‘full’ due to a great deal being
experienced in a short space of time” (80). Protracted duration is certainly the
temporal quality of Woolf’s stream of consciousness narrative in “The Window” and
“The Lighthouse.” Here we have a kind of anti-plot which is remarkably full of
experience; hours of reading on the extra-diegetic level of the reader constitute
seconds in the temporal paradigm of the novel. The second variant of duration is that
which is more appropriate for “Time Passes”: temporal compression. Here “time has
sped/whizzed by” (80), we ask where the time has “gone,” or clichés like “Time flies
when you’re having fun” (80). Temporal compression is when “we experience time
proceeding more quickly than usual, and is most often associated with our experience
of routine behaviours which we carry out effortlessly without much attention to the
task at hand” (80). Yet, temporal compression is also remarkable for its ability to
situate being itself as temporal. Like the knit stocking with which Mrs. Ramsay
busies herself, temporal compression makes urgently manifest that life is “too
short…ever so much too short” (Woolf 33). Time passes at variable durations, not
objectively of course, but as determined by lexical concepts that are, in turn,
determined by lived experience.
The lexical concept of moment constitutes the second mode of encoding time
through language as outlined by Evans and Green. This constitutes our “ability to
assess time in terms of discrete moments” (80). Not unlike the brushstrokes of the
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impressionists that establish a kind of logical continuum, moment establishes when
“the time for a decision has come” (80) or that “now is the time to address irreversible
environmental decay” (80). In short, time is conceptualized “not in terms of an
interval, whose duration can be assessed, but instead as a discrete point” (80). Third,
is the lexical concept of event. Though this term is intensely charged in critical and
literary theory, Evans and Green simply mean that which signifies an “occurrence of
some kind” (80). Summarizing Evans’ argument in The Structure of Time:
Language, Meaning and Temporal Cognition (2004), events “derive, at the perceptual
level, from temporal processing, which binds particular occurrences into a temporally
framed unity: a ‘window’ or ‘time slot’” (80-81). Evans and Greene use the
following examples: “with the first contraction, the young woman knew her time had
come” (81) and “the man had every caution given him not a minute before to be
careful with the gun, but his time was come as his poor shipmates say and with that
they console themselves” (81). Respectively, the events outlined here are birth and
death. Woolf’s manipulation of the “window” of time is more nuanced. Consider the
following as a temporal metaphor of event: “The drawing-room door was open; the
hall door was open; it sounded as if the bedroom doors were open; and certainly the
window on the landing was open, for that she had opened herself. That windows
should be open, and doors shut” (Woolf 31-32). Mrs. Ramsay is intent to order the
chaotics of temporality. A door of time is certainly a metaphor for event just as a
window may be; yet, the window of time—as the first section of the book is titled—is
that which is opened. That Mrs. Ramsay wishes windows to be open and doors shut
expresses a conceptual desire for language to conceal the valueless and asemic quality
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of pure temporality as much as it expresses her preference to govern how time will
“pass” for her, her family, and those lodging together. That windows should be open
and doors shut signifies the desire inherent in language use; the illusory domination
of lexical force—that of windows rather than doors—for the control of temporal
experience is as profoundly absurd as it is anxious; yet, it is also deeply
compassionate: “only the Lighthouse beam entered the rooms for a moment, sent its
sudden stare over bed and wall in the darkness of winter, looked with equanimity at
the thistle and the swallow, the rat and the straw. Nothing now withstood them;
nothing said no to them” (Woolf 150). Roberta Rubenstein notes that in May 1927,
Woolf received a letter from Roger Fry; in the letter, Fry congratulates Woolf on the
novel, and while expressing his admiration for the work, claims that he did not
understand it: “arriving at the Lighthouse has a symbolic meaning which escapes me”
(Woolf The Letters of Virginia Woolf Vol. 3 385n2). Woolf’s reply: “I meant nothing
by The Lighthouse. One has to have a central line down the middle of the book to
hold the design together. I saw that all sorts of feelings would accrue to this, but I
refused to think them out, and trusted that people would make it the deposit for their
own emotions” (385; emphasis Woolf’s). Whether doors or windows as temporal
lexical concepts, temporality as possibility—the lighthouse as metaphor and textual
level into which the reader may become consciously and affectively deposited—is as
ambient and absolute as it is semantically abysmal; here, nothing withstands and
nothing affirms, nor can anything negate: temporality and being with the utmost
equanimity.
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Next, instance as a lexical concept is that which “underlies the fact that temporal
events can be enumerated, which entails that distinct events can be seen as instances
or examples of the ‘same’ event” (Evans and Green 81). This “concept underlies the
fact that temporal events can be enumerated, which entails that distinct events can be
seen as instances or examples of the ‘same’ event” (81). They provide the following
example: “with that 100m race the sprinter had improved for the fourth time in the
same season” (81). In this case, time does not signify four distinct moments, they
argue, “but to a fourth instance of the ‘improvement’ event” (81). Ultimately, they
suggest that such an example of instance “provides linguistic evidence the separate
temporal events can be related to one another and ‘counted’ as distinct instances of a
single event type” (81). Instance, however, is the lexical concept underlying the
uncanny and that of haunting; that is, the simultaneous event repeating itself
spectrally in different pulsations of time yet, somehow, indicative of a single event
type:
Oh Mrs. Ramsay! [Lily] called out silently, to that essence which sat by the
boat, that abstract one made of her, that woman in grey, as if to abuse her for
having gone, and then having gone, come back again. It had seemed so safe,
thinking of her. Ghost, air, nothingness, a thing you could play with easily
and safely at any time of the day or night, she had been that, and then
suddenly she put her hand out and wrung the heart thus. (Woolf 194)
Instance, in Evans and Green’s sense, makes the uncanny lexically simplistic in the
sense that a kind distressing emotional affectivity proves that the improbable is
linguistically palatable. “Really [Lily] was angry with Mrs. Ramsay. With the brush

132

slightly trembling in her fingers she looked at the hedge, the step, the wall. It was all
Mrs. Ramsay’s doing. She was dead. Here was Lily, at forty-four.” (Woolf 163).
And while Mrs. Ramsay, finishing her recitation of a story to James, claims “‘and
that’s the end’…the interest of the story died away in them” (Woolf 68), we find, as
does Lily, that “something else take its place; something wondering, pale, like the
reflection of a light, which at once [makes us] gaze and marvel” (68). The ubiquity of
the ghostly air and nothingness that signifies Mrs. Ramsay after her death attests to
the instance; the conflation of a single event type that assures the primacy and
familiarity of the past and the future over that of strangeness, the present itself.
The manner in which “time passes” in the novel is ultimately that which engages
with these four lexical concepts in a more profoundly intimate way. In this section,
as opposed to “The Window” and “The Lighthouse,” temporality is compressed.
That this compression is expressed as a kind of discrete series of narrowing points
demonstrates that our temporal conceptions both challenge and confirm our temporal
perceptions. Furthermore, this uncanny instance of compression suggests that
multiple perceptions of a temporal event can be conflated into a single event type.
Duration, moment, event, and instance all gesture to the manner in which language
makes experience itself ordinary. Heidegger suggests that

133

Language15 is not only the danger of dangers, but necessarily conceals in itself
a continual danger for itself. Language has the task of making manifest in its
work the existent, and of preserving it as much. In it, what is purest and what
is most concealed, and likewise what is complex and ordinary, can be
expressed in words. Even the essential word, if it is to be understood and so
become a possession in common, must make itself ordinary. (Heidegger
“Hölderlin and the Essence of Poetry” 298-299)
In short, language—and thus lexical concepts—perform the task of preserving the
existent insomuch as it conceals itself from within its very schematic logic. Lexical
concepts, in their fundamental treachery, express temporality as something both
hidden and revealed, that which is strange and common. “Language is not a mere
tool” Heidegger continues,
on the contrary, it is only language that affords the very possibility of standing
in the openness of the existent. Only where there is language, is there world,
i.e. the perpetually altering circuit of decision and production, of action and
responsibility, but also of commotion and arbitrariness, of decay and
confusion. (299-300)
15
Fόti remarks upon Heidegger’s complex views on the reflexive quality between being and language:
“Heidegger insists that language is no human doing, nor the representation or expression of thought
and feeling, but that man himself appears, within the ‘speaking of language’…, as a Versprechen,
which is to say, as both a promise or commitment and a mis-speaking. This ambiguity is the very
ambiguity of poiēsis or bringing forth into un-concealment…instead of understanding technicity in its
own terms (as a means, or as neutral power), one will then understand it in its ambiguity which
bespeaks the ambiguous nature of un-concealment” (Fόti 23). Inwood, furthermore, remarks that, for
Heidegger, “Language is not a free-floating thing in which we all share. It seems to float freely, since
it belongs to no particular Dasein, it belongs initially to the They. But we do not have to speak only as
They speak. One can, by a mastery of words or by a fresh understanding of one’s subject-matter,
appropriate language in an original way” (Inwood 114). The appropriation of language in a novel way
makes a language live, placing it in conjunction with the change and metamorphosis of everyday life
and historicity; we may safely say that Woolf’s language is living in more than one sense. In later
Heidegger, Inwood remarks quite lucidly that “we do not so much have a language, as a language has
us” (115).
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If time is a lexical concept, it is the bridge that connects diegetic levels between text
and the being of an individual. “The being of men is founded in language,” he writes
(301) and language is experienced as both strange and ordinary. Claiming that this is
only actualized in conversation, Heidegger means that the being of humans is
founded in language when people are engaged in “the act of speaking with others
about something” (301). Yet, a similar case may be true if the conversation at hand is
with language itself: “The appearance of the world [is] not merely a consequence of
the actualisation of language, it is contemporaneous with it. And this to the extent
that it is…in the transmutation of the world into word, that the real conversation,
which we ourselves are, consists” (303). Speaking with others is a form of intimacy;
that is, that which establishes closeness between two separate ontological loci or
beings. For Heidegger,
we are a conversation, that always means at the same time: we are a single
conversation. But the unity of a conversation consists in the fact that in the
essential word there is always manifest that one and the same thing on which
we agree, and on the basis of which we are united and so are essentially
ourselves. Conversation and its unity support our existence. (301)
In the end, however, since “language really became actual as conversation…a world
has appeared” (302). For Woolf’s novel, exemplified in “Time Passes,” this intimacy
is not one of conversation between individuals so much as it is an intimate coming
together of the diegetic reader and the novel itself as a means of making manifest the
reader as the narrator; since the narrator of “Time Passes” is temporality, this reveals
the reader as time, a process that is experienced as profoundly uncanny.
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So, the concurrent upward and downward diegetic shifts from stream of
consciousness to the abstraction of time as narrator—from “The Window” to “Time
Passes”—establishes an idiosyncratic kind of reflexivity. Here, there is an illusory
transfer from what is perceived as narratively interior to a narrative space that
corresponds with what is exterior. Mrs. Ramsay ponders this strange phenomenon in
direct relation to ontology and temporality: “how life, from being made up of little
separate incidents which one lived one by one,” she considers, “became curled and
whole like a wave which bore one up with it and threw one down with it, there, with a
dash on the beach” (Woolf 53). The separate incidents here are not so much the
points or pulsations of impressionism as they are illusory separations of the
temporality of seemingly distinct diegetic levels. From inside the mind of Mrs.
Ramsay towards the curling ocean itself—an apt metaphor for the process at hand—
the motion here is deceptively upward and downward, interior and exterior; it is, in a
word, strange. This narrative peculiarity in To the Lighthouse is stratified in such a
way as to construct a kind of hierarchy, not of value, but of psycho-ecological
patterning. In short, the reader and the text “stay there like a smoke, like a fume
rising upwards, holding them safe together” (Woolf 114). Suzanne Raitt, in May
Sinclair: A Modern Victorian (2000), remarks on the pre-literary usage of the term
“stream of consciousness” in the work of psychologist William McDougall that offers
a possible topos for thinking about Woolf’s multi-tiered diegesis. McDougall muses
upon consciousness “as a kind of perpetual flowing together of minds, a network of
streams constantly joining and separating from one another” (Raitt 220). The use of
variations upon the stream of consciousness narrative technique is, of course, famous
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amongst Modernist writers; the matter here rests in the conceptual and spatial
formations that bloom from McDougall’s speculations. The network of streams
presumably extends in near infinite configurations within certain spatial limits: that of
consciousness. These networks are remarkable metaphors for artists working in the
early twentieth century furiously grappling with the rapid shifts in everything from
physics to psychoanalysis, from history and writing, mathematics and logic, etc.
“Woolf, unlike Jane Austen,” for example, write David Daiches, “was writing in a
world in which there was no consensus of opinion concerning what ‘reality’ was, and,
unlike some of her contemporaries, she was very much aware of that lack of
agreement” (Daiches 38-39), she is aware of the difficulty of the possibility of being a
single conversation. Where there is no consciousness, there are no more networks of
conscious streams; where there are networks, there is dissonance, confusion,
alienation but also intimacy, a profound sense of both closeness and loss. What
proves fascinating about “Time Passes” is that the section not only operates as a
temporally compressed corridor connecting “The Window” and “The Lighthouse;” in
addition, “Time Passes” founds a self-similar configuration to the veins or filaments
making a network of streams—or any network, for that matter—conceivable. That is,
the three part novel as a whole is itself emblematic of McDougall’s network: from
mind (“The Window”) to in-between minds—or level crossing between text and
reader—(“Time Passes”) to mind (“The Lighthouse”). Yet, the discussion here is not
so much concerned with an examination of the interconnectedness of minds or of the
aesthetics of stream of consciousness. Rather, the tripartite structure of To the
Lighthouse offers an architecture for considering the reader’s descent into the diegetic
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level of the text—and the text’s ascent into the reader—through the consideration of
Heidegger’s conceptualization of the temporality of being.
The logic here may suggest that “Time Passes” is that which departs from mind
and thus limits the psychological intimacy of the passage since the narrative throws
the reader from the experiences within to a reality without. Yet, the thoughts of Mrs.
Ramsay in “The Window” prove less affectively profound, and less emotionally
proximate, than the account of her death—always and perpetually receding from the
present—in the novel’s most startling sentence: “[Mr. Ramsay, stumbling along a
passage one dark morning, stretched his arms out, by Mrs. Ramsay having died rather
suddenly the night before, his arms, though stretched out, remained empty]” (Woolf
140). Janine Utell suggests that Mrs. Ramsay’s “death occurs early in the second part
of the novel, “Time Passes,” itself devoted to the symbolic exploration of the
insignificance of the individual when situated within the inexorable cosmic forces of
time and nature” (Utell 4). This presumed insignificance of the individual is rendered
inside out when we consider the ontological position of the reader, an individual, as
the animating force moving the diegetically constituted cosmic forces. Mr. Ramsay’s
arms, like the filaments that connect both the minds and the sections of Woolf’s
triptych are less corridors than couloirs: an anxious series of pathways as deficiencies
that make manifest the contingency of the reader as the direct foundation upon which
the reader simultaneously attempts to cling. The diegetic status of “Time Passes” as
in-between is thus analogous to the ontologic and topological status of the reader-asstretched-out-arms. The psychological interiorization of “The Window” and “The
Lighthouse” are intimate in a limited sense: the reader is both the prime mover of the
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diegesis yet accepts the conceit as observer thus establishing a kind of pseudointimacy. With “Time Passes,” the reader, however, accompanies solely himself as
the agent for both diegetic movement and change while this narrative flowing and
transformation operates as the medium that affects the reader. The distinction is one
of diegetic relativity. That is, the novel posits the reader in a position where they
claim “but this is what I see; this is what I see” (Woolf 24) and, simultaneously, sing
“damn your eyes, damn your eyes” (82). Reflect upon Lily’s mourning for Mrs.
Ramsay as an example of temporal and ontological proximity on the diegetic level of
the text itself: “Oh the dead! She murmured, one pitied them, one brushed them aside,
one had even a little contempt for them. They are at our mercy. Mrs. Ramsay has
faded and gone, she thought. We can over-ride her wishes, improve away her limited,
old fashioned ideas. She recedes further and further from us” (190). Counter
intuitively, however, “Time Passes,” proves the most intimate section of To the
Lighthouse; the reader, by being revealed as the narrative mover and changer—as
time—is thus situated both without the characters and within them. While Mr
Ramsay’s arms remain empty and Mrs. Ramsay, along with her ideas and beliefs,
seems to perpetually recede from those who mourn her on the textual level of
narrative, to the reader—ascended/descended into multiple levels of diegesis—the
spectral Mrs. Ramsay remains hauntingly affective regardless of her existence or nonexistence. For Lily, “the faint thought she was thinking of Mrs. Ramsay seemed in
consonance with this quiet house; this smoke; this fine early morning air” (Woolf
176); yet, the reader is occupying different temporal and spatial locations, the reader
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is the smoke “like a fume rising upwards” holding diegetic levels and temporal loops
safe together.
That is, Woolf’s To the Lighthouse, and specifically “Time Passes,” is the locus
for fascinating and idiosyncratic modes of reflexivity. The intimacy achieved in
“Time Passes” is the result of this reflexivity: the reader is at once the mover and
changer of language and yet language is the self-implicating category and
precondition of cognitive discourse that allows this process to proceed. Like Mrs.
Ramsay’s observation that little Prue is “just beginning, just moving, just descending”
(Woolf 118-119) into adulthood, the reader descends—the use of the relative descent,
rather than ascent, attests to the strange loopiness of this temporality—into the text,
the text rising up into the reader—we are “filled…with words” (44)—establishing a
kind of homeostatic and looping heterarchy of ontological cause and effect: “the
words…sounded as if they were floating like flowers on water out there, cut off from
them all, as if no one had said them, but they had come into existence of themselves”
(120). The nature of movement and change in this kind of language occurs on
multiple levels, from the morphological to the syntactical to the semantic yet these
levels presuppose the reader as primum movens. “Proof must not already presuppose
what its task is to found,” writes Heidegger,
[but] if interpretation always already has to operate within what is understood
and nurtures itself from this, how should it then produce...results without
going in a circle, especially when the presupposed understanding still operates
in the common knowledge of human being and world? But according to the
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most elementary rules of logic, the circle is a circulus vitiosus. (Heidegger
Being and Time 147-148)
Heidegger’s point is well taken, and an effective assessment of the paradox of the
vicious circle of self-reflexivity. This presupposition also attests to Prue’s descent
into the future or the reader’s descent into the novel. Yet, this self-reflexive reduction
proves counter intuitively productive: an awareness of a proof—a unique and isolated
diegetic topos—necessitates the presupposition of the very concept of that proof. The
means of recognizing this logic is also the effect of the logic; permeating and
embedding one diegetic topology is the negation of that very topos in the conventions
of literary narrative, and Woolf achieves this successfully in “Time Passes.” By
placing the reader in the same ontological position as Mr. Ramsay’s outstretched
arms, the reader, as if not an a priori utterance, is manifest as, and intensely situated
within, time; one is floating like flowers on water, out there, as if coming into, and
descending into, the temporal existence of oneself.
Again, To the Lighthouse is a novel of mourning, of elusive beginnings and
evasive ends; consequently, the reader, being both prime mover and one obliterated
into a vicious cycle is also posited in a topos of phantom origins and spectral closure.
Reflexivity, whether literary or otherwise, does ultimately “begin at home,” suggests
Steven J. Bartlett, “in individual mental space: it is something best understood
informally by its experience, rather than by stipulated or hypothetical definition”
(Bartlett 7). Appropriately, Woolf’s project establishes “Time Passes” at home in
multiple ways: biographical, at the level of character, and at the extra-diegetic level of
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the “splendid mind” (Woolf 39) of the extra-diegetic. “If this is so,” writes
Heidegger,
then the business of historical interpretation is thus banned a priori from the
realm of rigorous knowledge. If the fact of the circle in understanding is not
eliminated, historiography must be content with less rigorous possibilities of
knowledge…But even according to the opinion of historiographers
themselves, it would be more ideal if the circle could be avoided and if there
were the hope of finally creating a historiography which is as independent of
the standpoint of the observer as the knowledge of nature is supposed to be.
(Being and Time 148)
This remove of reflexivity from rigorous knowledge, however, is fundamentally a
feature of literature and the creative arts in general. Deleuze and Guattari suggest that
Heidegger remains a historicist to the degree that he “[posits] history as a form of
interiority in which the concept necessarily develops or unveils its destiny. The
necessity rests on the abstraction of the historical element rendered circular. The
unforeseeable creation of concepts is thus poorly understood” (Deleuze and Guattari
95). Similarly, Logician Paul Lorenzen suggests that “it does not make sense to ask
for an ‘explanation,’ or to ask for a ‘reason’…If you ask such questions…you have
already accepted at least the use of elementary sentences” (Lorenzen qtd. in Bartlett
6). Yet, as Bartlett suggests in his comment on reflexivity and psychotherapy, “it
appears that it is just this reflexive capacity to initiate self-change which characterizes
much of creative thought” (Bartlett 6). In short, there is no historiography, or any
writing, that can be extracted from the logic—or conceptual topos—of an observer.
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Nature, or “flesh turned to atoms which drove before the wind, of stars flashing in
their hearts, of cliff, sea, cloud, and sky brought purposely together to assemble
outwardly the scattered parts of the vision within” (Woolf 144) are “imaginations of
the strangest kind” (144) and are not simply mediated by the observer but are
reflexively embedded in multiple layers of diegesis. Or, “there is not a single thing
on earth that oblivion does not erase or memory change,” Borges remarks, “no one
knows into what images he himself will be transmuted by the future” (Borges
“Mutations” 41).
That we are filled with words and words are full of imaginations, posits a difficult
relation to the sound truth of such an analytical position as this. “What [Mr. Ramsay
the logician] said was true [to James]. It was always true. He was incapable of
untruth” (Woolf 8), though Mrs. Ramsay is more acute to note that the incapability of
truth is “absurd” and “impossible” (24) since, at best, “one could not say what one
meant;” more loopy, however, is that while this is accurate, one is constituted by this
mismatching signification. Later, Mrs. Ramsay, “starting from her musing” (35)
realizes the reality of such logical reversals: “she gave meaning to words which she
had held meaningless in her mind for a long stretch of time” (35). From the diegetic
level of the reader, it is this capacity to initiate transformation that corresponds to the
in-between status of “Time Passes” and proves productive on both the level of
narrative and reader. Situated in the non-space of knotted reflexivity and posited by
the novel as a proxy for time, the reader is, forced into a position of thinking towards
the question of becoming the text itself and, at the same time, recognizing how the
text becomes the reader. All this posits the reader as diegetic movement and change
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and therefore as a diegetic configuration of time itself. The reader is the source of the
narrative motion and diegetic change but is never an end in itself. “They must find a
way out of it all,” we might say about the viscous circle, “there might be some simple
way, some less laborious way” (Woolf 10). How far, then, is a book influenced by its
reader’s life? Perhaps there is a way out of it all, but we always start from our own
musings; resultantly, everyday lived experience is all the more startling.
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Chapter Three

Babelian Act of Fecundity: Ineluctable Modalities
and Joyce’s Sentimental Information
___________________________
This water, this movement keep people’s minds open…high tide
bring the space, the temptation, the consolation of possibility.
-Robbe-Grillet
River running free you know how I feel…
Stars when you shine you know how I feel…
-Anthony Newley and Leslie Bricusse

Robert Scholes, in his 2003 introduction to Clive Hart’s essay “James Joyce’s
Sentimentality” (1967), suggests that the “modernist critics, from I. A. Richards
through all the New Critics, had an almost pathological fear of sentimentality” (Hart
26). Scholes notes that “there are things about modernism that are not visible clearly
without a proper appreciation of the sentimental” and it is first with Hart’s essay that
meaningful discussion of Joyce’s sentimentalism may be properly discussed. Hart
claims that “Joycean modes of sentimentality require closer and more careful scrutiny
than they have hitherto received” (26). Noting that “[Joyce] was out of touch with the
work of his contemporaries and wrote, despite his surface brilliance, in an
unsophisticated, even naïve manner,” Hart remarks that when “Joyce is overemotional toward his subject, as is the case of parts of ‘Anna Livia,’ he reveals some
of the sentimentality of the proletarian writer who gives undue emphasis to the
cultivation of ‘feeling’ for his subject” (Hart 27). Sentimentalism itself is notable for
its ability to transfer emotion to the neutral and to metamorphose the objective topos
of interpretation into a looping kind of emotionally driven constructivism. Indeed,
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the psycho-ecological relationship between language and text is one that is not simply
felt in the body but is also experienced emotionally. Is it not appropriate that the
great artificer understands the potentiality of the creative and constructive dimensions
of feeling? Peter Mahon suggests that Finnegans Wake is not a mimetic text; that is,
the work does not aim to imitate reality as a thing or as an idea. Instead, he writes
that in place of mimetic processes “Finnegans Wake proposes the problematic of the
‘immargination’ (4.19)—a sort of unlimited imagination—which tries to picture the
ever-receding figure of Finnegan, who is lost in a past that has never been present or a
future that never arrives” (Mahon 3). What is of concern here is the idea of an
unlimited imagination as a form of psycho-ecology that functions as an alternative to
mimesis. Rather than representation, the informational mode of Finnegans Wake is
reconstructive and poetic. It offers possibilities and does so through an intensely
intimate process. In order to examine this, in this chapter we turn to the “Nuvoletta”
episode (FW 157.8-159.18) to analyze the strange logic of chaos and information
theory and Linda Hutcheon’s theory of cross-media adaptation as a means of
demonstrating how complexity lends itself to order and how texts that appear
limitless are, in fact, not expansive but inwardly infinite. Finally, I suggest that these
dynamic and chaotic patterns of engagement lend themselves to the mutual cognitive
and emotional transformation of both text and reader.
“Proteus,” the third episode of Joyce’s Ulysses, is an exhilarating prose experiment
in interior monologue and stream of consciousness in which the reader is granted
access to the rapid semantic associations and dislocations that take place in the mind
of Stephen Dedalus. The narrative motion of “Proteus” is aberrant and elegant,
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chaotic and intricately crafted. This episode also represents an example of structural
reflexivity. Reflexivity, here, is the textual flow, or movement, that generates a
diegetic system, that, by a switch to another narrative perspective proves to be part of
the diegetic system it alleges to create. It is the aberrant meandering of Stephen’s
intellection which constitutes the structure of “Proteus:” as Stephen thinks—
according to logical and syntactic structures as unpredictable, shifting, and vast as the
sea—the structure of a syntactic and semantic labyrinth is built. In short, through the
act of thought Stephen constructs an intellectual labyrinth, while his consciousness
simultaneously becomes part of the developing structure. The structure of “Proteus”
is not simply mimetic of Stephen’s consciousness and thought patterns; it is also
exemplary of a reflexive self-generating labyrinth.
Stephen’s thought processes are liquid, irregular, and oscillating; consequently, so
is the labyrinthine structure of the episode. In “Proteus,” language and its referent,
perceiver and percept, the architect and the labyrinth are equally protean as they are
all constituted within a self-reflexive system. The progression of “Proteus” gives the
sense of a fluid dynamic, or of unpredictable movements in divergent and looping
patterns, and thus the reader, like Stephen, becomes lost in a protean labyrinth from
which there is no escape. Joseph Campbell’s reading of “Proteus” reminds the reader
of the structural implications of the episode: “it is [in ‘Proteus’] that [Stephen]
realizes his problem is…to escape from his own ego” (67). That is, Stephen’s desire
to escape his own ego can be equated with the desire to escape from the labyrinth of
his own construction. However, the only hope Stephen can entertain in terms of
elluding the self-reflexive labyrinth is analogous to the tragic fate met by Icarus—
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symbolized in the episode by the drowned man. Death or non-consciousness, in this
sense, would be Stephen’s only escape from the labyrinth, yet he can only think of the
drowned man in association with “another literary drowning, that of Edward King, a
symbol of untimely death in Milton’s ‘Lycidas’” (Fairhall 185). So long as Stephen
is conscious, he will find himself—no matter how vast his intellectual excursions—
within the same system of his creation via language; or, simultaneously, within the
self reflexive system that creates him. The printed word, according to McLuhan,
carries with it the “power to create what [Joyce] throughout Finnegans Wake
designates as ‘the ABCED-minded,’ which can be taken as ‘ab-said’ or ‘ab-sent,’ or
just alphabetically controlled” (McLuhan Understanding Media 383-384). In short,
Stephen and the labyrinth are both simultaneously cunning artificers and
alphabetically controlled.
This labyrinthine structure of “Proteus” shares fascinating parallels to a structural
phenomenon of Hofstadter’s “strange loop.” As the most influential idea to arise
from Hofstadter’s book the strange loop is perhaps also of significant interest in
thinking about “Proteus” in terms of the relationship between the structure of the text
and Stephen’s consciousness: a structural analogue to the relationship between
metaphorical language and metanoiac response of the language user. Craig Werner
writes, in his 1980 review of Gödel, Escher, Bach in the James Joyce Quarterly that
Like Ulysses and Finnegans Wake, Douglas R. Hofstadter’s Gödel, Escher,
Bach: An Eternal Golden Braid is a book of strange loops and tangled
hierarchies, systems and metasystems, elusive figures on shifting grounds.
Although it never alludes directly to Joyce, Gödel, Escher, Bach…radiates a
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Joycean delight in resolving seeming incongruities and paradoxes into
intellectual and esthetic unities. (Werner 223)
Indeed, Stephen’s consciousness as it is represented in “Proteus” is a tangled
hierarchy teeming with paradox: the representation of a thought process that becomes
part of the system of representation. In “Proteus,” the sense of semantic
progression—or following one concept to the next toward some meaningful
conclusion—may feel like movement in a hierarchy but is, after all, illusory; the
movement of Stephen’s thoughts simply gives rise to a fluctuating closed cycle.
Hugh Kenner suggests that “every theme in the entire lifework of James Joyce is
stated on the first two pages of the Portrait” (Kenner “The Portrait in Perspective”
33). Alternatively, the first two words of “Proteus,” “Ineluctable modality” (Joyce
31), may also shed new light on the entirety of Finnegans Wake: an ever-mutating
dynamic strange loop structure characteristic of perpetual semantic and informational
reconfiguration. Within this self-reflexive system, Stephen’s labyrinthine
consciousness is constituted by an inescapable tendency to conform to a particular
pattern. That is, the ineluctable modality as a structure is a strange loop. Despite the
fluid motion of the episode, there remains a haunting sense of structural determinism
amidst the dynamism.
In other words, the structure of “Proteus” is constantly in the paradoxical process
of level-crossing—the levels being the tangential pathways of thought Stephen takes,
the metamorphosis of the meaning of words, Stephen’s perception of the phenomenal
world, and the reader’s experience of reading “Proteus”—thus leading the reader
further into the protean labyrinth. In reading the episode, these varying levels of the
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narrative are paradoxically in relation to one another according to a whirling singular
structure. As Stephen struggles with the mutation of words and the divergent
pathways of the thoughts he experiences, with the reader, the disorientation of a
protean labyrinth, the phenomenon of the strange loop, and an ineluctable modality.
So, in engaging the structure of “Proteus,” returning to Hofstadter’s phrase, “despite
one’s sense of departing ever further from one’s origin, one winds up, to one’s shock,
exactly where one had started out.”
In a sense, the prospective impulse of “Proteus” is embedded within these two
opening words: ineluctable modality. Hofstadter’s speculations upon the relationship
between multiple levels of reality—or in this case, levels of diegesis—are emblematic
of a kind of ineluctable modality; that is, the strange loop and its meandering levelcrossing dynamics is, despite its closed-system determinism, ultimately a remarkably
proliferating process of linguistic transformation in itself. Werner suggests that
Hofstadter’s investigations are perhaps most appropriate for a reading of the Wake
since the latter is concerned with the “relationship between the levels of ‘reality’
within intellectual and esthetic systems” that “touch directly on issues of central
concern to Joyceans” (Werner 223). Hofstadter’s work, according to Werner, may
offer new ways of looking at Joycean scholarship itself in a kind of heterarchical
manner. Hofstadter’s examination of human brain activity on both the reductionist
level of neuronal chemical squirts to the more ubiquitous level of the “abstract mind”
(224) may itself provide a way in which scholars may satisfy provisional connections
“between work on individual words and phonemes (the lexicons), external contexts
(Atherton), plot and character (Eckley, McHugh), themes (Benstock), and
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encompassing structural patterns (Begnal, Norris, Hart)” (224). That is, the
difficultly of integrating diverse yet individually effective studies may simply “reflect
a basic human incapacity for reconciling the various levels of operation of the human
brain” (224). Hofstadter’s response may be to begin thinking of the relationship
between different modes of interpretation by means of heterarchical or nonhierarchical relationships. “Each description remains valid on its own level,”
suggests Werner in his discussion of major moves in Wake criticism, “but there is not,
and perhaps cannot be, an inclusive system which clarifies the interaction of the
various levels in the mind of the intuitive reader” (224). In short, Hofstadter’s work
is relevant to Joycean criticism, particularly in relation to the Wake because it is
concerned with the connections and disjunctions that are established between systems
and perceived realities. Like Joyce, Hofstadter is also concerned with ineluctable
modalities.
Grappling with the tangled hierarchies of language and semantics of the Wake as
well as the critical work on the piece—engaging with the various semantic and
diegetic levels that constitute such interpretive activity—ultimately complicates the
possibility of observing the text from an ontologically privileged position. Like
Stephen’s predicament, the extra-diegetic level of the reader conforms to a loopy,
hierarchy-defying pattern. This is not to assert that there is overt self-similarity
between, for example, the processes at play on micro levels (say, morphology or
neural chemistry) and macro-level (the Wake as a whole and narratological
interpretation); instead, the ineluctable modality determines that these different levels
are frequently occupied simultaneously, looping from one level to another or multiple
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levels at the same time—“‘Simultaneously,’” Hugh Kenner suggests, “gives us
Finnegans Wake” (Kenner Joyce’s Voices 90)—thus conforming to rapidly
reconfiguring patterns suggesting diegetic level-crossing. Again, Werner:
Gödel demonstrated that there will always be true statements concerning a
system which cannot be proved using the procedures defined into the system.
Hofstadter, who cautions against simplistic metaphorical extensions of
Gödel’s theorem, observes that incompleteness forces us to “leap out of the
system” if we wish to reach the most profound levels of understanding. We
must be willing to employ intuitive, as well as mechanical, modes of thought.
(Werner 223)
The irony here is that once one leaps out of the system, one extends the system; at the
exit of the labyrinth is another corridor. The system, a kind of ubiquitous series of
different diegetic levels conforming to determined patterns, is an extension of the
human mind and the human mind is an extension of the system. The immanent
contours of the ineluctable modality ensures that the possibility of transcending the
liminal borders of the system itself. Media theorist, Douglas Rushkoff, suggests “the
purpose of reductionism is to contain and manage nature. To reduce something to a
category puts it in a convenient, if unreal, box” (Rushkoff Screenagers 18). Gödel’s
gesture is one which, in a sense, attempts to establish a privileged position whereby
one may observe, contain, and manage the loopy paradox from afar. The gesture of
moving towards a meta-position, or an ontological space from which one can achieve
an intense and objective locale of interpretation is thus thwarted in favor of a
movement towards an ever-expanding interior that mutates and shifts according to the
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shifting sense-ratios of the perceiver’s nervous system. Or, to leap out of the system
simply means to construct a new level of the system. In the “Scylla and Charybdis”
episode of Ulysses, Stephen famously claims that “A man of genius makes no
mistakes. His errors are volitional and are the portals of discovery” (Ulysses 9.22829); such portals are the entrances to further labyrinthine corridors. The ubiquitous
quality of the Wake —that of being engulfed within a text that is, on multiple levels,
engaged in expanding feedback loops and multileveled diegesis—thus establishes a
difficult topology for interpretation. The reader, like Stephen’s man of genius, can
make no mistakes since any errors become extensions of the mind and prove to
induce further discoveries, further levels that may or may not prove fruitful. Instead
the system “seems to uncoil spirally and swell lacertinelazily before our eyes under
pressure of the writer’s hand” (FW 121.24-25). So, similar to Woolf’s To the
Lighthouse, the work is intimate in an intense way.
And such intimacy plays out in controversial ways in discussions of High
Modernist texts. It is here that we return to Hart. Hart’s definition of sentimentality
is in line with that of I. A. Richards’ Practical Criticism (1929):
Literary sentimentality…means, first, the attribution by the author of more
emotion than is warranted by his subject (excessive “feeling”) and, as a
corollary, seeking from the reader a similar overplus of emotion; second, the
dissociation of subject from emotion and the presentation of the latter
divorced from the former (with, as a corollary, the valuing of emotion for its
own sake); third, a distortion of reality in order to make possible an emotional
response which would not otherwise appear to be relevant; fourth, an evident
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desire to maintain an illusory state of affairs because this is felt to be more
pleasing than reality. (Hart 26-27)
What is immediately evident in both Hart’s and Richards’ engagement with
sentimentality is the value status separating emotion from “reality;” that is, a
distinction in this formulation of literary sentimentality between ontological levels;
that is, they ignore the operations of the ineluctable modality. Yet, Joyce’s
engagement with sentimentality is more ambivalent. Hart discusses Sven Fagerberg’s
suggestion that Joyce was situated between two extreme tendencies when confronted
with objects or persons who represented, for the author, some kind of heightened
emotion. This ambivalence is formulated as follows: “the love-object is treated either
with gross obscenity or with its opposite: sentimentality” (Hart 29). For the former,
Hart discusses Shaun’s coarse approach of the girls in Book III (FW 433.22-28) and
(FW 466.13-17). Hart also remarks on the “repudiation of the sentimental attitude to
women” (30) by commenting on Joyce’s portrait of Issy: “What exquisite hands you
have, you angiol, if you didn’t gnaw your nails, isn’t it a wonder you’re [not]
achamed of me, you pig, you perfect little pigaleen! I’ll nudge you in a minute! I bet
you use her best Perisian smear off her vanity table to make them look so rosetop
glowstop nostop" (FW 143.33-144). The gesture here is one that rapidly shifts
towards grossness from sentimentality. From the compliment of “exquisite hands” to
the insult of a calling Issy a “perfect little pigaleen,” Joyce establishes the functional
spectrum for emotional ambivalence.
On the opposite end of this ambivalence, however, are Joyce’s many descriptions
of Anna Livia and the fable of Issy in her manifestation as Nuvoletta. The Nuvoletta
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episode may have its root in biographical emotionalism. Finn Fordham identifies
evidence in the third volume of Richard Ellmann’s edition of the Letters of James
Joyce that “Issy is in part modeled on Lucia” and that “Joyce may be incorporating
his own and Lucia’s grief over her breakdown. When she broke out of her hospital
near Geneva (Les Prangins), and tried swimming across the enormous Lac Leman,
she was thought to be attempting suicide” (Fordham 201). Yet, if the Nuvoletta
episode is an expression of grief, it is not meant to serve solely as an imitation of
mourning. Instead, the Nuvoletta episode is—like the mode of the rest of work—
poetic, constructive, and imaginative; it is, at once, an expression of grief and a joyful
declaration of possibility. Perhaps at his best in the Wake, Joyce achieves this
ambivalence, that of writing in both manners simultaneously, when engaged in both
the sentimentalized and abstract—that is, quasi-religious if not occult—treatment of
Anna Livia. As both archetypal woman (sentimentality) and a more explicit
abstraction (goddess), Joyce achieves a kind of sentimentality
by means of incantation of rhetorical naming: “O tell me all about Anna
Livia! I want to hear all about Anna Livia. Well, you know Anna Livia? Yes,
of course, we all know Anna Livia” (FW 196.01-05). The goddess-like nature
is stated, without its being in any real sense evoked for the reader. The
concluding monologue, on the other hand, though more sentimental in the
popular sense—more lush, more emotional—attaches its emotion to a more
vividly realized character whose touches of divinity derive in a more direct
and vital way from the woman herself and her situation (Hart 30).
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Next, for Hart, the Nuvoletta scene is more or less immune to “false sentimentalism”
(30) by the “sharpness of definition of the value-bearing things” (30) which ornament
the description of the girl: “Nuvoletta in her lightdress, spunn of sisteen shimmers,
was looking down on them, leaning over the bannistars and listening all she childishly
could” (FW 157.8-10). When we note that the sixteen “shimmers” are transmuted
into a concretization by the “bannistars” and the Sistine chapel mutates the gazing
young girl into a “specific sort of angel with genuine theological reference” (30),
Joyce ultimately employs sentimentality as a means of countering his use of
sentimentality. In short, Hart suggests that Joyce’s complex use of sentimentality in
his fiction is a means of making both ends of the spectrum work simultaneously: “to
indulge his sentimentality and yet save himself from it” (Hart 30). This identification
of the logic of ambivalence in Joyce’s sentimentality seems an elaboration on a brief
comment by B.F. Skinner nearly a decade earlier. Discussing the Nuvoletta fable,
Skinner remarks that “An inferred intraverbal crying appears to be displaced by
lapping as a distortion of laughing. A river which laughs is acting as if it had the
heart of a child—that is to say, of the child river or brook. The hysterical mixture of
laughing and crying, of being both old and young, is appropriate to the whole
passage” (Skinner 309). 16 Both Hart and Skinner are making valuable observations
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George Cinclair Gibson in Wake Rites: The Ancient Irish Rituals of Finnegans Wake (2005)
identifies Isabel/Nuvoletta as a upper emanation of “the ancient Triple Goddess of the pagan Irish”
(Gibson 49) and says that “readers of the Wake have sensed that the three main protagonists—Isabel,
Anna, and Kate—are all aspects of one individual” and that “Anna’s triune manifestation bears a
remarkable resemblance to that of the pagan Triple Goddess of Ireland” (49). He notes that Issy is
identified with the stars and the sky, Anna with the middle realm of earth and water, and Kate with the
lower realms, one who “spends much of her time in [the house’s] basement” (50). Yet, all three are
embedded in one another and shift between realms in both delightful and confusing ways. Syncretism,
or mixing of this kind, is indicative of what Edmund Lloyd Epstein identifies as Joyce’s “source of
linguistic creativity” (Epstein 77). The argument between Shem and Shaun is indicative of the way
these forces compete. “The genitalia, the instinctual centres of the being that are the power of Shem,
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regarding an unusual mode of writing for a High Modernist figure; however, what
they do not fully address is the dynamic logic of what Hart considers Joyce’s
employment of sentimentality. What Hart and Skinner recognize as an ambivalent
implementation of the sentimental mode in the Wake operates as a rhetorical gesture
establishing the dynamic non-space of language as the extension—and means of
mutation—of the mind.
First, Hart remarks that Joyce’s use of sentimentality is one in which the author
attributes more “emotion than is warranted by his subject.” This claim is balanced, in
a way, by suggesting that this rhetorical gesture expects “from the reader a similar
overplus of emotion.” The relationship established here is reasonable: the author
crafts language in unusual ways to achieve an unusual response from the reader; that
is, this represents a procedure that is essentially without value in the sense that,
despite the emphasis on emotions, what is at stake is a readjustment of the senseratios via an unusual use of language. Hart’s second claim—“the dissociation of
subject from emotion and the presentation of the latter divorced from the former”—
may be, if meaningful at all, a claim for the procedure of linguistic transfer and
cognitive transformation itself. That is, “emotion for its own sake” is a fanciful
conceit at best. Alain Robbe-Grillet, in his introduction to the screenplay of Last
Year at Marienbad—a film that is balances its radicalism with sentimentality in an
extremely effective way—comments on a sentimental effect that may be similar to
the ambivalent sentimentalism employs by Joyce. For Robbe-Grillet, this effect is
are also the source of all language” (77) Epstein continues. Shaun is suspicious and anxious about the
power of the genitals and creative language. It is Nuvoletta, however, who wishes to “reconcile the
two brothers” (78) but with no success. Indeed, the manner in which paradoxical identities are at once
metonymical for, and in conflict with, one another adds to the shifting ambiguity of how the
characters—and their corresponding imaginative effects—affect the reader emotionally.
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one of persuasion: “[it] deals with a reality that the hero creates out of his own vision,
out of his own words. And if his persistence, his secret conviction, finally prevail,
they do so among a perfect labyrinth of false trains, variants, failures, and repetitions”
(Robbe-Grillet “Introduction to the Screenplay” 26). Emotion via sentimentality is
both the set of aesthetic actions and the cognitive response of a reader; of course, such
iterations are easily reversed once set in motion. The claim for dissociation of the
subject from emotion ignores the self-reflexive conceit that the subject is emotional
and emotion is the subject; and the whole algorithm is a dynamic bidirectional
feedback loop in which valueless procedures and semantic possibilities are rapidly
developing within a kind of ineluctable modality. Hart’s third and fourth definitions
of the function of sentimentality—“a distortion of reality in order to make possible an
emotional response” and a “desire to maintain an illusory state of affairs because this
is felt to be more pleasing than reality,” respectively—prove illustrative of the
embedded logic of unusually crafted language and that of a transformation of the
mind of the reader. “Segmentation equals sentimentality. The isolation of the sense
of sight quickly led to the isolation of one emotion from another, which is
sentimentality,” writes McLuhan, “‘Sophistication’ today is a negative version of
sentimentality, in which conventionally appropriate feelings are simply anesthetized.
But the due interplay of the emotions is not unrelated to synesthesia or interplay of
the senses” (McLuhan The Gutenberg Galaxy 157). In short, the invocation of
emotion does not yield a reality based on distortion but rather the distortion itself
becomes the extension of reality making via a reorganized use of the “appropriate”
senses. Furthermore, the hierarchy between reality and illusion becomes effectively

158

heterarchical in the sense that reality is the mediation of language; or, the cognitive
perception of the individual is continuously mutated, reconfigured, and dynamically
altered by the engagement with unusual linguistic assemblages. That is, the process
is a matter of distortion in the informational sense: noise. The more distorted the use
of language, the more rich in information the text itself becomes. Hart’s engagement
with Joyce’s sentimentalism, therefore, proves to be an impetus for the reflexive
nature of the radical use of language.
Critically quite a distance from Hart’s argument, Margot C. Norris’ article “The
Consequences of Deconstruction: A Technical Perspective of Joyce’s Finnegans
Wake” welcomes Derridian analyses in Wake criticism as a means of reviving the
radical interpretations with which the novel originally met. She argues that the
conservative criticism of the novel “is characterized chiefly by a belief that the work
contains fixed points of reference in the manner of a traditional novel” (Norris 130).
The Wake, Norris suggests, “serves as a literary exemplar” (133) of the “event” or
“rupture” that the concept of structure underwent, according to Derrida, in the late
nineteenth and early twentieth century. In her discussion, Norris explains that
the ‘rupture’ in the history of structure—brought about, as Derrida says by our
being self-consciously forced to ‘think the structurality of structure’—results
in the idea of a structure in which presence is not so much absent as
unlocatable. The center is ex-centric, and the structure is determined not by
presence but by freeplay. (132)
As an example of this “rupture,” Derrida identifies the language in the Wake as a
“Babelian act of war” aimed at conservative approaches to language, literature, and
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the structure of meaning. While deconstructive approaches to the Wake are
absolutely appropriate with their analytical operatives exposing textual fissures,
discrepancies, and inversions, such analyses may overlook the possible radical
subtexts of apparently conservative readings like that of Hart’s. However acentric
and subversive Joyce’s text may be, Norris remains insensitive to the fact that the
Wake is constructed by means of extensive reference to and reliance upon Western
literary canon, science, history, religion, and teleology.
In this sense, a reading of the Wake may benefit from a study responsive to the
supplementary relationship that links, reconfigures, and absorbs both radical and
conservative interpretative approaches to the novel. Norris’ Derridian reading claims
the Wake “goes beyond the plunder of language to destroy it, in order that we may see
how it is created” (147). However, inverting this analytical position may indeed
prove more rewarding. By reversing Norris’ argument, the implication is that Joyce
need not transcend the plunder of language nor does his writing need to violently
destroy it. Indeed, one cannot go beyond the plunder of language since the
ineluctable modality of this reflexivity simply allows for the labyrinth to expand and
distort ad infinitum with every increasing level and cycle. Rather, the Wake is
immersed in the plunder of language, constantly reconfiguring it, in order that we
may see how Joycean language is dynamically producing, reproducing, and mutating
both on the level of the text and the extra-diegetic spaces.
Here, and in the Derridian sense, language in the Wake is in a supplementary
relationship—not with a referent—but with language itself. The crucial difference,
however, is situated in the opposing directions to which these two methods gesture.
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This is where the significance of information theory is most salient and may offer
further insights into Joyce’s ambivalent sentimentality and how it operates. While
sharing many of the same methods and assumptions as deconstruction, the
conclusions derived from chaos and information theory are decidedly different. Both
analytical models assert a kind of radical textual interiority; however, information
theory suggests, in contradistinction to deconstruction, that the unveiling of chaos
within a closed system enhances the richness of permutational possibilities. Hart
remarks in Structure and Motif in Finnegans Wake (1962), that
Joyce was always an arranger rather than a creator, for, like a mediaeval artist,
he seems superstitiously to have feared the presumption of human attempts at
creation. The mediaeval notion that the artist may organise but cannot under
any circumstances create something really new is, of course, capable of
universal application but it is more than usually relevant to Joyce. (Hart 44)
This suspicion towards the act of creation thus gestures towards an aesthetic of
reconfiguration. Skinner writes that “Finnegans Wake…is and may well remain the
classic example of the recombination of borrowed verbal fragments including
extended intraverbal frames” (Skinner 308). By the 1960s, Hart suggests Joyceans
were “gradually becoming aware that every situation, description, and scrap of
dialogue in [Joyce’s] works was remembered, rather than imaginatively ‘created’”
(Structure and Motif 44). In the opening decades of the twenty first century, such an
aesthetic approach, that of reconfiguration or textual remix, is remarkably prevalent
and certainly owes much to the Joyce’s methodology. “Joyce was in advance of the
communications pundits of our own day [1970s],” writes Burgess, “in recognizing the
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fascination of media in themselves (like Marshall McLuhan) and the width of the
whole field of semiology (like Roland Barthes)” (Burgess Joysprick 24). Eliot
suggests that
History has many cunning passages, contrived corridors
And issues, deceives with whispering ambitions,
Guides us by vanities. (Eliot “Gerontion” 38)
Such is the mode of the Wake: a work of historical and mnemonic reconfigurations,
contrived labyrinths, the ambitious deception of conventional language, guided by
narcissistic vanities (that is, circular and loopy reflexive extensions amidst differing
levels of diegesis). While the Derridian mode gestures towards the subversion of
order, the analytical apparatus presented here suggests that the idiosyncratic language
of the Wake is indicative of the processes that underlie a supplementary relationship
between genuine originality, literary reproduction, and the metamorphosis of text
towards a new kind of multiplicitous literary order.
The critical discussion surrounding Joyce’s writing and the new sciences of chaos,
complexity, and information theory is relatively scarce yet its insight is highly
successful. Thomas Jackson Rice’s excellent study Joyce, Chaos, and Complexity
(1997) splits Joyce’s scientific influences in two directions: the science of the past for
Dubliners and A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man and an intense anticipation of
the sciences of chaos and complexity for Ulysses and the Wake. Indeed, Rice argues
that, like chaos theorists, the reader of the Wake is faced with the problem of
conceptualizing the connections that link minute and vast phenomena. Philip
Kuberski’s equally outstanding Chaosmos: Literature, Science, and Theory (1994)
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details a vast array of conceptual shifts in literature, science, philosophy, and theory
away from modernism towards a “chaosmos.” Key to Kuberski’s book is the
convergence of dichotomic preconceptions. The second chapter ,“Joycean Chaosmos
and the Self-Organizing World,” links Joyce’s agenda in the Wake largely with those
of the poststructuralists. Here Kuberski suggests Joyce’s project was largely
subversive and thus draws a similar conclusion to Norris: “Finnegans Wake is a
massive joke at the expense of the enlightenment inspired by Bacon, Descartes, and
Newton, perpetrated by one of its most rigorous students; an encyclopedia
compendium of world history, human sciences, and art—all consigned to darkness”
(Kuberski 70). N. Katherine Hayles in Chaos Bound: Orderly Disorder in
Contemporary Literature and Science (1990) suggests that the final impulse of these
types of studies “is to show that both scientific and literary discourses are being
distinctively shaped by a reevaluation of chaos. It is this vision that defines the
contemporary episteme and differentiates it from the modernist era” (177). However,
Hayles suggests that chaos, complexity, and the information sciences yield
constructivist readings rather than subversive analyses and may prove to be a critical
way out of the irony and reflexivity of the postmodern labyrinth; though, the exit
from such a labyrinth seems to be another labyrinth: Stephen’s protean labyrinth.
Reading the Wake in terms of chaos and information theory therefore allows for a
reading which is simultaneously radical and conservative, a means of conflating the
text as a reflexive technological extension of the human mind with traditional
discussion of literary sentimentalism.
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Developed in the 1940s at the Bell Telephone Laboratories, largely through the
work of mathematician Claude Shannon, information theory offers interesting
implications for radical studies of language. Shannon outlines the general
principles—and mathematical realization of those principles—of communication
systems in The Mathematical Theory of Communication (1949). Shannon’s lucid and
economic prose served as an impetus for specialists in the humanities to employ the
philosophical implications of information theory to their own fields of study. The
philosophical suggestion here most pressing for the study of literature is that
information theory allows for a study of the interrelationships and metamorphoses of
words and language without an analytic assumption that a linguistic unit in question
must corroborate with a meaningful referent. In his addendum to Shannon’s work,
“Recent Contribution to the Mathematical Theory of Communication,” Warren
Weaver explains:
The word information, in this theory, is used in a special sense that must not
be confused with its ordinary usage. In particular, information must not be
confused with meaning. In fact, two messages, one of which is heavily loaded
with meaning and the other which is pure nonsense, can be exactly equivalent,
from this present viewpoint, as regards information. (8)
This phenomenon may at first elicit a reaction of anxiety towards this intractable
divide between information and meaning. Meaning suggests a direct and ordered
relationship conjoining a signifier and its referent; information implies a relationship
that is metamorphosing and aleatoric. In other words, meaning is governed by pattern
while information is characterized by randomness. Burgess records that “Joyce often
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spoke of [Finnegans Wake] as mathematical, and one thing in it that the vast chaotic
dreaming mind never impairs is number” (Burgess Here Comes Everybody 270).
Yet, even if the dreaming—i.e. closed system—mind does not misinterpret number,
the arithmetic mode here is non-linear and chaotic; Joyce never impairs number in the
same sense that his asemic information fecundates into remarkably semantic
possibility. Like his formulation of sentimentality, Joyce indulges asemic possibility
yet saves himself from it. That is, since the Wake is a literary work, it must—in
accordance with information theory—paradoxically express aspects of both
semantically charged pattern and playful metamorphosing randomness.
As an analytical model for the study of the non-traditional mode of language
employed in the Wake, this paradox inherent in information theory, like that of
Joyce’s formulation of sentimentalism, allows for the creation of fascinating literary
possibilities. That is, the language of Joyce’s novel is certainly not mathematical
information in the pure sense of Shannon and Weaver. Rather, this move permits the
language of the Wake to work in terms of orthographic, phonetic, syntactic, etc.
relational networks which comment upon and complete their connections, only to
metamorphose and reorganize in new configurations. In her book How We Became
Posthuman: Virtual Bodies in Cybernetics, Literature, and Informatices (1999), N.
Katherine Hayles astutely expresses the implications of the paradox in question:
Identifying information with both pattern and randomness proved to be a
powerful paradox, leading to the realization that in some instances, an
infusion of noise into a system can cause it to reorganize at a higher level of
complexity. Within such a system, pattern and randomness are bound
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together in a complex dialectic that makes them not so much opposites as
complements or supplements to one another. (Hayles 25)
This supplementary relationship between pattern and randomness is fundamental in
examining the unique function of language in the Wake as that which is polysemous
yet its semantic multiplicity is constantly reorganizing itself at higher levels of
complexity. The language is, therefore, not necessarily gesturing toward a stable
referent but is rather reconfiguring a multiplicity of relationships within a closed
textual system.
Before examining a passage emblematic of literary sentimentalism in the Wake,
take the first paragraph of the novel as an example of how the relationship between
information and language may ameliorate an examination of heterarchical
sentimentalism and cognitive mutation. One reason this paragraph is of great
significance is that the first sentence of the novel is, as the reader eventually learns
some six hundred and twenty eight pages later, the second half of the novel’s final
sentence and is therefore metonymical of the ineluctable modality in question. It does
not demand much of a leap to accept that this structural peculiarity suggests
something about the notion of “beginning” and “end” as conceptual nodes in a pattern
that may become decreasingly manifest—though manifest nonetheless—within an
overarching structure governed by circularity and chaos. A similar trend is apparent
in the syntactical structures that configure the novel; while the language of the novel
is largely constructed and governed by complexity, the variety of syntactical
structures are principally identifiable as correct according to English grammatical
rules. Arguably, a preliminary observation of the unique circularity of the novel’s
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overall structure that is, however, the structural result of smaller units of
grammatically correct syntax reveals the paradoxical nature of interpreting the Wake.
Radical interpretation may focus on the idiosyncratic language and unusual structure
of the novel as definitively subversive forces, while conservative readings can
simultaneously proclaim the work’s correctness and impeccability in terms of
syntactical sophistication. The counterintuitive response to these two opposing
readings would be to assert that both have equal interpretive merit toward the same
end, particularly if the two analyses are necessarily permitted to function
simultaneously. Furthermore, both gesture towards the potency of language to
disorder the senses and the senses to, in turn, disorder language.
Upon closer examination, the strangeness of the supplementary, conflicting,
complementing, and metamorphosing nature of the work complicates any interpretive
approach to the novel. A paradoxical approach—that which is always gesturing
towards contradictory directions—may indeed be the most appropriate for an optimal
reading of the Wake. While this move does not require an elucidation of the textual
meaning, it does suggest the possibility of radical linguistic experimentation as a
chaotic path to thinking about the ceaseless metamorphosis and reconfiguration of
language and art within a closed system. In this sense, the first word of the text,
“riverrun” (1.1), is not necessarily, as Tindall suggests in A Reader’s Guide to
Finnegans Wake (1969), “the central word of the book” (30); the occurrence of
“riverrun” is, according to an alternative accuracy, anywhere and everywhere in the
book. That is, if there is neither beginning nor end to the Wake, there is also no
definitive centre, no possibility of finding the action “arundo…in midias reeds” (FW
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158.7). If the motion of the running river is “from swerve of shore and bend of bay”
and “brings us by a commodius vicus of recirculation back to Howth Castle and
Environs” (1.1-3) so confirming the structural loop of the novel, this circular motion
also suggests that the structure of the cycle is neither direct, stable, or linear. Rather,
the loop here is paradoxically back where it started, yet different. Indeed, to delimit
the complexity of the sentence (1.1-3) would yield something like “riverrun…brings
us” back by means of recirculation to “Environs;” “Environs,” is important in that, in
the French, the term suggests approximation—or, since it suggest the plural,
indefinite approximations. This structural loop does not destroy language in order to
reveal how it is constructed; rather, it suggests, through radical literary form, the
recirculation of ideas and their gradual metamorphosis into new, yet self-similar,
manifestations. Each time the novel is reread, a new novel is born; each time a new
novel is born, so is a new reader.
The metamorphosing loop of the novel itself is comprised of excessive divergence,
reiteration, digressions, and fissures. It may be argued that the components of the
novel are chaotically metonymic—that the metamorphosing, dispersing, and mutating
structure of a word or sentence contains the changing whole within its processes.
“There is considerable variation in the extent to which each individual chapter of
Finnegans Wake is organised according to an internal cyclic scheme, and in general it
is true to say that those chapters which were written or revised last tend to show the
greatest concern with cyclic development,” writes Hart, “such a late chapter may be
subdivided again and again until complete cycles are to be found in short sentences or
even in single words” (Hart Structure and Motif 45). While a delimited version of the
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sentence above suggests the cyclical metamorphosing nature of the novel, the
informational excess of the sentence does not function to destroy the traditional
utterance but rather adds to its flourishing richness. McLuhan intimates much the
same in his commentary on the work’s title: the title of the Wake “is a set of multileveled puns on the reversal by which Western man enters his tribal, or Finn, cycle
once more, following the track of the old Finn, buy wide awake this time as we reenter the tribal night. It is like our contemporary consciousness of the Unconsious”
(McLuhan Understanding Media 55). The river which runs past “Eve and Adam” to
“Howth Castle” reconfigures relationships between time and location. Here, the river
runs from Eden to Dublin Bay (Tindall 30). The reversal of names, “Eve and Adam”
rather than the traditional “Adam and Eve,” is also suggestive of the cyclical
“Environs;” that is, the reversal of the names demonstrates a metamorphosis through
reiterated cycles in sequential terms. That the river runs from the first humans to
Joyce’s contemporaries implies that the loop structurally reconfigures, not solely a
sequential order of names, but also concepts of temporal progression. Thus location
and temporality are also absorbed by a structure of radical interiority: a closed
feedback loop that is mutating with every cycle, yet in which each cycle cannot be
identified in terms of progressive, dichotomic, or hierarchical relations.
An analytic inclusion of the remaining words of the “opening” sentence again
significantly adds to the level of operational complexity. The riverrun brings us “by a
commodius vicus.” Burgess identifies the “vicus” as a signifying fissure:
Time remains the enemy; history must be spatialised. How? By seeing it as a
circle, a wheel perpetually turning, the same events recurring again and again.
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In the ‘Nestor’ episode in Ulysses there is a reference to Vico Road, Dalkey
[situated along the shore of Dublin Bay] and it is the Italian historiographer,
Giovanni Battista Vico (1668-1744), who shows the way to the wheel.
(Burgess 191)
“Vicus,” in this sense, responds to emphasis on acentric location and temporality.
The term conceptually links an Irish location—“vicus” being Latin for vicinity
(Tindall 30)— with the Italian historiographer’s Scienza Nuova in a fashion that is
spatially and temporally strange. However, these lines of association are neither
direct nor are they corroborative; Joyce’s diagrammatic structure of time collapses
linearity and causality into a purling structure of turbulence.
The term, “commodius” is more contentious. The term is most certainly linked to
the adjective “commodious” consequently modifying the multiplicitous “vicus” as
spacious and suitable. Tindall suggests that the term is “probably a reference to
commode or chamber pot, a suitable container for ‘riverrun’” (30). Campbell and
Robinson suggest that the neologism “sweeps the mind back to the Rome which
showed its first severe symptom of decay in the time of emperor Commodus”
(Campbell and Robinson 26). “Commodius” may also suggest a commode, a highly
ornamental piece of furniture characterized by its structural inclusion of drawers. A
conceptual assemblage of these four interpretations is telling. “Commodius” is a term
which is at once indicative of a “container” or a piece of furniture—that which forms
and structures the work as a whole, a work which is baroquely ornamented and
contains hidden chambers or convenient spaciousness—that is ultimately governed by
change and decay thus becoming emblematic of the relationship between text and the
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mind of the reader. To appropriate Campbell and Robinson’s notion of “decay” in
terms of information theory is to neutralize the negative value of the term. In this
sense, decay can be interpreted less according to a fall into an inferior condition and
more in terms of a transformation from one condition into another, a movement
towards ambient disorder. In his book, Ambient Findability, Morville discusses how
information technologies are developing means for users to find any kind of
information from any place at any time. In the book, Morville provides two simple
and effective definitions for ambience: “surrounding; encircling” and “completely
enveloping” (6). Indeed, the opening lines of the Wake attest to its ambient quality.
If we add to the ubiquitous quality of ambience the Heraclitean element of
unencumbered plasticity, we are confronted with the difficult task of navigating a
foggy and dynamically turbulent sea of both entropic information and ordered
semantics. In the field of information development and search engine marketing,
Morville employs the term “ambient findability” as that which “describes a fast
emerging world where we can find anyone or anything from anywhere at
anytime…Information is in the air, literally. And it changes our minds, physically.
Most importantly, findability invests freedom in the individual. ” (6-7). Yet,
ambience also invest a great deal of freedom for the linguistic processes constantly at
play in the Wake. In the opening three lines of the work, like the opening two words
of “Proteus,” Joyce introduces the reader to the theme and form of the novel—that of
ever shifting, circulating, and metamorphosing phenomena thus establishing the
novel, like its elements, as a literary shape shifter. The events will not, as Burgess
and Vico suggest, be the same “again and again;” rather, with each “pass,” the Wake
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becomes a new novel, configures new themes, and structurally mutates and adapts to
a new ecological iteration; simultaneously, as Morville suggests, what the reader
finds will change who the reader becomes.
The peculiarity of this phenomenon when speculating upon the Wake harkens back
to the crucial distinction between information and meaning characteristic of chaos
and information theory. To read Joyce’s work in terms of meaning—to attempt a
definitive exegesis of the text—is to comply with an ontological position which is
impossible for the Wake. This is to say that the very conceptual models and processes
that produce meaning are dichotomic. A linguistic signifier from this ontological
position, no matter how chimerical, must express significance or semantic intention—
it must gesture towards an end or purpose, it must correlate with some cultural
referent. The very concept of the tenor, a continuity of semantically charged
expression that progresses through a written work, purports a conceptual movement
towards the exterior, a semantic drift or flow that begins with an initial expression
which transcends itself and associates with an external referent.
Information, on the other hand, need not subscribe to a logic of binarism. Rather,
information is, in its mathematical sense, asemic and asignifying; the relationships
that develop through information are reflexive, chaotic, and internally self-organizing.
While language in the Wake cannot be equated directly with scientific information,
Joyce’s prose experiments can certainly optimize in potential when regarded as
aesthetics of proto-systems theory. “Form is what [Joyce] loves,” suggests Burgess,
“and it seems a pity that...prose form cannot subsist without content. Joyce’s content
is as limited, in terms of the separable and summarisable, as ingenuity can make it.
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He is, as we know, McLuhan’s delight” (Burgess Joysprick 119). Thinking about the
language of the Wake in terms of information—rather than meaning-generating
linguistic structures—may open new approaches of inquiry into the performance of
the work: that is, its effects on the mind of the reader. Chaos theory and information,
according to Hayles, express the
desire to breach the boundaries of classical systems by opening them to a new
kind of analysis in which information is created rather than conserved…chaos
is deemed to be more fecund than order, uncertainty is privileged above
predictability, and fragmentation is seen as the reality that arbitrary definitions
of closure would deny. (Chaos Bound 176)
To read the Wake in accordance with information—and therefore resist totalizing
exegesis of the text—is perhaps a more fruitful way of approaching the text as a kind
of writing which opens a multiplicity of possibilities for assertions of orthographic
assemblage and assemblages of the level of the senses and emotion.
The uncertainty of Joyce’s words—both chimeran and protean—declares
fecundity through their ability to metamorphose according to syntactic, temporal, and
affective relationships. Though traditional practices of writing seem to decay further
and further in the Wake, as the reader reexamines the text, the literary and aesthetic
possibilities of the novel simultaneously flourish. Shannon suggests that
the fundamental problem of communication is that of reproducing at one point
either exactly or approximately a message selected at another point.
Frequently the messages have meaning; that is they refer to or are correlated
according to some system with certain physical or conceptual entities…The
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significant aspect is that the actual message is one selected from a set of
possible messages. The system must be designed to operate for each possible
selection, not just the one which will actually be chosen since this is unknown
at the time of design. (31)
This system is much like Joyce’s novel itself; if there is indeed an actual message in
the Wake—such as the exegetic and reductionistic studies of Campbell, Burgess, or
Gordon (1986) reveal—this does not delimit the likelihood of other messages that
result from unusual configurations and reconfigurations of multiple levels of diegesis.
The relationships between words and meaning in the Wake are, in this sense, more
akin to the metamorphosis that information undergoes in a state of transmission in
that the chimerical portmanteau language is ever-dynamic, resisting an ultimate
referent; in the Wake there is no refuge for the dichotomic logic of denotation or
traditional formulations of sentimentalism. The Wake is constantly reconfiguring; the
novel is many novels. Like the traveler stepping in the Heraclitean river, the reader
of the Wake cannot read the same word twice.
Nor can narcissus gaze at the same reflection twice. It is appropriate, therefore,
that the Nuvoletta episode, like that case of Dorian Gray, is one of both
sentimentalism and narcissism. Joyce’s sentimental Narcissus is, unlike Wilde’s,
female and as a result the transformations, extensions, and mutations in sense and
sentimental ratios here gesture towards Joyce’s tendency to understand women in
reproductive terms. Christy Burns, in her article “An Erotics of the Word: Female
‘Assaucyetiams’ in Finnegans Wake,” remarks that “When a voice in Finnegans
Wake proclaims that ‘[t]he word is my Wife, to exponse and expound’ (FW 167.29),

174

it echoes a motif from Joyce’s earlier works that is brought to the fore in the Wake,
where it is alternately affirmed and ironized. Both women and words are potent
transformers in Joyce’s writing” (Burns 315). Burns is correct to note that the
“absolute demarcation of virgins and whores—in their relation to that which is
intellectually ‘pure’ are and that which arouses ‘kinetic’ desires” (315-316) is not
only a characteristic trait of Stephen, but also one that continues throughout Joyce’s
oeuvre. However, that this gesture is one that acknowledges “the dangers of
women’s sexual desires and [indentifies] the artist’s inability to control women (or
words) as a spur to the vengeful artist” (316) may be a point of contestation in the
sense that Joyce is not necessarily engaged in a struggle to control women and
language but employs textual formations of women as a means of demonstrating
certain operations of diegetic level transfer, linguistic extensions, and cognitive
transformations. Female narcissism, for Burns, is mediated by the male gaze. Like
Craft’s reading of Dorian Gray, however, the narcissism that concerns Burns is
Freudian, that which is engaged in “self-enrapture, which completely severs the
subject’s relation to the outside world, eliminating any prospect of influence of
affection” (318).
Narcissism here, on the other hand, is narcosis and amputation; in its pure sense,
narcissism is the absolute transfer of body and mind to the diegetic space of the
reflection. Nuvoletta’s act of reflexive reflection is explicitly expressed three times
during the fable: “Nuvoletta listened as she reflected herself” (FW 157.17-18); “her
feignt reflection” (FW 157.24); and, finally, “Nuvoletta reflected for the last time in
her little long life” (FW 159.6). In contradistinction to Freud’s formulation, the
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relation between the self and the outside world is intimate by extension rather than
severed in a literal sense; the prospect of influence and affection is heightened in an
intense way. The body is anesthetized because it is cognitively transferred to the
reflection yet the connection remains; the sense ratios extend in strange and nonlinear
formations; the relationship between body and media is closed in a complex knot of
perpetual reconfiguration. In this formulation of narcissism, if the body is present it
is aware of its presence as mediated through language; as a result of engaging with
language, the body and mind are transferred to the diegetic level of the linguistic or
aesthetic and are therefore negated. However, since the language user is aware of his
or her transfer into the reflection, he or she knows about their negation thus affirming
the presence of the body and mind. This intimate knot, the ineluctable modality, or
the strange loop is in this case one whereby the body is simultaneously present and
negated/anesthetized. Like Dorian, then, Nuvoletta is emblematic of the relationship
between language and the mind in terms of the narcissistic formula, the ineluctable
modality. Also, like Dorian, Nuvoletta’s narcissism ends in suicide; however, while
Dorian literally severs the intimate relationship between aesthetics and the body
resulting in his death—and the death of the wiggly level-crossing narrative—
Nuvoletta’s suicide is one that occurs early in the work and is more accurately a scene
of ambient transformation than of diegetic negation. Dorian effectively ends up like
the drowned man in “Proteus,” severed from the realm of language and, as a result,
dropped from the text. Nuvoletta, on the other hand, as a sentimental and narcissistic
operative establishes the manner in which a character is both present and absent in the
text, evaporating then liquefying, and transferring the body absolutely into the text
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while simultaneously transforming into Anna Livia, the water, the Heraclitean river,
the subject and substance of the textual dream. While Hart’s definition of
sentimentalism and Freud’s formulation of narcissism both stress disjunction and
dissociation, the Nuvoletta episode demonstrates how emotion, like narcissism,
depends on an intensely intimate relationship between differing narrative topologies.
Burns’ formulation of this logic operates in much the same way, though in the terms
of relationships amongst women rather than level of narrative: “In Joyce’s
construction of female identifications, narcissism, even in its altered form, eliminates
the aggression implicitly upon realizing the alienation or difference encoded within
identification. Narcissism becomes the ability to simply embrace a contiguity, a
similitude that links the distinct subjects” (Burns Gestural Politics 99). Nuvoletta’s
suicide, whereby she becomes water—and by extension, a similitude with the text
itself—ultimately expresses the informational fecundity associated with the
ineluctable modality.
Nuvoletta’s tale is, at first glance, a relatively simple narrative in comparison with
much of the Wake. Nuvoletta appears in the short episode—itself a translation of a
Javanese parable from the professor’s lecture—featuring the authoritarian Mookse
who, while out for an evening walk, encounters a strange creature hanging from the
branch of a tree, the Gripes. Their conversation rapidly turns into a debate whereby
the Mookse is aggressively demanding the Gripes’ respect and recognition of the
former as the superior. The Gripes more or less ignores the Mookse’s insistence and,
as a result, the two engage in a battle of words, a massive Babelian act of war. This is
the context of Nuvoletta’s story. “The Nuvoletta portion of the tale,” suggests
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Bernard Benstock in “Beyond Explication: The Twice-Told Tale in Finnegans
Wake,” “is entirely subsumed by the Nuvoletta voice, from the opening sentence…to
the closing sentence…The style is remniscient of the first half of the “Nausicaa”
chapter of Ulysses, where any pretense of objective narration is forgone and a
narrative mode that is romantically young and feminine is in full swing” (Benstock
100). Whether this narrative mode is indeed “feminine” is not particularly the point;
what matters most is that Nuvoletta’s episode—though a fable in the tradition of the
Russian fabulist Ivan Krylov (McHugh 159)—is, like that of “Nausicaa,” reminiscent
of the language of romantic novelettes (phonologically similar to Nuvoletta’s name)
that were marketed to women at the time: “I mean for those crylove fables fans who
are ‘keen’ on the pretty-pretty commonface sort of thing you meet by hopeharrods”
(FW 159.13-15).
What is remarkable, though, is the sentimentality of the Nuvoletta episode:
Nuvoletta in her lightdress, spunn of sisteen shimmers, was looking down on
them, leaning over the bannistars and listening all she childishly could. She
was alone. All her nubied companions were asleeping with the squirrels. Their
miwer, Mrs Moonan, was off in the Fuerst quarter scrubbing the backsteps of
Number 28. Fuwer, that Skand, he was up in Norwood's sokaparlour, eating
oceans of Voking’s Blemish. Nuvoletta listened as she reflected herself,
though the heavenly one with his constellatria and his emanations stood
between, and she tried all she tried to make the Mookse look up at her (but he
was fore too adiaptotously farseeing) and to make the Gripes hear how coy
she could be (though he was much too schystimatically auricular about his ens
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to heed her) but it was all mild’s vapour moist. Not even her feignt reflection,
Nuvoluccia could they toke their gnoses off for their minds. (FW 157.08-25)
The evening progresses and the Mookse and the Gripes pay no heed to Nuvoletta and
her attempts to attract their attention. “A woman of no appearance” then gathered
“up his hoariness the Mookse motamourfully where he was spread and carried him
away to her invisible dwelling” (FW 158.25-28). The Gripes is, meanwhile,
“plucked…torn panicky autotone, in angeu from his limb and cariad away its
beotitubes” (158.35-36) by a “woman to all important” (158.32). Where the space of
debate was once occupied by the Mookse and the Gripes, “there were left now an
only elmtree and but a stone” (159.3-4). So, by failing to attract the attention of the
Mookse and the Gripes,
Nuvoletta reflected for the last time in her little long life and she made up all
her myriads of drifting minds in one. She cancelled all her engauzements. She
climbed over the bannistars; she gave a childy cloudy cry: Nuée! Nuée! A
lightdress fluttered. She was gone. And into the river that had been a stream
(for a thousand of tears had gone eon her and come on her and she was stout
and struck on dancing and her muddied name was Missisliffi) there fell a tea,
a singult tear, the loveliest of all tears (I mean for those crylove fables fans
who are ‘keen’ on the pretty-pretty commonface sort of thing you meet by
hopeharrods) for it was a leap tear. But the river tripped on her by and by,
lapping as though her heart was brook: Why, why, why! Weh, O weh! I’se so
silly to be flowing but I no canna stay! (FW 159.06-18).
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As Hart remarks, Joyce employs sentimentality as a way of negating sentimentality,
simultaneously employ information to negate meaninglessness. In this sense, Joyce’s
sentimentalism operates in a self similar way to the narcissism of Nuvoletta: that of
the paradoxical knot or yet another ineluctable modality. Here, sentimentalism is
negated via ambivalence; thus its logic is transferred and transformed into
ambivalence. Since the transformation is transparent—and on display—the rhetorical
employment of ambivalence ultimately heightens the significance of sentimentalism.
Therefore, Joyce’s sentimentalism is not simply negated but is simultaneously
emotionally lush and leaden, swirling unpredictably between the two. That is, “one
of the most remarkable things about Finnegans Wake” Hart remarks, “is the way in
which emotion, in respect both of feeling and of tone, pops in and out of the book.
Hard, cerebral writing suddenly gives way to an emotional extreme, and vice versa”
(Hart “James Joyce’s Sentimentality” 28). Another way of considering this modality
is to think of Joyce’s formulation as sentimentalism mirroring itself: the sentimental
mode reflecting upon the sentimental mode in a bidirectional feedback loop,
affirming and negating itself according the logic of McLuhan’s Narcissus. Like the
semantic conundrums that link information and meaning, and the relationship
between the numbed senses and media extensions, the sentimental dimensions of the
Wake are enhanced in the presence of ambivalence by means of tangled diegetic
hierarchies. Nuvoletta, “her heart…brook” ultimately, dissolves into the river and
like the Heraclitean river, she will no longer remain semantically static: “so silly to be
flowing but I no canna stay.”
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Yet, what is perhaps most striking about the Nuvoletta episode is how Joyce
actively demarcates differing diegetic levels by means of a topological distinction
between the clouds and the river. These topologies as conceptual metaphors establish
a kind of geometrical grid that permits the visualization of diegetic matrices in such a
way as to facilitate the interdependent relationships between the concrete and the
abstract. In 1965, American neurophysiologist, neurobiologist, and Nobel laureate,
Roger Sperry, intimates a kind of abstract topology for the diegetic level of ideas in
his paper “Mind, Brain, and Humanist Values.” Sperry suggests a self similarity
between the two differing levels: neurons and the ideas that these neurons make
possible. As always, this logic may also operate in reverse. The suggestion is one of
ontological significance in that Sperry suggests that neurons and ideas may coexist on
the same level of reality; that is, the relation between the brain and ideas is
heterarchical or, at least, a tangled hierarchy. In a sense, the reader is like Nuvoletta,
“looking down…leaning over the bannistars and listening;” intensely engaged,
though like a child, not fully conscious of the mental processes that leap and fall
between different levels of a tangled diegetic schema. Nuvoletta’s life does not end
in suicide, but rather in evolving metamorphosis. “Ideas cause ideas and help evolve
new ideas,” Sperry writes, “They interact with each other and with other mental
forces in the same brain, in neighboring brains, and thanks to global communication,
in far distant, foreign brains. And they also interact with the external surroundings to
produce in toto a burstwise advance in evolution that is far beyond anything to hit the
evolutionary scene yet” (Sperry 36) Ideas, like organisms, are apt to mutate and
adapt to their environment. The primordial ooze of nature is, in this sense, analogous

181

to a kind of primordial riverrun of the Wake where “the river tripped on [Nuvoletta]
by and by, lapping as though her heart was brook;” organisms and ideas, materialism
and abstractionism, brains and language are all subject to the same systemic
parameters of dynamism and plasticity. Gleick writes that
Atoms of hydrogen, oxygen, carbon, and iron could mingle randomly for the
lifetime of the universe and be no more likely to form hemoglobin than the
proverbial chimpanzees to type the works of Shakespeare. Their genesis
requires energy; they are built up from simpler, less pattered parts, and the law
of entropy applies. For earthly life, the energy comes as photons from the
sun. The information comes via evolution. (Gleick 292)
Like Borges’ “Library of Babel” (1941), the biosphere—or, on the higher level of
information—infinite combination just as on the scale of infinite ideas, all possible
ideas find their home among the semantic abyss of endless combination for the
reader’s “bungless curiasity” (FW 157.25-26). Likewise, sentimentality in the Wake
gestures towards continuity of possibility rather than disjunction. Where there is
absolute possibility in a single level of narrative, there is no “gnoses” (FW 157.25), or
knowledge. Where there is possibility in noisy, looping relationship amongst
multiple levels, there is the possibility of knowledge by constant reorganization of
semantic extensions of the mind. Likely the former is the reason why so few have
undertaken the task of theorizing a kind of selection of ideas. That is, for many
scientists it is tempting to shy away from such poetic conceits—the cognitive
fecundity of conceptual metaphor—in favor of a more staunch materialism indifferent
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to the medium of communication: linguistic potentiality. That Sperry and others take
the pains to entertain this diegetic topology, however, is telling.
French Jesuit paleontologist and philosopher Pierre Teilhard de Chardin17
established an analogous conceptual topos to describe the infosphere: the noosphere.
“Similar to the atmosphere and biosphere, the noosphere is composed of all the
interacting minds and ideas on earth,” writes Morville, “it’s a provocative and
romantic concept. But is the noosphere real? Or, is it just a metaphor, a figure of
speech for relating one experience of the physical world to the ethereal realm of
knowledge?” (33). In a 2004 essay, Tom Wolfe describes the profound effect that
Teilhard’s work had on McLuhan:
technology was creating a “nervous system for humanity, “[Teilhard] wrote,”
a single, organized, unbroken membrane over the earth,” a “stupendous
thinking machine…” That unbroken membrane, that noosphere, was, of
course, McLuhan’s “seamless web of experience.” And that “one civilization”
was his “global village.” We may think, wrote Teilhard, that these
technologies are “artificial” and completely “external to our bodies,” but in
fact they are part of the “natural, profound” evolution of our nervous systems.

17

In his 2004 article, “McLuhan’s New World,” Tom Wolfe writes “here we see the shadow of the
intriguing figure who influenced McLuhan every bit as much as Harold Innis but to whom he never
referred: Pierre Teilhard de Chardin…His mission in life, as he saw it, was to take Darwin’s theory of
biological evolution, which had so severely shaken Christian belief, and show that it was merely the
first step in God's grander design for the evolution of man. God was directing, in this very moment, the
20th century, the evolution of man into a noosphere...a unification of all human nervous systems, all
human souls, through technology. Teilhard…mentioned radio, television, and computers specifically
and in considerable detail and talked about cybernetics…He died in 1955, when television had only
recently come into widespread use and the microchip had not even been invented. Computers were
huge machines, big as a suburban living room, that were not yet in assembly line production. But he
was already writing about “the extraordinary network of radio and television communication which
already links us all in a sort of ‘etherised’ human consciousness,” and of “those astonishing electronic
computers which enhance the ‘speed of thought’ and pave the way for a revolution in the sphere of
research” (Wolf 22).
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“We may think we are only amusing ourselves” by using them, “or only
developing our commerce or only spreading ideas. In reality we are quite
simply continuing on a higher plane, by other means, the uninterrupted work
of biological evolution.” Or to put it another way: “The medium is the
message.” (Wolfe 22-23)
Though Morville rightly suggests that this conceit is both provocative and romantic,
the ramifications of the noosphere being “just a metaphor” are somewhat misleading.
That is, for both Teilhard and McLuhan, what the noosphere represents is a process of
transformation whereby thought—or the central nervous system—crosses from one
level of narrative to another through a process of transformation. These levels are
deceptively stacked; instead, they prove to be embedded within one another. Teilhard
suggests that “the further the living being emerges from the anonymous masses by the
radiation of his own consciousness, the greater becomes the part of his activity which
can be stored up and transmitted by means of education and imitation” (225). For
Teihard the noosphere is a topological space where thought is born and proceeds
according to the processes of evolution:
The recognition and isolation of a new era in evolution, the era of noogenesis,
obliges us to distinguish correlatively a support proportionate to the
operation—that is to say, yet another membrane in the majestic assembly of
telluric layers. A glow ripples outward from the first spark of conscious
reflection. The point of ignition grows larger. The fire spreads in ever
widening circles till finally the whole planet is covered with incandescence.
Only one interpretation, only one name can be found worthy of this grand
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phenomenon. Much more coherent and just as extensive as any preceding
layer, it is really a new layer, the ‘thinking layer,’ which, since its
germination…has spread over and above the world of plants and animals. In
other words, outside and above the biosphere there is the noosphere. (Teilhard
182)
This conceptual space above and outside the biosphere is also the diegetic space
where Nuvoletta leans over the bannistars of ever widening, shimmering circles of
light. From leaning to leaping, Nuvoletta dramatizes the cognitive processes of
crossing levels of tangled narrative levels and, as Teilhard suggests, “from this point
of view man only represents an extreme case of transformation” (225). That is,
Nuvoletta is demonstrative of the cognitive transformations that reading unusual
literature effects. Furthermore, this transformation is one which the reader
experiences in a manner that is both intellectual as well as emotional: transfer to and
from “the noosphere tends to constitute a single closed system in which each element
sees, feels, desires and suffers for itself the same things as all the others at the same
time” (Teilhard 251). This conceptual stratification resonates with the Nuvoletta
episodes since it documents a little cloud that eventually crosses over into the
biosphere by condensing into rain. Teilhard’s conceptual map is fascinating, yet it
does not account for a theory that describes the means through which the substance of
level crossing may operate.
Parisian biologist and Nobel Prize winner, Jacques Monod, however, did attempt
to theorize this in a more concrete way that would prove remarkably fecund in the
conceptualization of ideas in the age of information and, as a result, in its relation to

185

the Wake. Monod’s proposal was that analogous to the biosphere which “stands
above the world of nonliving matter” (Gleick 310), so can another conceptual level of
abstractions—of ideas—exist beyond the biosphere, “ideas have retained some of the
properties of organisms. Like them, they tend to perpetuate their structure and to
breed; they too can fuse, recombine, segregate their content; indeed they too can
evolve, and in this evolution selection must surely play an important role” (Monod
Change and Necessity qtd. in Gleick 311). For Monod, there is a conceptual topology
where all the “myriads of drifting minds [are] one” (FW 159.7); this topology is a
conceptual space of remarkable fecundity that ultimately blends sense ratios,
emotional ambivalence, meaning, and information. Dawkins, six years later, with the
publication of The Selfish Gene (1976), comes to a similar conclusion through a study
of genetics. Dawkins remarks that genes are the units of natural selection:
They are past masters of the survival arts. But do not look for them floating
loose in the sea; they gave up that cavalier freedom long ago. Now they
swarm in huge colonies, safe inside gigantic lumbering robots, sealed off from
the outside world, communicating with it by tortuous indirect routes,
manipulating it by remote control. They are in you and in me; they created us,
body and mind; and their preservation is the ultimate rationale for our
existence. They have come a long way, those replicators. Now they go by the
name of genes, and we are their survival machine. (Dawkins 19-20)
From this position, Dawkins speculates upon an analogous unit to the gene: the
meme. The origin of memes, for Dawkins, is in the brain of the individual. Memes
are kinetic and travel along certain trajectories; the specifics of these trajectories are
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unique to the type of thought with which the meme corresponds. What is crucial,
however, is that the meme always gestures outwards yet is, at the same time,
embedded within the brains of individuals.
A meme, regardless of its specific qualities or content, always travels away from
one mind towards another mind. In this sense, a meme is both a unit of thought
constituted within the brain of an individual and simultaneously that which crosses
diegetic levels: springs from the material brain, to the abstraction ambience of tangled
trajectories that link cognitive terminals, and into another material brain. Adding a
humorous connotation to Joyce’s “vaultybrain” (FW 159.25), Gleick clarifies that
memes travel outward and away from the brain
establishing beachheads on paper and celluloid and silicon and anywhere else
information can go. They are not to be thought of as elementary particles but
as organisms. The number three is not a meme; nor is the color blue, nor any
simple thought, any more than a single nucleotide can be a gene. Memes are
complex units, distinct and memorable—units with staying power. Also an
object is not a meme. The hula hoop is not a meme; it is made of plastic, not
of bits…The hula hoop is a meme vehicle…the meme is not the dancer but the
dance. (Gleick 313-314)
Memes are the process and the effect. They are, Gleick and Dawkins would suggest,
not conscious and active agents; rather, they are abstract units whose only procedure
is to further their replication in the cultural environment. “[Memes’] interests,”
Gleick remarks, “are not our interests” (314); yet, “awareness of memes [foster] their
spread” (318). This recalls the complexity of thinking about information in relation
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to meaning: the asemic quality of mathematical information guarantees the possibility
for the manifestation, and gradual reconfiguration, of any number of semantic
patterns. Doing so, however, requires movement from one topology to another; this
abstract process is acutely dramatized in the Nuvoletta episode through the means of
the girl’s suicide: jumping from a cloud—and, indeed, being a little cloud that
succumbs to condensation, “Nuée! Nuée!” (FW 159.9)—into the biosphere: “A
lightdress fluttered. She was gone. And into the river that had been a stream” (159.910). “A gene might maximize its own numbers by giving an organism the instinctive
impulse to sacrifice its life to save its offspring,” Gleick writes, “the gene itself, the
particular clump of DNA, dies with its creature, but copies of the gene live on. The
process is blind. It has no foresight, no intention, no knowledge. The genes, too, are
blind” (Gleick 304). Just as the genes have no foresight, no intention, and no
knowledge, the same can be said of memes. This is why Joyce’s dramatization of the
process is both aesthetically pleasing and intellectually gratifying. Memes emerge
from the brain yet they proceed without intention and without meaning; Nuvoletta’s
self-murder, however, gives the process an emotional and sentimental force that is
otherwise absent in the actual course of memetic transfer and transformation. Just as
“the gene is not an information carrying macromolecule” but rather “is the
information” (Gleick 308), memes are not information carrying conceptual units but
rather are information. This distinction helps distinguish memetic dissemination
from, for example, allusion, homage, or intertexuality. Rather, this mode of
conceptualization allows for certain valueless processes to propagate and proceed
according to their own logic in conjunction with the logic of the cultural environment
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in which they are situated. That is, memes, like genes, adapt; they are both the
process and the effect. Likewise, not only does Nuvoletta reconfigure the constitutive
assemblage of the water, but the river, or constitutive environment, “tripped on her by
and by, lapping as though her heart was brook” (FW 159-16-17). Her reflexive
movement from one diegetic level to another—suicide, autoamputation, or an
instinctive impulse towards the sacrifice of the self into her own reflection—not only
generates a media ecology but ultimately becomes an integral part of the system it
produces. That is, Joyce’s sentimental narcissism as expressed by Nuvoletta is a
dramatization of media and information adaptation.
Adaptation has a biological connotation associated with processes of evolution and
mutation and therefore a different kind of metamorphosis of form than that which is
associated with the revelation of underlying metaphysics of language. Linda
Hutcheon’s A Theory of Adaptation (2006) examines the processes in which
narratives continually reappear—that is, are adapted—from one form or medium into
another. Crucial to Hutcheon’s analysis is Dawkins’ concept of the meme. What is
noteworthy about this gesture is that Hutcheon sets up an analytical apparatus where
cross-media adaptations can be examined beyond reader/audience expectations
regarding formal and semantic fidelity to its original. Instead, she redirects the focus
to the necessity for change, sometimes radical, when considering adaptation. In short,
there is a shift away from agency: memetic adaptation is blind, has no foresight, no
intention, and no knowledge of its origin and its plasticity. Like in biological
reproduction, the adapted text must have some copying fidelity, but what is even
more crucial is that the texts-as-memes must, in Dawkins’ words “exploit their
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cultural environment to their own advantage” (Dawkins 199). Hutcheon agrees: a
form “adapts to its new environment and exploits it, and the story [or form] lives
on…the same and yet not” (Hutcheon 167).
The processes of environmental engagement—or, cross-diegetic mutations—
prompt the question as to whether we can “look for selfish or ruthless memes” (196).
Dawkins’ answer is “that we might, because there is a sense in which [memes] must
indulge in a kind of competition with each other” (197). Dawkins continues: “the
human brain, and the body that it controls, cannot do more than a few things at once.
If a meme is to dominate the attention of a human brain, it must do so at the expense
of ‘rival’ memes” (197). This is where Dawkins’ argument is explicitly at odds with
the present conceit. For Dawkins, the brain is in control; perhaps it is over occupied
by a particular meme—establishing competition with rival memes—but nevertheless
the multi-level diegetic topos between ideas and the brain is, in general, ambient. “In
the competition for space in our brains and in the culture,” suggests Gleick, “the
effective combatants are the messages. The new, oblique, looping views of genes and
memes have enriched us. They give us paradoxes to write on Möbius strips. ‘The
human world is made of stories, not people,’ writes David Mitchell” (Gleick 322).
Yet, what Mitchell’s wit understates is that the worlds of stories are both embedded
within people and construct the social effects that connect people. In the Wake
different semantic and diegetic levels are in a kind of competition with one another;
certainly this ineluctable modality provides us with a complex Möbius strip worth
speculation. Nuvoletta’s lightdress shimmering as she leans over the bannistars
suggests a girl in a dress made of light, shining fabric who is leaning over a banister
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in the starlight. This polysemous and kaleidoscopic image occupies the same
semantic space as that signifying a “girl” comprised of vaporous river water—a little
cloud—situated somewhere above the atmosphere who, like an evening gown is
reflecting the shimmering starlight. Furthermore, she acts as a safety railing
delimiting the borders of the cloud, preventing rays of starlight from approaching the
Earth. These three conflicting, yet simultaneous, significations are crucial in
considering the informational fecundity of the text. While Dawkins suggests that one
meme—a single reading of the sentence—must dominate another reading, an
effective manner of experiencing the Wake would be to read both simultaneously.
That is, Nuvoletta is a girl and a cloud; she is wearing a shimmering dress of
lightweight material and is evaporated water refracting starlight; she leans over a
banister and operates as that which guards the borders of light and shadow. Phrases,
language, memes certainly are in selfish or ruthless competition with one another,
though a single mode of reading cannot dominate the text itself but rather only
dominate the mind of the reader in a momentary manner. That is, one possible
meaning will, to the reader’s surprise, slip and loop upwards or downwards to another
semantic possibility; a myriad of other readings—both semic and asemic, emotionally
ambivalent, and chronologically linear or non-linear—will also struggle for linguistic
and informational authority. Nuvoletta may not be selfish, but her incorporation into
the river is ruthless and absolute: at first, “She was alone” (FW 157.13), then “She
was gone,” but ultimately her suicide occurs in the fluvial system that is the
expanding work itself. The effect is one of semantic and asemic simultaneity and of
ambivalent sentimentalism. The fable expresses more emotion that is warranted of
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the process it represents, yet it operates effectively as a demonstration of narcissistic
cross-diegetic level crossing.
Dawkins writes that “we must not think of genes as conscious, purposeful agents.
Blind natural selection, however, makes them behave rather as if they were
purposeful, and it has been convenient, as a shorthand, to refer to genes in the
language of purpose” (Dawkins 196). Here, again, is an explicit example of
conceptual metaphor: a mode of language employed to transform asemic and
valueless processes into meaningful language. That this mode of language seems to
provide agency to those chemical—or linguistic—processes is indicative of the ways
in which the mind itself is engaged in a bidirectional relationship of semantic
formation with phenomena; that is, it is sentimental. Dawkins employs the following
example: “when we say ‘genes are trying to increase their numbers in future gene
pools,’ what we really mean is ‘those genes that behave in such a way as to increase
their numbers in future gene pools tend to be the genes whose effects we see in the
world’” (196); or, this is what Joyce is doing when dramatizing the Nuvoletta fable.
That this mode of utilizing conceptual language or agential metaphors, describing
valueless processes in terms of those which may be the effects of willed action, is
convenient according to Dawkins:
Just as we have found it convenient to think of genes as active agents,
working purposefully for their own survival, perhaps it might be convenient to
think of memes in the same way. In neither case must we get mystical about
it. In both cases the idea of purpose is only a metaphor, but we have already
seen what a fruitful metaphor it is in the case of genes. We have even used
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words like ‘selfish’ and ‘ruthless’ of genes, knowing full well it is only a
figure of speech. (196)
Yet, figures of speech are indeed the modes of accessing, evaluating, and
transforming reality; language, like scientific modes of symbolic notation, is not
numinous but is rather metaphorical. The claim that these agential modes of language
are simply metaphor is misleading here. Dawkins suggests that memes are living
structure; the “life” or “living” of these linguistic modes is, in fact, not at all
mystical—that is, transcendent—but are instead immanent extensions of the
ineluctable modality that changes and adapts and changes with its constitutive
ambient media ecology.
Something is at stake here, however, at least on a material analytical level.
Thinking about memes, or metamemetics, disrupts certain distinctions between
material and the conceptual; that is, there is an ontological level crossing that brains
(material structures) are structurally reconfigured by ideas (conceptual abstractions).
Gleick records evolutionary psychologist Nicholas Humphrey’s response to Dawkins’
meme as that which should not simply be considered metaphorically but, rather,
technically: “When you plant a fertile meme in my mind,” Humphrey writes,
you literally parasitize my brain, turning it into a vehicle for the meme’s
propagation in just the way that a virus may parasitize the genetic mechanism
of a host cell. And this isn’t just a way of talking—the meme for, say, “belief
in life after death” is actually realized physically, millions of times over, as a
structure in the nervous systems of individual men the world over. (Gleick
315)
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This gesture towards the parasitic will return in a moment. What is crucial, however,
is Humphrey’s emphasis on how certain ideas or memes have physically become
manifest in the nervous systems of individuals all over the world. This is another
instance of hierarchical level-crossing. For Wilde, it is the crossing between the
apparently distinct ontological levels of Victorian England and Hallward’s canvas;
here, it is the distinction between literary sentimentalism and the physical structure of
the individual brain; Nuvoletta does acquire a kind of life after death, a diegetic event
that, given the structure of the novel, repeats ad infinitum, each time the same yet
different. The haziness here is between the abstract and the conceptual, though the
two are self-reflexively intertwined in ways that suggest a complexity that disorders
such a hierarchy. The paradox of transcending incompleteness, a metamemetic
position is simply an expansion of the ineluctable modality. Nuvoletta crosses
diegetic levels—consider the conceit linking the noosphere and the biosphere—only
to be integrated into the ambience of the work itself, ultimately parasitizing and
reconfiguring the text as a whole. The reader’s “gnoses” of the text is not
transcendent but immanently fissioning and mutative.
Yet, this gesture does not explicitly suggest that the organic or the cognitive is in
fact undergoing a mutation to the material, so much as the inanimate is most
effectively conceptualized as alive, as living structures. Dawkins engages in a kind of
Darwinian structuralism, or what he refers to as “Universal Darwinism” (322). From
this position, he suggests that “all life, everywhere in the universe, would turn out to
have evolved by Darwinian means” (322). That Dawkins recognizes this conceit as
one that is “general,” rather than as a concise argument “based upon the facts about
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life as we know it” suggests that this approach is one that proceeds in principal. “In
principle arguments such as mine,” he writes, “can be more powerful than arguments
based on particular factual research. My reasoning if it is correct, tells us something
important about life everywhere in the universe. Laboratory and field research can
tell us only about life as we have sampled it here” (322). This universalist claim is
not so much philosophical arrogance as it is an intellectual conceit from which
Dawkins can make further claims, not only regarding natural selection on the genetic
level, but also in regards to analogous parallelisms. Therefore, Dawkins is capable of
making claims like: “memes should be regarded as living structures, not just
metaphorically, but technically” (192). Here is Dawkins apology: “DNA is a selfreplicating piece of hardware. Each piece has a particular structure, which is different
from rival pieces of DNA. If memes in brains are analogous to genes they must be
self-replicating brain structures , actual patterns of neuronal wiring-up that
reconstitute themselves in one brain after another” (323). That is, memes, or ideas,
restructure the patterns of the brain, and according to Dawkins, physically rearrange
brain structures. If King Lear is the pattern of all patience, it is appropriate that the
Wake constitutes the pattern of all potentialities. That is, Joyce, like Wilde, is a
monstrorum artifex.
Memes, like all replicators, are “survival machines,” a term Dawkins employs to
denote both the material and the processes through which replicators mutate for
survival. With the Wake, the brain and historiographic culture form a kind of closed,
dynamic ecology, an ambient Heraclitean river. Consider the following passage in
which, for the sake of consistency, the term “gene” has been substituted by “meme”:
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The first thing to grasp about a modern replicator is that it is highly
gregarious. A survival machine is a vehicle containing not just one [meme]
but many thousands. The manufacture of a body is a cooperative venture of
such intricacy that it is almost impossible to disentangle the contribution of
one [meme] from that of another. A given [meme] will have many different
effects on quite different parts of the body. A given part of the body will be
influenced by many [memes], and the effect of any one [meme] depends on
interaction with many others. Some [memes] act as master [memes]
controlling the operation of a cluster of other [memes]. In terms of the
analogy, any given page of the plans makes reference to many different parts
of the building; and each page makes sense only in terms of cross-references
to numerous other pages. (Dawkins 24)
The messages in the Wake—the linguistic and cognitive processes that instigate
change amongst the respective diegetic levels—become the constitutive and
ubiquitous structure through which “survival machines” operate in a literary fashion.
What is important to consider regarding the significance of the conceptual
structures is that they are all Heraclitean rivers. As a result each operates selfsimilarly as the conceptual topos for the Wake. Furthermore, these conceptual topoi,
or non-material extensions of the central nervous system and its cognitive acrobatics,
are established as topographically, thus conceptually, different levels of diegesis. As
a result, the link between the noosphere/infosphere and the brain are intricately linked
in a turbulent, ambient ecology. What, then, might reconfigure an understanding or
engagement with the Wake is to imagine the text and its cognitive extension as a kind
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of ambient Heraclitean river through which the reader must first navigate. Such
ecological metaphors should, however, not alienate the conceit of the Wake as an
information system. Rather the extenions of material or organic into the non-material
or information—from blood to bits—is the foundational logic structuring the diegetic
level crossing in discussion. Much in this sense, the Wake is very much a protoinformation era text, almost metonymical for the sensibility and experience of the
information boom of the turn of the millennium. The work is a “fast emerging world”
where can find a multitude in a given word, or anyone in any place. The Wake shifts
its canonical authority to the cognitive mutations of the reader while, instantaneously,
the reader’s authority is a point of suspicion insomuch as subjectivity here is coadapting rapidly with the constitutive fluent ecology. While ambient findability
invests freedom in the individual, it also, by its very logic, envelops the individual
into its ubiquity: “Why, why, why! Weh, O weh! I’se so silly to be flowing but I no
canna stay!” (FW 159.17-18). Read the quotation again: “Why, why, why! Weh, O
weh! I’se so silly to be flowing but I no canna stay!” The phrase is no longer there
nor is the reader: I no canna stay. The reader cannot read the same phrase twice since
the reader is the book, the noosphere, the river memetically adapting with Joyce’s
text. That is, the imperative of reading the Wake is to conceptually blend the static
with the dynamic, the stable with the fluid, information with meaning, language with
mind, and ambivalent shifts in sentimentality with changes in sense ratios. In short, it
is appropriate when navigating Joyce’s river that the reader conflate the “groot hwide
Whallfisk” (FW 13.33-34) with the land. The reader cannot step into the same river
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twice since the reader is level crossing “into the river that had been a stream” (FW
159.10).
Ultimately, whether the “ineluctable modality of the visible” or the “ineluctable
modality of the audible” (Ulysses 31), the reader, like Stephen is forced to submit to
the absolute continuity of experience through shifting sense ratios when engaged in
unusual media. And Stephen is steadfast in asserting his continuity: “Open your eyes
now. I will. One moment. Has all vanished since? If I open and am for ever in the
black adiaphane. Basta! I will see if I can see” (31). As Stephen opens his eyes, he
accepts that one cannot sever the mind from the world/word: “See now. There all the
time without you: and ever shall be, world without end” (31). If one sense is severed,
it continues in another diegetic space; in short, Stephen is—like Nuvoletta—
inescapably and dynamically knotted with multiple levels of diegesis whereby a
movement from one diegetic space to another simply results in reorganization of
sense ratios: labyrinth without end. The world without end is embedded within
language just as the word is embedded within the world. Like the bells of George’s
church, both the level of language and the brain are “a creak and a dark whirr in the
air high up” (57); transportation of one diegetic level to another, and it somehow
remains in multiple locations simultaneously as an “overtone flowing through the air”
(57). The “Nausicaa” episode of Ulysses has Leopold Bloom experience a similar,
though less successful, level crossing. Like Stephen, Bloom’s experience also takes
place along the shore of the beach. After his encounter with Gerty MacDowell,
Bloom begins writing a message in the sand employing a stick as a writing
instrument. It begins with “I” (312) and is promptly interrupted: “Some flatfoot
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tramp on it in the morning. Useless. Washed away. Tide comes here. Saw a pool near
her foot. Bend, see my face there, dark mirror, breathe on it, stirs. All these rocks with
lines and scars and letters. O, those transparent! Besides they don't know. What is the
meaning of that other world. I called you naughty boy because I do not like’’ (312).
Following the interruption, Bloom writes five more characters ‘‘AM. A.’’ (312);
however, rather than concluding the sentence, he effaces ‘‘the letters with his slow
boot’’ (312). Bloom seems to miss the significance of this moment. Rather than
recognizing himself as cognitively embedded within the markings in the sand, he
concludes ‘‘Hopeless thing sand. Nothing grows in it. All fades’’ (312). Whether or
not Bloom assumes the letters in the sand are ‘‘in the waste of all peacable worlds’’
(FW 158.10-11), he does not linger to contemplate his relationship with the letters in
an intimate or sentimental way. Rather than accepting the reflexive quality of ‘‘I. AM.
A.’’ as a complete formulation in itself-----that is, Bloom is extended into and
embedded within the characters scraped into the sand and vice versa-----he rejects this
operation valuing growth over reconfiguration. ‘‘Granular as this first membrane
might be,’’ writes Teilhard of the birth of thought and self-reorganization, ‘‘the
noosphere there and then began to close in upon itself-----and to encircle the earth’’
(Teilhard 206). The letters effaced by the slow boot thus disassemble and are
engulfed within the noisy ambience of tiny pebbles; the procedure is, therefore,
remarkably similar to Nuvoletta’s suicide: that of dissolving character into the
ubiquitous noise of informational fecundity.
So, Nuvoletta’s suicide is her transformation and complete sublimation into
looping processes of the text/brain relationship. Death, in this episode, is a
dramatization of the fluent dissolve of the cognitive centre into language and
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language into a cognitive centre. The girl’s death by condensation is, for Burns, a fall
“out of her virginal life, and, when she is an Anna Livia, she will fall, not to her
corporeal death but to the death of physical innocence” (Burns 324). That is, when
she transforms into an Anna Livia—the river and the text—the loss of physical
innocence, on a structural level, is the narcosis of the body as it is absolutely
transferred into the water. In short, Nuvoletta is a survival machine because she, like
the reader, perpetually, repetitively, and reflexively extends into alternative levels of
diegesis. Unlike Bloom who “looped, unlooped, noded, disnoded’’ (Ulysses 226), by
not recognizing the extension of his cognitive centre in the phrase ‘‘I. AM. A.,’’
Nuvoletta’s transformation is “motamourfully” successful: a metamorphosis of the
word (mot)—and thus perception—through the sentimentality of amour. Henry
Miller intimates this in more aggressively energetic language, privileging the position
of writer though intimating the ambience of cognitive reception from a reader: “I am
a writing machine…The thing flows. Between me and the machine there is no
estrangement” (Miller 28). Writing machines belong to the same ecology as
Dawkins’ survival machines; consequently, so do reading machines. The intimation
here is again that of self-reflexive loops moving in surprising ways between linguistic
transfer (writing machines producing survival machines) and cognitive transformation
(reading machines). While the processes here are dynamic they are also ubiquitous;
the sentimentality is ambient and, yet, ambivalent. Each survival machine only
makes sense in terms of cross-referencing, not only other survival machines, but its
ambient relationship with writing machines and reading machines. We find ourselves
back where we begin, yet the signpost is uncanny. “Destiny takes pleasure in
repetition, variants, symmetries,” writes Borges (Borges “The Plot” 36). One cannot
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truly escape ubiquity, the semantic dimensions of lexography and syntax change with
indifferent constancy, the same phrases, yet different. “So it returns,” as Bloom
muses, “Think you’re escaping and run into yourself. Longest way round is the
shortest way home” (Joyce Ulysses 309). I am so silly to be flowing but I no canna
stay: I am a writing machine; I am a reading machine; I am a Heraclitean river; I am
Finnegans Wake; I am a strange loop; I am motamourfully protean.
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Chapter Four

“Zero, zero, and zero”: Zero-Player Games,
Proceduralism, and Samuel Beckett’s Endgame
___________________________
Everyone knows his part by heart. Words and gestures follow each other in a relaxed, continuous
manner, the links as imperceptible as the necessary elements of some properly lubricated machinery.
Then there is a gap, a blank space…And then suddenly the action resumes, without warning, and the
same scene occurs again.
-Alain Robbe-Grillet Project for a Revolution in New York
As a reader I find myself locked within an automaton I cannot control, which will never do what I
would do (even by chance), and which provides no nourishment.
-Steve Aylett
Cellular automata are stylized, synthetic universes.
- Tommaso Toffoli and Norman Margolus

1. Introduction: Something is taking its Course
In his essay Trying to Understand Endgame (1957), Theodor Adorno comments
that in the work of Samuel Beckett “poetic procedure surrenders…without intention”
(119). This observation is a remarkable claim about, not Beckett’s work, but the
effect Endgame has on the way we experience intimacy with narrative. Indeed, it
clears the path for the question of what exactly is “taking its course” (Beckett 13, 32)
in Endgame. Not only does it open an interrogation of what is taking its course, but
also how the play proceeds on its own. Adorno suggests that with Beckett “thought
becomes as much a means of producing meaning for the work which cannot be
immediately rendered tangible, as it is an expression of meaning’s absence” (Adorno
120). He continues: “the interpretation of Endgame therefore cannot chase the
chimera of expressing its meaning with the help of philosophical mediation” (120).
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Instead, Adorno suggests that understanding Beckett’s text “can mean nothing other
than understanding its incomprehensibility” or engaging in an act of “reconstructing
its meaning structure” only to admit that the text, in the end, “has none” (120).
Adorno’s observation is acute yet also limiting if not misleading. Beckett’s text does
not necessarily suggest that “philosophy, or spirit itself, proclaims its bankruptcy as
the dreamlike dross of the experiential world, and the poetic process shows itself as
worn out” (121). Instead, the process that propels Endgame is one that ultimately
demands of the reader the assumption of an unusual interpretive pose: that of readerly
non-involvement, diminution of agency, and, at its most extreme, to assume the
conceit of readerly exclusion. Pose means that the interpreter assumes a particular
intellectual, analytical, and imaginative position in an argument, particularly when the
argument is grounded on the self-contradictoriness of a paradox. To do so, we must
first establish certain premises for this argument:
1. We must consider Endgame as an ideal text divorced from materiality or
performability (it is, after all, a play).
2. This ideal text is a poetic procedure that proceeds without intention.
3. Without readerly intervention, the ideal text still “takes its course.”
4. The reader assumes an imaginary pose: of exclusion and non-agential
involvement.
So, what we have here is a thought experiment: an ideal text that proceeds without
intention and without a reader, a kind of textual automaton. What this thought
experiment is asking is: what are the effects of this ideal text? What might it say
about our relation to narrative; what is the significance of our exclusion? That is to
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say, how might Endgame offer itself to us as a means to meditate on the encroaching
shift in what is becoming the predominant cultural narrative code in the developed
world: the increasing dominance of programming and digital code over the narratives
of alphanumeric code?18 For this final inquiry, we will turn to the work of Vilém
Flusser. Along this trajectory, Flusser writes that
when programming has set itself free of alphanumeric writing, thought will no
longer need to work through a spoken language to become visible. The detour
through language to the sign, such a distinguishing mark of Western cultures
(and all other alphabetic cultures), will become superfluous. Thought and
speech will no longer be fused, as they were when the alphabet was
predominant…As the alphabet is surpassed, thought will liberate itself from
speech, and other, nonlinguistic thought (mathematical and pictorial, and
presumable completely new ones as well) will expand in ways we cannot yet
anticipate. (Flusser Does Writing have a Future? 63)
Ultimately, our thought experiment suggests that Endgame can act as a stepping stone
toward new thinking in the digital age as much as it is a text for interpretation. The
path to thinking in this manner, however, is tangled and strange. It is our prerogative
not to interrogate the path; thought rests waiting sometime beyond this tradition of
analysis.

18

I am using Flusser’s extrapolation on alphanumeric code. He writes “the alphanumeric code we
have adopted for linear notation over the centuries is a mixture of various kinds of signs: letters (signs
for sounds), numbers (signs for quantities), and an inexact number of signs for the rules of the writing
game (e.g., stops, brackets, and quotation marks). Each of these types of signs demands that the writer
think in the way that uniquely corresponds to it. Writing equations requires a different kind of thinking
from writing rules of logic or the words of language” (Flusser Does Writing have a Future? 23).
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But why Endgame in particular? The work of Beckett is at the forefront of a
literature that interrogates the relation between the degree to which language and
narrative constitute the individual and the degree to which the individual may
fracture, destroy, and reconfigure language and narrative as a means towards
identifying the essential quality of the self. Creative work is, in its very poesis,
implicitly critical and so it is no surprise that Endgame among other work by Beckett,
appears at a point in recent history when major shifts in thinking from structuralist
and functionalist thought towards more explicitly poststructuralist and formalist
modes of thought. Endgame is situated at this historical moment, resting on the
structuralist intellectual environment yet allowing the poststructuralist impulse to
arrive as a new poetic and critical possibility. I recognize Endgame as a psychoecological text since it operates according to both functionalist and formalist
impulses. However, what makes the text particularly relevant to this study is how it
also suggests, by procedural determinism and various failures of engagement that
constitutes its narrative, is how it suggests experimental thinking outside the strange
loop of language and thought: that is, Endgame asks us to become the void in order
to, paradoxically, think in the void. The void here, however, is not a concrete absence
but, instead, it is that which rests in silence succumbing to and inviting the possibility
of that which is unthought to arrive. The void is submission, a clearing of self, a
distinct nothingness that resists the poesis of self-representation. To ground this
position, I turn to Heidegger’s formulation of thought as that which demands the
invitation of openness of being to the possibilities that arrive before us. This
openness is at once founded upon language but only insomuch as that language is
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poetic. Poetic here means that which is never before uttered, the event of allowing
futurity to speak through Dasein, to allow the nothingness of the abyss of thinking to
be the condition upon which production and creative thinking can only take effect. In
short, Heidegger asks for an exclusion of the agent in thought almost as if the agent
were a medium for the possibility of new thought. Again, like in the case of Beckett,
the unthought, the nothingness, the unword, is not a concrete and literal absence.
Instead, it is a calling for the assumption of a position of intellectual and agential
openness, clearing and diminution.
This is all more urgent now than it has been to date. Indeed, Endgame is situated
at the moment when a shift from structuralism to poststructuralism takes place.
Moreover, the text is also situated at the moment when another shift is becoming
more explicitly manifest: the shift from a focus on language to a focus on digital
code. Structuralism suggests that there is a reductionist element that functions as the
substratum of any narrative and, resultantly, explains and structures all that which is
extrapolated from it and rests within its constitutive logic. Poststructuralists do not
deny the limits of this logic, but they do recognize the play and spontaneity of the
individual within the limits of the constitutive system. Meanwhile, in symbolic logic
and computer science a new narrative was gradually taking shape: that which would
come to be called digital code. By the early 1960s, the intellectual climate is
recognizing the birth of an information revolution. “It is a commonplace that
cybernetics and automation will bring about radical changes in our way of life” writes
Ulric Neisser in 1964 (Neisser 71). More emphatically, McLuhan acknowledges the
gradual formation of a “cybernation” (McLuhan “Cybernation and Culture” 103). In
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the twenty-first century this code will constitute the predominant mode of information
dissemination. The most fundamental thing that distinguishes this kind of narrative
from the narratives of language is its rigidity. While poststructuralists unveiled the
degrees to which the limits of language are subject to spontaneity, plasticity, and
direct agential intervention, digital code is explicitly—even radically—structuralist: it
is rule-based and is the procedure that operates inflexibly as the substratum that
makes discourse—and its limits—possible. While code expresses itself as that which
is not poetic, it is nevertheless expressive of poesis; that is, it is productive, creative,
and offers new possibilities for narrative. While code proceeds by a procedure we
may identify as mechanistic, this kind of mechanism is ultimately creative. Indeed,
Valéry suggests that a poem is “a kind of machine for producing the poetic state of
mind by means of words” (Valéry 152). Deleuze identifies something similar:
The modern work of art is anything it may seem; it is even its very property of
being whatever we like, of having the over-determination of whatever we like,
from the moment it works: the modern work of art is a machine and functions
as such…Why a machine? Because the work of art, so understood, is
essentially production—productive of certain truths. (Deleuze Proust and
Signs 128)
Perhaps Deleuze could be more accurate to suggest that the work of art is productive
also of uncertain truths. Valéry’s suggestion that the mechanistic can establish the
poetic state of mind, however, is accurate. If we consider these statements in terms of
mechanistic procedures of code, then we see that the poetic state of mind—the mind
capable of thinking the unthought—may arrive at us by accepting the arrive of digital
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code as a narrative that, if learned, may offer similar flexibility (within deterministic
limits) that poststructuralists recognize in language. That is, digital code is capable
of, not only poesis, but poetry more generally understood.
In this chapter we recognize digital code as the substratum that lies beneath the
narrative; that is, in our thought experiment, the proceduralism of digital code is that
which is taking its course. As opposed to the conflict between ideas/speech/writing
and reality and the difficulty of discourse to arrive at truth, digital code as narrative in
the thought experiment is a coherent system but does carry along with it any semantic
value. This is the difficulty of engaging with the text in an intimate way; that is, its
incoherence is due to the inflexibility of its systemic coherence. With psychoecology, I suggest that it is the power of systems that structure our thought and self
identity; yet, I also suggest that through Heidegger’s formulation we are able to learn
to think spontaneously at the limits of what the procedural narrative of code permits.
Here, digital code is the constitutive narrative structure with which we cannot fully
engage until we think at its limits. Rather than focusing on the way the reader can
think and interpret within the operating narrative structure, I suggest that we speak
after the narrative by allowing the possibilities of the future to arrive at us by being
open to it by thinking in the void.
The text demands that the reader identify as absence and openness toward the end
of taking up identification with incomprehensibility and become transposed directly
into that which is without semantic structure. Our thought experiment concerns how
the reader must submit through absence to the text at hand. This conceit is in
contradistinction to what Robbe-Grillet suggests about Endgame, even though our
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thought experiment, like Robbe-Grillet’s reading is phenomenological. “The human
condition, Heidegger says, is to be there. Probably it is the theatre, more than any
other mode of representing reality, which reproduced this situation most naturally,”
writes Robbe-Grillet, “the dramatic character is on stage, that is his primary quality:
he is there” (Robbe-Grillet 111). Robbe-Grillet’s position, however, is one that
emphasizes the actor/spectator relationship. Robbe-Grillet suggests that the
characters/actors are there in the sense that they must explain themselves and that
Beckett’s theatre is an “assertion of Sartrean freedom en situation” (Connor 129).
And so, Robbe-Grillet suggests that Beckett’s stage characters “do not seem to have a
text prepared beforehand and scrupulously leaned by heart, to support them. They
must invent. They are free” (Robbe-Grillet 121). Here, however, we will discuss
how neither Beckett’s characters nor his readers are free. Instead, we are concerned
with the strange role into which Endgame posits the reader of the text. Beckett’s text
strives for a kind of paradoxical and imaginative rigor rather than an existential or
post-philosophic exactness; instead of operating as a dramatic and textual “opposition
to ontology” (Adorno 121), Endgame is experimental, employing nothingness as a
means of making manifest that which we wish to forget: meaninglessness,
nothingness, our own exclusion. “Interrogating the nothing—asking what and how it,
the nothing, is—turns what is interrogated into its opposite,” writes Heidegger, “the
question deprives itself of its own object” (Heidegger “What is Metaphysics?” 96).
What our thought experiment asks is how the textual object may take its course by
depriving itself of its questioner—that is, its reader—and what this may mean. The
chapter asks of Endgame how the determinism of closed systems may be made
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diegetically significant when the text is considered as a zero-player game: a game that
proceeds by digital code, grammar, and laws—instead of intuitive human language—
without the input of human players. 19 This observation offers the possibility of
meditating upon the motion of the play and Beckett’s utterance that something is
taking its course with consideration to actantial narrative theory, procedural rhetoric
in current video game theory, and a discussion of computer simulated cellular
automata with emphasis on John Conway’s zero-player automation Game of Life
(1970). James Acheson suggests that Beckett’s early plays are preoccupied with “the
relationship between art and the limits of human knowledge” (Acheson 141) and
indeed our idealized Endgame, text of our thought experiment, pushes this concern to
the ends of logic. Indeed, as Lawrence E. Harvey suggests, with Beckett’s work “art
is above all a way to fill the vacant house, to make the time go by while we wait for
the end” (Harvey 393). That the end never arrives in Endgame makes more emphatic
that the end, nothingness, is a condition of the reader. In order to do so, Beckett
inverts the paradoxical formulation of the interrogator investigating nothing by
allowing nothingness to assume the role of procedure and the reader to assume the
pose of nothingness.
Early readings of the text are primarily concerned with its relationship to the
intellectual and cultural influence of existentialism. Martin Esslin’s The Theatre of
the Absurd (1961), and its chapter “Samuel Beckett: The Search for the Self,” is
likely the most influential and long lasting of these studies. While accurate, this kind

19

This does not exclude the author of the text or game. Just as zero-player games, like John Conway’s
Game of Life was designed by Conway, Beckett’s text is clearly written by Beckett. However, the
manner in which these games play out is, beyond the initial set-up or writing of the game, procedural
and automatic.
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of reading is reductionistic and, resultantly, by the 1970s and 1980 fell out of favor
for more nuanced readings.20 The title of the play21 has had an influence on earlier
critical judgments of the text as a “the last part of an on-stage game of chess”
(Acheson 150). So, as Acheson reminds us, that Hamm and Clov have very red faces
while Nagg and Nell have very white faces implicates the text’s characters in some
kind of conflict, though a conflict governed by strict rules. David Helsa, as a result,
sees Nagg and Nell as removed from the game and so removed from the conflict.22
Francis Doherty, however, notes that the colors red and white represent the same
team in chess: “in this play we have only one of the two colours for the protagonists,
only one side of the board. The metaphor of the chess-game is so far frustrated,
broken-backed, and any critical attempt to pursue too closely the movement of the
play in chess terms will be equally frustrating” (Doherty 93). Acheson remarks that
there is, instead, another game at play here, “a game in which Beckett pits his four
red-or white-faced characters against the darkened faces of the theatre audience”
(Acheson 150). The purpose of this game, Acheson suggests, is to disrupt our
attempts at interpreting the play in a definitive manner. In this way, checkmate
occurs at the moment the audience “recognizes that the play is meant to be a
counterpart both to the infinitely complex world around us and to the equally
complex human mind—a counterpart that resists even the most ingenious
explications” (150). Later critics, however, are more concerned with the mechanics
20

Readings of Beckett in, and against, the context of Esslin’s Theatre of the Absurd, however, still
appear. See Michael Y. Bennett’s Reassessing the Theatre of the Absurd: Camus, Beckett, Ionesco,
Genet, and Pinter (2011).
21
The meaning of the title was finally confirmed in Deidre Bair’s Samuel Beckett: A Biography
(1978). Beckett corrected the mistranslation of Fin de partie as End of The Game to “Endgame, as in
chess” (Bair 467).
22
See David Helsa, The Shape of Chaos: An interpretation of the Art of Samuel Beckett. Minneapolis:
U of Minnesota P., 1971. 151. Print.
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of the text that make this destabilization possible. That is, more recently, the
discussion regarding Beckett’s work is concerned primarily with language and
performance.23 Michael Worton provides an apt summary:
The central problem [that Beckett’s early plays] pose is what language can
and cannot do. Language is no longer presented as a vehicle for direct
communication or as a screen through which one can see darkly the psychic
movement of a character. Rather it is used in all its grammatical, syntactic
and—especially—intertextual force to make the reader/spectator aware of
how much we depend on language and how much we need to be wary of the
codifications that language imposes upon us. (Worton 68)
The role of language in Beckett’s work, however, operates in an even more radical
than that of Worton’s suggestion. Jonathan Boulter questions Robbe-Grillet’s
assertion of presence via a Derridian reading of Endgame in “‘Speak no more’: The
Hermeneutical Function of Narrative in Samuel Beckett’s Endgame.” Rather than
disclose a ground from which meaning can be negotiated and made possible, Boulter
demonstrates how Beckett’s narrative functions to make manifest the absence of this
possibility. Ultimately, narrative in Endgame gestures towards the reification of “the
absolute interpretive isolation of the characters” and “to signify the impossibility of
hermeneutic or dialogical, communication” (Boulter 42). This shift towards language
and the logic through which language discloses absences rather than presences marks
fascinating paths for the consideration of Endgame.

23

Here, however, we are concerned only with language, and text specifically, that speaks itself.
Performance relies too heavily on spectatorship and, as is often the case, the agency and intentionality
of the spectator as a kind of reader.
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It is, however, Ileana Marcoulesco’s interrogation of the tendency towards
solipsism24 in Beckett’s oeuvre, one his central concerns, against—in the sense of
alongside—which the argument at hand is also situated. Marcoulesco suggests that
solipsism is commonly “no more than a provisional, ephemeral, almost fictional stage
in the development of an argument” but that in the work of Beckett this philosophical
mode operates as “one of the leitmotifs that stamp his artistic construct with the
indelible emblem of an impossible wager” (Marcoulesco 215). The disclosure of
Beckett’s fiction as a pose for Cartesian solus ipse is, as Marcoulesco points out,
accurate. With her identification of this stance as refracted through the Cartesian
occasionalism of Arnold Geulincx (1624-1669), she aptly suggests that, in Beckett,
“the cogito is an assertion of powerlessness associated with an incessant and painful
introspection; the ego, unlike the Cartesian subject of cogitationes, is at best an
occasion for, and not an underlying substructure of, thinking” (216). While this is
effective for Beckett’s work in general, at least from Murphy onward, Endgame
suggests something different. Rather than the tendency towards inwardness,
Endgame posits the reader in a different movement of diminution. Like Mouth in Not
I (1972), but to the diegetic level of the reader, Beckett attempts to “supersede
anguish” by bringing about the “nihilation of the ego itself” (217). Endgame turns
the cogito ergo sum inside out demonstrating that something proceeds with no
concern to organic intentionality: or, Endgame is a procedure, non sum. Something is
taking its course but we, as readers, are not in control.
24

Marcoulesco ultimately concludes that “it would be preposterous to try and inflate his flickering
meditations to the size of a philosophical self-conscious thesis, or to dissolve his work into a mosaic of
metaphors each signifying a philosophical dilemma, and argument, or a counterargument. Solipsism is
not really thematized by Beckett, but only lightly touched upon, toyed with, and, in the end,
deconstructed” (Marcoulesco 223).
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2. Actants and Pataphysics: Imagining Exclusion
In the 1960s Algirdas Greimas developed the actantial narrative model as a means of
analyzing the processes and functions of narrative. Rather than examining the story,
plot, or character, Greimas’ model suggests that the study of action and operation is
the imperative of structural reading. Greimas’ methodology is as effective in its
possibilities as it is striking in its limitations. What Greimas does provide, however,
is the analytical concept of actants.25 One clarification that needs to be made in
regards to actants is that they are not actors. Actants “operate at the level of function”
write Donna Haraway (Haraway 115). “Several characters in a narrative may make
up a single actant,” she continues, “the structure of the narrative generates its
actants…Non-humans are not necessarily ‘actors’ in the human sense, but they are
part of the functional collective that makes up an actant” (115). On the level of
narrative, various elements and essential qualities operate in tandem in such a way as
to propel a narrative, to animate it without the agential intention. Haraway suggests
that in this sense, “action is not so much an ontological as a semiotic problem. This is
perhaps as true for humans as non-humans, a way of looking at things that may
provide exits from the methodological individualism inherent in concentrating
constantly on who the agent and actors are in the sense of liberal theories of agency”
(115). While Haraway suggests that action in this sense is more of a semiotic than
ontological problem, Adorno’s comments in regards to Endgame suggest that the text
may indeed yield some remarkable ontological observations. Not only does the

25

Greimas categorizes actants into six categories of three oppositions: 1. The axis of desire:
subject/object 2. The axis of power: helper/opponent 3. the axis of knowledge: sender/receiver. See
Greimas, A. J. Structural Semantics: An Attempt at a Method. Trans. Daniele McDowell, Ronald
Schleifer, and Alan Velie. Lincoln: U of Nebraska P., 1983. Print.
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actant as a critical tool provide a means of examining the function of a narrative as it
operates without agential intention, this inevitably places the reader-theorist in the
odd position of false objectivity. “Let us be on guard against the dangerous old
conceptual fiction that posited a ‘pure, will-less, painless, timeless knowing subject,’”
writes Nietzsche, and suggests that “we should think of an eye that is completely
unthinkable, an eye turned in no particular direction, in which the active and
interpreting forces, through which alone seeing becomes seeing something, are
supposed to be lacking; these always demand of the eye an absurdity and a nonsense”
(Nietzsche On the Genealogy of Morals 119). For the poetic procedures to operate
without intention the reader as an inevitable agential force may aim to imagine their
absence; that is, interpretation must take on the conceit of agential exclusion.
Though, “there is only a perspective seeing, only a perspective ‘knowing,’” suggests
Nietzsche (119), this perspective can only be made more urgent through its temporary
eclipse. Such is the oddity the reader/interpreter must face when imagining such an
eclipse of both semantics and agency. Like the poetic procedure—and Endgame as
actant—the reader must, then, undertake an imaginary pose: a mode of reading
founded upon the principle of imagination and procedure rather than induction. That
is, our thought experiment asks of us to imagine our exclusion.
This imaginary pose is tantamount when considering Endgame as that procedure
that surrenders without intention. It is a pose that is explicitly one of relations
amongst actants not amongst reader and text. In his collection Pataphysical Essays
(2012) René Daumal writes that “there is no other way to define an actor but through
its action, and there is no other way to define an action but by asking what other
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actors are modified, transformed, perturbed, or created by the character that is the
focus of attention” (Daumal “Ghosts” 122). In other words, we do not define actors
by their agency or intentionality but, instead, on the systemic effects they cause and
how these systemic effects precede the very possibility of such causality. One way of
thinking about this is by engaging with the text in a pataphysical manner. The term
pataphysics was coined by Alfred Jarry in his posthumous 1911 novel Exploits and
Opinions of Doctor Faustroll, Pataphysician: A Neo-Scientific Novel: “Pataphysics,”
he writes “is the science of imaginary solutions, which symbolically attributes the
properties of objects, described by their virtuality, to their lineaments” (Jarry 145).
He continues: pataphysics is
the science of the particular, despite the common opinion that the only science
is that of the general. Pataphysics will examine the laws governing
exceptions, and will explain the universe supplementary to this one; or, less
ambitiously, will describe a universe which can be—and perhaps should be—
envisaged in the place of the traditional one, since the laws that are supposed
to have been discovered in the traditional universe are also correlations of
exceptions, albeit more frequent ones, but in any case accidental data which,
reduced to the status of unexceptional exceptions, possess no longer even the
virtue of originality. (145)
So, the pose our thought experiment suggests is a pataphysical one. Also, Jarry is at
the core of a theatrical movement that Esslin retrospectively christened the Theatre of
the Absurd. However, this assumption greatly deforms the possibility of Beckett’s
work. Esslin suggests that “language in Beckett’s plays serves to express the
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breakdown, the disintegration of language” and that his complete oeuvre “is an
endeavor to name the unnamable” (Esslin 85). Esslin remarks that Jarry’s
pataphysics is “subjectivist and expressionist” (351) and “exactly anticipates the
tendency of the Theatre of the Absurd to express psychological states by objectifying
them on stage” (351). This is true, but what Esslin disregards, and what is essential in
our thought experiment is that pataphsyical subjectivism and expressionism need not
be projected outward towards some kind of presence on the stage. That is, Esslin is
not committed to the pataphysical gesture that would negate the very site of
psychological and expressionistic projection. Indeed, as P. J. Murphy suggests,
“Esslin’s statements epitomize a common tendency to circumvent the full
implications of the problem by, at key critical junctures, identifying Beckett’s
characters as somehow real or human, when it is the rigorous investigation of their
very status as bestowed by language that is at the heart of the Beckettian enterprise”
(Murphy 222). Esslin’s reading requires anthropocentrism whereas Jarry’s, like
Adorno’s and Beckett’s, do not. So, considering Jarry’s pataphysics as a guide to
Beckett legitimizes the potentials of imaginative solutions to reading effectively by
imaginatively removing the reader from the procedure at hand. Because, as we saw
in Adorno’s comment, Beckett’s work is by definition exceptional, the pose the
reader needs to assume when reading Endgame must be exceptional: to assume the
pose of virtual disappearance and to allow the narrative, the actant, to take its course
and to attribute the properties of objects to the contours of their operations.
3. Endgame, Experimentation, and Scientific Narrative:
Experiment Without Experimenter
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Jarry’s pataphysics and, by extension, Endgame, express the relation between
scientific experimentation and literary experimentation: or, the relation between
scientific and aesthetic paths to epistemology. Sociologist and philosopher of science
Bruno Latour remarks that “the accuracy of [a] statement is not related to a state of
affairs out there, but to the traceability of a series of transformations” (Latour 123).
So, when the narrative structure of scientific method is divorced from experimenter
and object of inquiry what is revealed is a narrative that confirms itself via repetition
and reproducibility. In this sense, experimentation as a narrative, whether scientific
or literary, may be appropriately considered according to the criteria of pataphysics.
Experimentation is not that which projects outwards; our thought experiment on
Endgame does not tell us something about the world so much as it tells us about
analogous methodological procedures. So, whereas Esslin would have experimental
modes of theatre perform an expressionistic projection of psychological states,
Beckett’s text—as it negates the reader as the site of inquiry—projects only its own
methodological procedure. That is, experimentation itself, as a kind of narrative,
once put in motion also takes its course: science and art, as actants, proceed and
surrender without intention. The reader’s most intense involvement then, is the pose
of non-involvement and so the traceability of transformations here is not concerned
with the state of affairs of the individual or the world so much as with the effects
produced by the transformations within the parameters of methodology as a narrative.
“An experiment is a story, to be sure…but a story tied to a situation in which new
actants undergo terrible trials” writes Latour (123). Something is put in motion by
experimentation itself, the experiment takes its narrative course, and ultimately
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experimentation reveals what it must reveal via relations amongst repetition.
However, the text of Endgame will “never end” and will “never go” (Beckett 81)
because it cannot accomplish more than the reproducibility of results implicit in the
inductive methodology assumed by scientific experimentation. The text simply
refuses to engage our intimacy by prohibiting our involvement.
“The assertions of science are on shaky ground,” writes Vilém Flusser,
the puzzle-solving way of reading is a criterion-setting one in disguise, and
science establishes values just as politics and art do. Science, like art and
politics, is a fiction. It is becoming more and more clear that it is nonsense to
try to distinguish sharply between science, art, and politics. We can assume
that in science, there are normative-political as well as fictional, artistic, and
poetic impulses at work. (Flusser Does Writing Have a Future? 83)
Beckett’s text may be that which resists the inductive bias behind the scientific
project. It is too much to suggest that the effect of Endgame is to blur the distinction
between science, art, and politics. Instead, what Endgame accomplishes through
repetition without change is the denaturalization of criterion-setting modes of
expectation associated with interpretation of scientific and experimental narrative.
“Imagine if a rational being came back to earth,” muses Hamm, “wouldn’t he be
liable to get ideas into his head if he observed us long enough” (Beckett 33). Beckett,
however, does not allow this rational being to make an appearance and so, such a
criterion-setting mode of interpretation is excluded allowing the text to proceed
according to its own criteria. It is Hamm who has to provide the voice of this rational
being, this extra-diegetic entity: “Ah, good, now I see what it is, yes, now I
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understand what they’re at!” (33). For Hamm, this agency of interpretation from
without will be that which may justify that his suffering will not “all have been for
nothing” (33). Unfortunately for Hamm, Endgame, the experiment without
experimenter or object of study, proceeds according to the criteria of an unknown
procedure that resists rationalization. Whether the course of events is or is not “for
nothing” rests outside the methodology of experimentation as experimentation.
Value judgment is interpretation yet the interpreter is asked by our thought
experiment to submit to the pose of nonexistence. The reader, then, cannot
“understand what they’re at” because to do so is inaccurate to the procedure at hand.
In Latour’s discussion on Pasteur’s philosophy of science, where “the phenomena
preceded what they are the phenomena of” (Latour 118-119), he talks of what he calls
the “name of action” (119). The name of action is an expression Latour ultimately
uses to describe “strange situations—such as experiments—in which an actor
emerges out of its trials” (308); another way of thinking about this phenomenon is
when procedure reveals procedure. Here, “we do not know what it is, but we know
what it does from the trials conducted…a series of performances precedes the
definition of the competence that will later be made the sole cause of these very
performances” (119). “The actor does not yet have an essence,” writes Latour,
instead “it is defined only as a list of effects…Only later does one deduce from these
performances a competence, that is a substance that explains why the actor behaves as
it does” (308). The name of action, in short, is what happens when experiment as a
narrative unfolds as scientific narrative. That is, the methodologies and procedures of
scientific experimentation propel themselves by a kind of logical prescription: they
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are pre-scripted by their constitutive narrative. Endgame follows this process yet the
text excludes the possibility of the later deduction. Instead, the text is the persistent
series of performances that precede its causal meaning. In other words, Endgame
speaks itself; the narrative precedes interpretation and proceeds as an actant. The
reader thus assumes, rather than the privileged position of experimenter-interpreter,
an imaginary pose to the conundrum of reader a text via exclusion. The name of
action for Endgame as procedure, then, is the manner that the text reveals itself as
itself through iteration.
So, unlike Joyce’s reconstructive synthesis, the diegetic conundrum in Beckett’s
text demonstrates, as Latour remarks about scientific experimentation, that
“‘construction’ is in no way the mere recombination of already existing elements”
(Latour 124). Rather, there is a relationship between the narrative and narrative as
narrative—both as actants—that “mutually exchange and enhance their properties”
(124). In this way, we cannot say that Beckett writes as a means of prompting the
text to say simply what he wants it to say—that the text cannot simply prompt
meaning from the reader—nor can we claim that the reader simply prompts any
additional semantic competence from the text or its author. Instead, the three are
shapelessly intertwined and proceed without intention, agential design, or value.
Hamm seems aware of, not only his lack of agency, but his proxy status as actant
indistinguishable from the diegetic determinism of the text:
HAMM:
Clov.
CLOV (absorbed):
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Mmm.
HAMM:
Do you know what it is?
CLOV (as before):
Mmm.
HAMM:
I was never there.
(Pause.)
Clov!
CLOV (turning towards Hamm, exasperated):
What is it?
HAMM:
I was never there.
CLOV:
Lucky for you.
(He looks out of window.)
HAMM:
Absent, always. It all happened without me. I don’t know what’s
happened.
(Beckett 74)
That Hamm was never there is a contentious statement. He is, certainly, there in
Robbe-Grillet’s sense: he, as actant, proceeds and repeats like and with the narrative
of the text. Yet, Hamm is an actant constituent rather than an agent; that is, he is part
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of the text and therefore part of the textual actant. This, perhaps, is the closest point
of identification he can have with the extra-diegetic. Though Clov thinks this state of
exemption is lucky, as if unlike Hamm, he is there always, his lot is no different from
anyone or anything constituted by the narrative as narrative. “Action is slightly
overtaken by what it acts upon,” Latour writes,
an experiment is an event which offers slightly more than its inputs…transfers
of information never occur except through subtle and multiple
transformations…there is no such thing as the imposition of categories upon a
formless matter…in the realm of techniques, no one is in command—not
because technology is in command, but because, truly, no one, and nothing at
all, is in command. (Latour 298)
Because nothing and no one is commanding the procedure that animates the actant,26
there is no reason to attempt communion between diegetic realms. “We have to
abandon the division between a speaking human and a mute world” and we must
dismantle the assumption that “we have words—or gaze—on one side and a world on
the other,” writes Latour (140). Because we need not think of the language of the text
as a kind of series of large vertical gaps between things and language, we may instead
consider “small differences between horizontal paths of reference—themselves
considered as a series of progressive and traceable transformations” (141). Endgame,
like Latour, aims to move beyond models of interiority versus exteriority, looking for
an “alternative to the model of statements that posits a world ‘out there’ which
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Beckett, as author, certainly commands the text. However, the thought experiment here asks that we
suspend this kind of judgment. Beckett’s presence in this kind of formulation is that of one who
establishes the initial set-up of the actant. He puts the automaton in motion, but it is the automaton that
takes its course.

223

language tries to reach through a correspondence across the yawning gap separating
the two” (141).
The episode, in which Hamm requests a prayer, articulates the drama of
incomplete inter-diegetic communication, or multi-level interchange. “Let us pray to
God” (54), he suggests. And although he is interrupted by the crisis of a rat in the
kitchen, Hamm, Clov, and Nagg do proceed to attempt a petition of observance, first
out loud, then in silence, both to no success. With rehearsed and ironic expectation,
Hamm asks “well?” (55) only to receive Clov’s answer “What a hope! And you?”
inevitably abandoning his aspirations for communion; from Nagg, the comical
“Wait!” and then “Nothing doing!” (55); and Hamm himself to himself: “Sweet damn
all” (55). Their attitude of abandon is not, however, one of theological crisis.
Though Hamm concludes that “the bastard…doesn’t exist” (55), his remark is not
exclusively concerned with God so much as an extra-diegetic primum movens of any
kind. Here, the absent animator is the reader more precisely than God. The crisis is
not religious so much as it is diegetically systematic: the crisis is not cosmic but,
rather, one of malfunction. The text is more indicative of a reiterative, skipping
simulation than a theological cosmology. The reader, in this sense, is the nonexistent
bastard, not God. While Hale suggests that the universe of Endgame is one “without
order” (Hale 83), what unveils itself is that the text is one of absolute order. And so
the experiment, the name of action, of Endgame lends itself to the discourse of
computer procedure just as aptly as it does to procedures of language.
4. The Excluded Reader: Zero, Zero, Zero, Heidegger and Thinking
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Dramatizing, in this subtle and systemic fashion, our exclusion as reader, the text
operates in such a way as to make not only narrative appear before itself as narrative,
but the reader (through subtraction) interfering in the act of reading by disclosing
process itself. This procedure discloses itself most tellingly in the episode where
Clov turns the telescope, first on the window, and then on the auditorium. This move,
though certainly meta-theatrical on the level of performance, operates in two ways
when considering the play as that which propels itself by its own logic. First, it
reveals its diegetic level as something distinguished from, though somehow
connected to and dependent upon, the auditorium or extra-diegetic level of the reader.
That is, Clov’s action at once discloses and deconstructs the conventional way of
thinking about the performer/audience or text/reader relationship. Secondly, the
episode emphasizes the misplacement of the extra-diegetic: Clov unveils that the link
which establishes readerly agency has been severed. Indeed, this is the moment when
the reader needs to take notice and make manifest that the mystery of his or her
absence is hidden, not only on the level of Hamm and Clov, but back at his or herself:
CLOV:
Things are livening up.
(He gets up on ladder, raises the telescope, lets it fall.)
I did it on purpose.
(He gets down, picks up the telescope, turns it on auditorium.)
I see... a multitude... in transports... of joy.
(Pause. He lowers telescope, looks at it.)
That's what I call a magnifier.
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(He turns toward Hamm.)
Well? Don't we laugh?
HAMM (after reflection):
I don't.
CLOV (after reflection):
Nor I.
(He gets up on ladder, turns the telescope on the without.)
Let's see.
(He looks, moving the telescope.)
Zero...
(he looks)
...zero...
(he looks)
...and zero.
HAMM:
Nothing stirs. All is—
CLOV:
Zer— (Beckett 29)
The “zero” to which Clov refers is not simply the enigmatic nothingness that lies
beyond the room. The mischievous connotation that haunts Clov’s claim that “things
are livening up” (in the environment that rests beyond the room’s bare interior) is a
gesture of caustic irony. There is, at once, a reader beyond; however, the conceit
demands the reader amounts to zero: “Nothing…nothing…good…good…nothing…
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goo—” (78). The exclusion of the reader, that is, announces itself via its absence in
the reiterative narrative motion at hand. The reader is, in a word, “corpsed” (30)
since we accept the analogy between death and exclusion. On the level of the textual
automaton, in its deathly reiterations, “the whole place stinks of corpses” (46) yet, as
Clov aptly remarks, for the extra-diegetic, “the whole universe” (46) carries the same
stench. But, the play cannot fall into further decay: the methodological iterative
structure forbids this kind of trajectory. At what seems to be a moment of intense
anxiety, of remarkable self awareness, Hamm attempts to initiate an intervention (an
absurd intervention that fails as it must always have failed) into the unfolding
procedure, to bring something unthought, unknown, unprogrammed, into being:
“Think of something” (46), he requests.
This shift to thought directly confronts the iterative determinism of the play. Yet
neither Hamm nor Clov exist in a constitutive environment where they can think
simply because the determined procedural motion of the characters will not permit
them to learn. Heidegger remarks that the human being “learns when he disposes
everything he does so that it answers to whatever essentials are addressed to him at
any given moment. We learn to think by giving our mind to what there is to think
about” (Heidegger What is Called Thinking 4). Hamm and Clov cannot dispose of
every thing they do because they are not agents but constitutive parts of the narrative
as actant. Since, “in order to be capable of thinking, we need to learn it first” (4), the
two characters cannot think because they cannot learn. If they were to give their
minds over to what there is to think about, their minds would, in this case, neither
undergo an experience nor a transformation. As systemically constituted characters,
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they can only give themselves over to the constitutive actant-as-narrative. Whatever
essentials are indeed addressed to these at any given moment will, indeed, be
precisely what is, was, and will be addressed to them. Heidegger continues:
“everything thought-provoking gives us to think. But it always gives that gift just so
far as the thought-provoking matter already is intrinsically what must be thought
about” (4). They cannot, in its most absolute sense, engage in what is thoughtprovoking because they constitute what is thought-proceeding. Marcoulesco remarks
that philosophy “can be read into the Beckettian text as the willy-nilly
accompaniment of the drive to think, along with the impossibility to think, one’s lived
experiences…yet never as the thing itself” (Marcoulesco 223). The inflexible method
of the narrative here determines the impossibility of thinking with each cycle of the
text. So, the episode unfolds with the kind of comedy that reveals the mechanics of
the humour: procedure and routine.
That is, routine in the sense of a conventional unfolding of procedure is a kind of
coded set of instructions. Clov’s answer to the request to think is, in its own right,
appropriate: “What?” (Beckett 46). Hamm’s response is reiteration as much as
recitation. That he responds “angrily” (46), is precise in its futility: “An idea, have an
idea” (46). Hamm’s anger, he adds the exclamatory “A bright idea” (46), unfolds
according to the deterministic logic of a joke. We simply wait for the punch line
because the diegetic determinism here again disallows the joke to proceed in a
manner which is rejuvenating or defiant. “Although the state of the world,”
Heidegger writes, “is becoming constantly more thought-provoking” (Heidegger
What is Called Thinking 4)—and we might add that the play is gesturing towards a
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similar status of inquiry—what is “most thought-provoking is that we are still not
thinking” (4). Endgame radicalizes this. Clov and Hamm are still not thinking
because they will, forever stuck in the automaton, still not be thinking. Clov, “pacing
to and fro, his eyes fixed on the ground, his hands behind his back” (Beckett 46), as
the stage directions note, is, with comical futility “having an idea” (47). His idea?
An ineffectual and absurd mode of action: to “set the alarm…You whistle me. I don’t
come. The alarm rings. I’m gone. It doesn’t ring. I’m dead” (47) so Clov claims. If,
as Heidegger remarks, we are still not thinking, then “this course of events seems to
demand rather that man should act, without delay instead of making speeches…and
never getting beyond proposing ideas on what ought to be, and how it ought to be
done. What is lacking, then is action, not thought” (Heidegger What is Called
Thinking? 4). Then in Endgame, this predicament is radicalized: what is lacking is
both thought and action. Whether the alarm is working or not—“it’s worked too
much,” but “it’s hardly worked at all,” because “it’s worked too little” (Beckett 4748)—is not significant. What is significant is that the sum of each possibility is
procedurally equivalent: the narrative proceeds, something takes its course.
5. Zero-Player Games and Proceduralism: Endgame as Automaton
This is all very odd. Yet, the impulse to understand certain narrative systems with
the exclusion of a participant or reader has recently been undertaken in the theory of
game and play. At the 2012 Philosophy of Computer Games Conference in Madrid,
Spain Staffan Björk and Jesper Juul presented an evocative paper titled “Zero-Player
Games, Or: What we Talk about When We Talk about Players.” Their argument
aims to disclose the biases behind the way we think about games and players. For
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Björk and Juul, the most frequently cited definitions of games in the literature refer to
players as central to an understanding of what games are and what gaming means.
While the authors acknowledge that games are “designed objects” (Björk and Juul)
that imply an engagement, input, or intervention on behalf of a player, they argue
“that many common conceptions of players are too vague to be useful” (Björk and
Juul) and that any definition of a game overly reliant on the idea of a player will
prove both denotatively and connotatively inadequate. In order to reconceptualize the
player concept, Björk and Juul aim to examine the paradoxical idea of the zero-player
game: a game that proceeds without agential intervention and thus an appropriate
analogue to Beckett’s narrative. The critical and theoretical discussion surrounding
the question of what a game is and what a game means is, Björk and Juul suggest,
explicitly what they call “player-centric.” As a result, the means of extrapolating
upon the concept cannot reflexively account for itself as a phenomenon. With the
very gesture of the player-centric debate, games are being defined by a subcomponent (the player) that is assumed to be a semantic constituent and thus cannot
disclose themselves to themselves as games, to flip and turn in on themselves. The
player-centric bias is one that stems from the bias of the critic; indeed, it is odd to
concede that one can consider an object of study without one considering it. Yet,
what Björk and Juul propose here is not a study that wishes to argue against the
significance of the study of players and their role in games—or to argue that players
need to be dismissed entirely from the gaming equation—but instead to bring to the
attention of the discussion that it possible and productive to examine games in the
absence of the player concept. In a sense, they are also engaging in pataphsyical
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imagination solutions. In this logic of negation, Björk and Juul are effectively
establishing the negative space through which one may consider both games and
players and games and non-players. Here we note the analogue to our thought
experiment on Endgame. Acheson suggests that Beckett undermines “whatever
illusion the play might fortuitously create by insisting on Endgame as theatre”
(Acheson 152). Yet, we recognize the text as a kind of literary zero-player game in
that it operates by a similar conceit: that of an excluded reader27 and a text that
proceeds impartially taking its course.
Björk and Juul suggest that “many publications from the last few years have tried
to argue that it is impossible to discuss games as designed objects, since games only
actually exist when played, or as played” and that games are objects that “give
players the ability to intentionally act towards reaching the goals of a game” (Björk
and Juul). In much the same way, we are tempted to think of texts as deliberate
artifacts that only exist—in the sense that they reveal a kind of semantic ambience—
when read or as read and that give readers an intentional engagement towards a
reading goal, primarily completing the narrative through active engagement and
interpretive intervention. Citing the dominant literature on games and players, Björk
and Juul find a noticeable bias in the role of player agency, intentionality, and
aesthetic engagement.28 Such features are fundamentally at odds with the
procedurality of Endgame since the unfolding of the text is, and will be as Clov
27

Here the reader could conceivably constitute a traditional reader, a theatre spectator, or stage actor
responding to textual prompts. For this discussion, however, we will limit the inquiry to the scope of
this project: the reader in the conventional sense, a person who reads text from a printed book. There
is much discussion regarding Beckett’s intertextuality; that is, the relational role of text-as-text. See
Michael Worton’s “Waiting for Godot and Endgame: Theatre as Text” in The Cambridge Companion
to Beckett for an introduction.
28
My survey of the critical literature is indebted to research compiled by Björk and Juul.
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remarks, “the same as usual” (Beckett 4). Linda Hughes in “Children’s Games and
Gaming” (1999), for example, identifies the interpretation and aesthetic variation on
behalf of the player when discussing games:
Game rules can be interpreted and reinterpreted toward preferred meanings
and purposes, selectively invoked or ignored, challenged or defended,
changed or enforced to suit the collective goals of different groups of players.
In short, players can take the same game and collectively make of it strikingly
different experiences. (Hughes 94)
Laura Ermi and Frans Mäyrä (2005) note the “interactive nature” as the “essence” of
a game, concluding that “there is no game without a player” (Ermi and Mäyrä). Mia
Consalvo, in “There is No Magic Circle” (2009), suggests that games are created—
that is, they come into being—“through the act of gameplay” and that this coming
into being “is contingent on player acts” (Consalvo 408). Likewise, Gordon Calleja,
in In-Game: From Immersion to Incorporation (2011), also places emphasis on a
coming into being, “a game becomes a game when it is played,” he writes: until the
game is played “it is only a set of rules and game props awaiting human engagement”
(Calleja 8). Miguel Sicart, in his paper “Against Procedurality” (2011), engages in a
critique of the limits of procedural rhetoric and “takes a game design perspective akin
to that taken in some procedural rhetorics,29 but expanding it to include creative
play30 as the privileged way in which games act as rhetorical artifacts” (Sicart).
Sicart identifies what is the exceptionalist argument that dominates discussion about
games “an argument that justifies that games as aesthetic form are different than
29

See Ian Bogost’s Persuasive Games. The Expressive Power of Videogames (2007) and Mary
Flanagan’s Critical Play. Radical Game Design (2009).
30
See Bernie DeKoven’s The Well-Played Game. A Playful Path to Wholeness (2002).
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others” (Sicart) and “that games belong to players—at most, games belong to the
designer if she wants to establish a dialogue with the player through the game—but
play, the performative, expressive act of engaging with a game, contradicts the very
meaning of authorship in games” (Sicart). Sicart’s movement towards play rather
than procedure is, again, evocative of this privileging of the player as agent, prime
mover and instigator of the game. Yet the exceptionalism of agency and aesthetic
engagement is, ultimately, that which rests upon the assumption of the player as a
central element to games themselves and, by extension, the reader as a central
element for a text. Indeed, in Endgame, the role of player or reader is interrupted.
Rather than a text that permits the performative expressive acts of play and, in
striking contrast to Hughes’ emphasis on players instigating “strikingly different
experiences” from the same game, Endgame is a text that reveals itself in the thought
experiment as radically unchangeable: it is the same as usual. Indeed, rather than
Sicart’s creative play and agential flexibility, Hamm concurs that, within the
parameters of the Endgame environment, “there’s no reason for it to change” and
Clov, always lacking in his faith for any kind of diegetic intervention, utters the
significant remark: “all life long the same questions, the same answers” (Beckett 5).
What we may suggest now is that Beckett’s play, as a game, is proceduralist rather
than player-centric. As a text, it is proceduralist rather than reader-centric. Its central
diegetic conceit is, at its most extreme, that the text is a zero-player game.
Perhaps the most well-known kind of a zero-player game is the cellular automata.
Cellular automata “lend themselves to a variety of uses. In some cases, they are used
to simulate processes for which the equations that do exist are not adequate to
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describe the phenomena of interest” (Keller 205), writes Keller. Conventionally
cellular automata are implemented as a means of “producing recognizable patterns of
‘interesting’ behavior in their macrodynamics rather than in their microdynamics”
(205). “Cellular automata models are simulators par excellence,” she continues,
“they are artificial universes that evolve according to local but uniform rules of
interaction that have been pre-specified. Change the initial conditions, and one
changes the history; change the rules of interaction, and one changes the dynamics”
(207). Tommaso Toffoli and Norman Margolus write in Cellular Automata
Machines: A New Environment for Modeling (1987) that
cellular automata are stylized, synthetic universes…They have their own kind
of matter which whirls around in a space and a time of their own…A cellular
automata machine is a universe synthesizer. Like an organ, it has keys and
stops by which the resources of the instrument can be called into action,
combined, and reconfigured. Its color screen is a window through which one
can watch the universe that is being “played.” (Toffoli and Margolus 1)
Keller notes that Christopher Langton, computer scientist and founder of artificial life
systems, understands cellular automata as that which could be used to simulate
universes or environments for living beings, “where the ultimate goal would be to
create life in a new medium.” (Keller 209). Langton speculates that the simulation of
artificial life:
is the study of man-made systems that exhibit behaviors characteristic of
natural living systems. It complements the traditional biological sciences
concerned with the analysis of living organisms by attempting to synthesize
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life-like behaviors within computers and other artificial media. By extending
the empirical foundation upon which biology is based beyond the carbonchain life that has evolved on Earth, Artificial Life can contribute to
theoretical biology by locating life-as-we-know-it within the larger picture of
life-as-it-could-be. (Langton “Artificial Life” 1-2)
The means of creating new kinds of life in a process that follows a “bottom-up
synthesis” (Keller 210), in which great complexity arises from very simple rules and
within determined—limited and local—parameters, has “proved to have immense
appeal for people far beyond the world of computer scientists. Perhaps especially, it
proved appealing to readers and viewers who have themselves spent a significant
proportion of their real lives inhabiting virtual worlds” (210). The virtual worlds to
which Keller refers are extended here to those which range from various forms of
social media to our engagement with aesthetic artifice. H. Porter Abbott suggests that
what this kind of “formal experimentation requires from the critic is to find ways of
talking about Beckett’s fiction as an imitation of life without producing those often
elaborate structures of meaning, knit from a variety of ‘clues,’ which have marred so
many otherwise excellent discussions of Beckett” (Abbott 8-9). When considering
our thought experiment as a kind of zero-player game, under the conceit of a cellular
automata, we are faced with the obtrusive potentiality of facing life as we know it and
life (or, exclusion from life) as it could be. There are no clues for us here because
Endgame does not invite the interpreter to intervene in the procedure. Much in the
way Langton imagines the significance of computer models of artificial life as
creative mimesis, representation that looks-forward and is future-directed, Endgame
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unfolds most intensively in the text, yet its effects are felt most intrusively on the
extra-diegetic level. The life as it could be, horrific and sterile as it is on the textual
level, is life as it is, at the extreme of future-directedness, absent.
The most famous example of a zero-player game is Conway’s The Game of Life
(1970). In the October 1970 issue of Scientific American, Martin Gardner, wrote the
piece “The Fantastical Combinations of John Conway’s New Solitaire Game ‘Life’”
in his “Mathematical Games” column, where discusses John Horton Conway’s
experimental zero-player game then simply called “Life.” The game follows the
principles of automation expressed in the work of game theorist and mathematician
John von Neumann. “A mathematical simulation of cellular genetics,” writes Justin
Parsler, the game is more of an “intellectual puzzle” than a traditional game. In this
sense, the game follows in the same spirit as that of Endgame a text that Acheson
identifies as “a puzzle” (Acheson 204). The Game of Life, like Endgame, plays out
on a metaphorical checkerboard.31 The squares on the board are representative of a
cell that is either dead or alive. “Because of its analogies with the rise, fall and
alternations of a society of living organisms, it belongs to a growing class of what are
called ‘simulation games’—games that resemble real-life processes” writes Gardner
(Gardner 120). “To play life you must have a fairly large checkerboard and a
plentiful supply of flat counters of two colors. (Small checkers or poker chips do
nicely)” he continues, “An Oriental ‘go’ board can be used if you can find flat
counters that are small enough to fit within its cells. (Go stones are unusable because
they are not flat.) It is possible to work with pencil and graph paper but it is much
easier, particularly for beginners, to use counters and a board” (120). With each turn,
31

Conway’s The Game of Life can, however, also be played on an actual checkerboard.
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“cells either die or come to life, depending on the number of living neighbors they
have; a cell with two live neighbors dies, one with more than three dies, one with
three stays stable. A dead cell with three live neighbors comes to life” (Parsler). The
game is, in essence, a Universal Turing Machine. First conceptualized in 1936 by
mathematician and cryptologist Alan Turing, the Turing Machine can simulate the
logic of any well-formed instructions. In other words, the Machine can be modified
in such a way as to process the logic of any computer algorithm.
The game is also remarkable in its ability to establish a logic of complexity from
simplicity: that is, the variety of possible ways to set up the game in combination with
its simple rules proves profound in its meditative implications. “The rules,” Gardner
suggests, “should be such as to make the behavior of the population unpredictable”
(Gardner 120). And, the rules are quite simple. Gardner identifies only three: first,
“there should be no initial pattern for which there is a simple proof that the population
can grow without limit,” second, “there should be no initial patterns that apparently
do grow without limit,” and finally,
there should be simple initial patterns that grow and change for a considerable
period of time before coming to end in three possible ways: fading away
completely (from overcrowding or becoming too sparse), settling into a stable
configuration that remains unchanged thereafter, or entering an oscillating
phase in which they repeat an endless cycle of two or more periods. (Gardner
120).
To these criteria, Conway adds simple genetic laws. Each cell of the checkerboard,
which is assumed to be a plane that extends infinitely in every direction, will have
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eight relative cells “four adjacent orthogonally, our adjacent diagonally” (Gardner).
Here are the laws: first, survivals constitute those cases in which “every counter with
two or three neighboring counters survives for the next generation” (Gardner). The
second refers to deaths: “each counter with four or more neighbors dies (is removed)
from overpopulation. Every counter with one neighbor or none does from isolation”
(Gardner). And the third refers to births: “each empty cell adjacent to exactly three
neighbors—no more, no fewer—is a birth cell. A counter is placed on it at the next
move” (Gardner). It is clear here that once the pieces on the board are set up, there is
no direct engagement by the player. “The initial setup of the game board” writes
Parsler, “constitutes ‘playing’ the game, even though there are no set goals, nor any
winner” (Parsler); in this sense, the processes that follow from the well-formed
instructions unfold as a series of deterministic nodes of mutation and change upon
which the instigator may consider. Gardner is careful to indicate that “it is important
to understand that all births and deaths occur simultaneously” and that they
“constitutes a single generation or, as we shall call it, a ‘move’ in the complete ‘life
history’ of the initial configuration” (Gardner). This complex relation between
simplicity and complexity—and by initiating simple diegetic procedures that reiterate
indefinitely—Endgame proves remarkable when considering it in relation to cellular
automata.
Like simple systems of chaos and unpredictability, from Conway’s The Game of
Life emerge complex patterns and demonstrates that even within the confines of
determinism, even simple determinism, the complexity and variability of possible
results are staggering. Hayles writes that
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emergence implies properties or programs appear on their own, often
developing in ways not anticipated by the person who created the simulation.
Structures that lead to emergence typically involve complex feedback loops in
which the output of a system is repeatedly fed back in as input. As the
recursive looping continues, small deviations can quickly become magnified,
leading to the complex interactions and unpredictable evolutions associated
with emergence. (Hayles “Narratives of Artificial Life” 146)
The recursive loops to which Hayles refers are unique from those we examined in
earlier chapters. That is, unlike Hofstadter’s strange loops that are characterized by
inter-diegetic level crossing paradoxes, the feedback of simulation systems occur only
in one diegetic level. This recursive process is how, from simple sets of instructions,
properties or programs can emerge on their own. Gardner discusses this emergence
further: “You will find the population constantly undergoing unusual, sometimes
beautiful and always unexpected change.” He continues,
In a few cases the society eventually dies out (all counters vanishing),
although this may not happen until after a great many generations. Most
starting patterns either reach stable figures—Conway calls them “still lifes”—
that cannot change or patterns that oscillate forever. Patterns with no initial
symmetry tend to become symmetrical. Once this happens the symmetry
cannot be lost, although it may increase in richness. (Gardner 120)
And here, with the “still life” is where we find Endgame. Itself a kind of zero-player
game, a diegetic automata, a procedure that cannot change, is skipping, and oscillates
forever. Hamm’s repeated phrase “don’t stay there, you give me the shivers”
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(Beckett 32, 65) thus signifies something structurally metonymical: his shivers are the
shivers of the simulated, still life universe. He is not commanding Clov to cease
standing because of the ominous sense it causes him to experience. Rather, it
becomes indicative of the text itself and a recognition thereof: Hamm is addressing
the simulated universe as much as he is addressing Clov. The shivers are the
oscillation of still life, the recognition of the constitutive situation. “Well, you’ll lie
down then, what the hell!” expresses Hamm, “Or, you’ll come to a standstill, simply
stop and stand still, the way you are now. One day you’ll say, I’m tired, I’ll stop.
What does the attitude matter?” (37). Indeed, the attitude does not matter; one may
say that they are tired and they will stop, but this cease in movement is not an end but
an oscillation. The standstill, the simple stop, shivers, oscillates. The text itself takes
on “nice dimensions, nice proportions” (2); that is, the text assumes a symmetry that
cannot be lost.
So, when Hamm demands to know “what’s happening” (13), Clov’s response that
something is taking its course is as indicative of the proceduralist rhetoric as it is an
accurate description of the diegetic motion of the text. “Proceduralists claim that
players, by reconstructing the meaning embedded in the rules, are persuaded by
virtue of the games’ procedural nature” writes Sicart (Sicart). They also suggest that
“objects can embody values in their design” (Sicart) and justify “the cultural validity
of computer games providing arguments for the exceptionality argument (computer
games as unique, expressive cultural objects), and opened the possibility for a new
take on serious games that combined design approaches with a strong humanist
discourse” (Sicart). The discourse associated with proceduralism, Sicart suggests,

240

opens the discussion on how games are vehicles of political and ideological
significance; here, however, we are concerned with how the narrative-as-game may
disclose particular operations of reading on the extra-diegetic level. The work of Ian
Bogost in his studies Unit Operations: An Approach to Videogame Criticism (2006)
and Persuasive Games: The Expressive Power of Videogames (2007) are significant
additions to proceduralist criticism in both academia and industry: “It is the success
of Bogost’s arguments not only across the academic body but also in the games
industry what makes proceduralism a popular way of conducting computer games
scholarship” (Sicart). Sicart continues:
What proceduralism…[argues is] that computer games present a technological
and cultural exception that deserves to be analyzed through the ontological
particularities that make computer games unique, in this case, the fact that
they have a “procedural nature.” The proceduralists take their starting point in
[the]32 statement that digital games are unique, among other things, because of
their procedural nature…that is, because they are processes that operate in [a]
way that is akin to how computers operate…procedurality is understood not
just as an ontological marker of computer games, but as the specific way in
which computer games build discourses of ethical, political, social and
aesthetic value. (Sicart)
Yet, with Endgame, the conceit of proceduralism is carried to a kind of extreme. The
text itself embodies a diegetic value in its design, and this value is, however,
reconsidered as that which operates and proceeds without intention. The
demonstration at play is a text that proceeds without semantic value. Value here is
32

See Janet H. Murray’s Hamlet on the Holodeck: The Future of Narrative in Cyberspace (1998).
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the status of meanings in relation to one another: value is the intentionally structured
hierarchical merit of one term in semantic exchange with others. To be without
semantic value is to be semantically procedural and heterarchical. That is, Endgame
expresses its value as a procedure signifying that without value. Hamm asks what is
happening, but he must already know (if knowledge is constituted and programmable)
as he is moved by unseen forces. We do not “play” the players in the text, rather they
are played by the valueless process, the design, of the play itself: “Me—(he yawns)—
to play,” Hamm notes, his yawn expressing disjunction more so than ennui. The
disjunction being between “me” and “to play;” that is, rather than indicating that he
“plays” and therefore “is,” Hamm’s yawn signifies a vocalized gap that separates
agency from procedure. Hamm, though without diegetic agency, is not without an
acute sense of anxiety. There is embedded in Endgame the sense that the game itself
wishes to transcend its own process. The desire to exceed what Ruby Cohn calls the
“claustrophobic boundaries” (Cohn 21) of the room’s walls that both constitute and
signify the architecture of procedurality is the straining to escape the valueless
processes: “Let’s go from here, the two of us!” Hamm arduously cries to Clov, “You
can make a raft and the currents will carry us away, far away, to other…mammals!”
(Beckett 34).
However, Hamm’s ardor speaks to the futility of his cry. There are no other
mammals—if we excuse the brief existence of a rat, or the questionable existence of
the boy33 beyond the walls—in the design of Endgame. Indeed, it is Hamm’s dog
that makes manifest the processes of text as a kind of game simulation rather than a

33

That the boy does not appear within the walls suggests that he cannot exist according to the
procedure in any way other than as a brief, non-manifest textual mention.
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traditional narrative. This unsettles not only the status of narrative but also the status
of language in Endgame. In his discussion on Endgame, Benjamin H. Ogden
suggests that Beckett’s language is one that forgoes any attempt at an ideal abstract
language of the kind Wittgenstein proposed in Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus in
favor of a language that is understood to be explicitly concerned with, following
Stanley Cavell, natural concretisms. Ogden suggests that “in order to speak a
language properly, then, one cannot just know the dictionary or formal definitions of
words (its ‘ideal’ generative grammar), but must understand the ‘natural
environment’ in which phrases and words are logical or appropriate” (Ogden 127).
The act of reading literature, Cavell suggests, is a process of “naturalizing ourselves
to a new form of life, a new world” and that by doing so it is essential to focus upon
the inhabitants of the fictional world (127). Ogden, however, seems to be gesturing
more towards a kind of reading position of which the sort proceduralists would agree.
He finds Cavell “too eager to ‘hear’ things in the text, to discover the cleverest
readings rather than to permit the text to yield its unique, multiform logic” and, so,
Ogden opts to “allow Endgame to speak for itself” (136). The wording of the play
must not speak to but rather speak for itself, to proceed without intention. The
wording of Hamm’s request for his dog is, then, worth noting for its heterarchical
indeterminacy: “Is my dog ready?” (Beckett 39). Clov’s responses, that the dog
“lacks a leg” and that he is “a kind of Pomeranian” (39, emphasis added), is equally
telling; the animal is, after all, a “black toy dog” with “three legs” (39). Here we
cannot read Endgame literally as Cavell might have us because we assume the pose
that the text proceeds on its own, the simulation moves itself and speaks itself. So,
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not only is the dog a simulation, but it is one that reveals itself as an imperfect
simulation demonstrative of a debilitating mutation of the appendages of agential
mobility. Indeed, the lifeless dog becomes metonymical of both the status of
language and the text itself:
CLOV:
Your dogs are here.
(He hands the dog to Hamm who feels it, fondles it.)
HAMM:
He's white, isn't he?
CLOV:
Nearly.
HAMM:
What do you mean, nearly? Is he white or isn't he?
CLOV:
He isn't.
(Pause.)
HAMM:
You've forgotten the sex.
CLOV (vexed):
But he isn't finished. The sex goes on at the end.
(Pause.)
HAMM:
You haven't put on his ribbon.
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CLOV (angrily):
But he isn't finished, I tell you! First you finish your dog and then you put
on his
ribbon!
(Pause.)
HAMM:
Can he stand?
…
CLOV:
Wait!
(He squats down and tries to get the dog to stand on its three legs, fails,
lets it go. The
dog falls on its side.)
HAMM (impatiently):
Well?
CLOV:
He's standing.
HAMM (groping for the dog):
Where? Where is he?
(Clov holds up the dog in a standing position.)
CLOV:
There.
(He takes Hamm's hand and guides it towards the dog's head.)
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HAMM (his hand on the dog's head):
Is he gazing at me?
CLOV:
Yes.
HAMM (proudly):
As if he were asking me to take him for a walk?
CLOV:
If you like.
HAMM (as before):
Or as if he were begging me for a bone.
(He withdraws his hand.)
Leave him like that, standing there imploring me.
(Clov straightens up. The dog falls on its side.) (Beckett 40-41)
While Clov is only partly committed to the farce—he refers to the dog in the plural,
concedes that the black dog is “nearly” white, only to, upon interrogation, admit that
the dog, in fact, “isn’t”—he does seem to demonstrate a recognition of the
proceduralism of the narrative as metonymically expressed by the dog. His response
to Hamm’s accusation that the maker has forgotten the dog’s reproductive organs is
indicative of the diegesis itself as an iterative procedure that is at once static and
sterile. The dog “isn’t finished” and, until the end, the dog will have no genitalia.
However, there is no end to Endgame; the procedure forbids it. Endgame is, rather,
taking its course, and will continually do so ad infinitum. The dog cannot stand and
therefore cannot—like Hamm, Nagg, Nell, and the narrative itself in our thought
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experiment—have or be engaged by any agential mobility. The text, like the dog, can
only demonstrate the as if it were being asked to be taken for a walk; or, as if the
intervention of agency and intentionally could provide alternatives to the strict design.
That the narrative can “go on” differently from the procedural patterns determined by
the text’s design is impossible: an attempt at intentional intervention will, like the
dog, fall flat. Indeed, while both Hamm and Clov indicate awareness of the
proceduralism that governs the course of the text, here, it is Clov who euphemistically
expresses that the text is “not a real dog, he can’t go” (56). Indeed, the diegesis of the
play, like the dog, is a simulation: it is “not even a real dog!” (69). It is not a real
diegetic environment, it is not a game with a player, it “can’t go,” but it must take its
course.
6. Simulation Fever: Endgame as Zero-Player Simulation
That Endgame is not a real diegetic environment implies its status as a simulation.
The simulated environment that constitutes the text is radical in its proceduralism.
Keller clearly identifies simulation as follows: “simulo v. 1. To make a thing like
another; to imitate, copy…2. To represent a thing as being which has no existence, to
feign a thing to be what it is not” (Keller 203). So, simulation is simultaneously
openly mimetic and artificial. Ian Bogost, in Unit Operations (2006), utilizes the
concept of “simulation fever” as a means of discussing the implications of
procedurality on the relation between the system and its player. “Working through
simulation fever means learning how to express what simulations choose to embed
and to exclude,” he writes (Bogost 109). The player thus becomes integrated in his or
her relation to the processes determined by the game. Working through simulation
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fever involves the recognition of how one is embedded within and how one is
excluded from the procedurality of the game. This mode thus permits a certain
flexibility in the agency and interpretive methodologies that a player may utilize to
understand the game while simultaneously remaining implicated in and determined
by those processes animating the game. Bogost suggests that certain kinds of
interpretation may achieve a point through which one may understand the system
from within and without: this
would encourage player critics to work through the simulation anxiety a
simulation generates. Part of this process takes place within the gameplay, as
the player goes through cycles of configuring the game by engaging its unit
operations. Another process of configuration has to do with working through
the play’s subjective response to the game, the internalizations of its
cybernetic feedback loops. (Bogost 108-109).
What Bogost identifies as the working through of a simulation anxiety is, in fact, a
kind of anxiety itself. That is, the anxiety of undergoing an experience with
simulation is that which discloses anxiety to itself. The experience cannot be one
governed by anxiety, that causing anxiety, but instead anxiety is that disposition
which reveals anxiety. Anxiety is that which helps the player both recognize how he
or she is embedded within the systemic procedure of Endgame yet also forcing the
indifference of the system to that recognition by unveiling how one’s intentionality is
ultimately, and paradoxically, excluded from the operation. The concept of
simulation fever, then, is a means of assuming a kind of contradictory stance
regarding how one may be an accomplice in the simulation itself: it is a means of
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making meaningful the constitutive system and deterministic ambience while at the
same time attempting to express how the player or reader experiences the system.
The player is, then, both embedded and excluded. Yet, this balance is, unlike
almost every other element in Beckett’s text, hardly symmetrical. Hamm and Clov
are ultimately forced into this paradoxical stance. They seem largely aware of the
procedurality of the text—of the parody that mocks the possibility for them to live
authentically or make meaningful and meditative choice—and, yet, are unable to have
an effect on the very procedurality that determines the reiterative narrative. So, when
Hamm, for example, remarks that “nature has forgotten us” (Beckett 11), and Clov
responds that “there’s no more nature,” the two are simultaneously recognizing the
text itself as a kind of simulation as well as that constitutive environment, nature
itself, being excluded from the artificial system in which they take their course. “No
more nature! You exaggerate,” Hamm repudiates suggesting that there is at least
something that resembles nature—the artifact, the text as simulation—but Clov is
steadfast: there is no more nature “in the vicinity” (11). That is, simulation is an
approximation but not a spatial proximity; Hamm and Clov are, nevertheless, both
embedded and excluded from the system. Again, Hamm and Clov do not fully
correspond with Bogost’s player; instead, it is the reader of Endgame who is most
intimately embedded, and yet taking the conceit of the text as a case of radical
procedurality—the zero-player game—the reader is more excluded than embedded in
the text. While simulation fever allows, Sicart writes, for games to “convey messages
and create aesthetic and cultural experiences by making players think and reflect
about the very nature of the rules” (Sicart), this reflexivity is one that gestures more
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intensely to that which is excluded rather than that which is embedded. If Hamm and
Clov were fully embedded in the text, we could suppose some degree of agency from
them. Because they are not, we see that they often do think and reflect about the
nature of the rules, but the nature of these rules is not natural, they are artificial,
simulated, and these thoughts and reflections are programmed. The procedurality
here does not establish a delicate balance between agency and absence; rather, the
text is one that gestures more towards that which expresses diminution of choice to
the point of absence, nothingness, exclusion: zero. “Both mental modeling and
cognitive mapping show how the interpretation of a game relies as much or more on
what the simulation excludes or leaves ambiguous than on what it includes,” writes
Bogost (Bogost 105). In a strange turn for this logic, our zero-player game embeds
the reader by readerly exclusion: the radical finitude of the extra-diegetic in relation
to reiterative endlessness of the diegetic logic. Like Björk’s and Juul’s examination
of what the player means to gaming in zero-player games, our thought experiment
raises the question of what reader means with a text as zero-player game. So, with
such simulation anxiety a simulation generates for the reader is at once that which
intensifies self-awareness only towards a directionality of exclusion, the transitory
conditionality of the reader.
The text, though one of repetition, cycles, and reiteration, operates in such a way
to express a kind of communion with nothingness. Beckett’s insistence on the
repetitive qualities of the text juxtaposed with the sterility of the simulated natural
environment is significant. When Hamm asks Clov if his seeds have come up, Clov’s
response is telling:
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CLOV:
No.
HAMM:
Did you scratch round them to see if they had sprouted?
CLOV:
They haven’t sprouted.
HAMM:
Perhaps it’s still too early.
CLOV:
If they were going to sprout they would have sprouted.
(Violently.)
They’ll never sprout! (Beckett 13)
Like all occurrences in Endgame, Clov’s seeds will never sprout simply because they
never have sprouted. It is the non-linear cyclical directionality of the text that
determines this; Clov’s hopelessness is not despair; it is, instead, procedural accuracy.
Much in the manner that the toy dog is a simulation without reproductive organs, the
diegesis of Endgame is a simulation where nature and the natural environment itself
is absent, sterile, and incapable of proclivity and unpredictability. Hamm, with his
typical exaggeration, muses: “But beyond the hills? Eh? Perhaps it’s still green. Eh?
(Pause.) Flora! Pomona! (Ecstatically.) Ceres!” (39). But the green will not sprout
because, again, it never has sprouted in this looping reiteration and, so, cannot.
Indeed, even stories themselves, mythology and narratives of growth and rebirth, are
without significance; neither Flora nor Pomona, no Ceres are beyond the hills. That

251

is, the prospect of both biological and narrative proliferation and growth are at odds
with the static simulation that constitutes the diegesis of Endgame.
Like Conway’s Game of Life, before achieving a state of still life, sterility, or
reiterative death, there is a moment of remarkable fecundity, a simulation of nature’s
cycles of reproduction, flourish, prolificacy, and unpredictability. Whether the
memories of these earlier cycles as recited in the text are based on past actualities is
not important. What does draw attention, however, is that the very logic of Nagg and
Nell, as an older generation, suggests that there is something of a programmed past
that proved remarkably different from Endgame’s skipping present. That is, Nagg
and Nell once reproduced: Hamm is their offspring. And, indeed, Hamm understands
this as a great injustice, cursing Nagg as an “accursed progenitor” (9), an “accursed
fornicator” (10), and as “scoundrel” (49) asking Nagg “why did you engender me?”
(49). Not only did Nagg and Nell once procreate, they have memories of a past once
remarkable in its fecundity, growth, and mobility. Nagg and Nell, now confined to
living inside trash cans, once rode, and “crashed on [a] tandem and lost [their]
shanks” (Beckett 16). Unlike the present, their orientation in the world is precise and
relatable: “It was in the Ardennes” recalls Nell, “on the road to Sedan,” is Nagg’s
concurrence. Though, abruptly juxtaposing this memory with the present, Nagg
compassionately interjects, asking Nell whether she is “cold” (16). Indeed, the
tenderness and thoughtfulness that Nagg and Nell share towards one another is also of
the past. Nagg recalls how he once could make Nell laugh, “the first time,” he made
her laugh so intensely, he “thought [she’d] die” (21). This recollection is, again, set
in a nostalgic scene of time, place, and mobility now lost: this time, not in the
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Ardennes or on the way to Sedan, but “on Lake Como” (21) in that month of rebirth,
April. The two, out rowing on Lake Como the day after their engagement, recollect
how they “were in such fits that we capsized. By rights we should have been
drowned” (21). However, they could not have drowned because they represent the
possibility of life in another time and place. Indeed, even within the action of text,
death and the prospect of an absolute change is uncertain. It is not definite whether
Nell dies. It is reasonable to suppose she, like the rest of the characters, does not
perish because she cannot. It simply “looks like” (62) she is dead but, as Hamm
claims, “life,” or at least something that resembles it, “goes on” (67). No matter how
powerfully the characters may will to “get it over” (70), they, as actants rather than
agents, can neither be “gone nor dead” (70) but rather must go on. That is, they
represent what would be still life oscillations—a no longer changing loop—of the
simulation rather than cycles of alteration.
The past, real or imagined, is a time diametrically contrasting with the now
constant present of the text. The happiness or comedic prospect of natural order
being restored is, now, recognized by both Nagg and Nell as no longer something of
potentiality. Nagg is more disheartened, however: he reveals the possibility that the
past and the recollections that accompany it are, indeed, themselves (if not false in the
sense of simulations) false to the sense that they did not (and cannot) take place in the
simulation at all. In response to Nell’s meditation upon her happiness on Lake Como,
Nagg indignantly responds that it was not happiness, “it was not, it was not, it was my
story and nothing else. Happy! Don’t you laugh at it still? Every time I tell it.
Happy!” (21). Indeed, now, for Nell, the only thing that is comical is the unhappiness
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of stasis: “Yes, yes, it’s the most comical thing in the world. And we laugh, we laugh,
with a will, in the beginning. But it’s always the same thing. Yes, it’s like the funny
story we have heard too often, we still find it funny, but we don’t laugh any more”
(19). Laughter, as an affective source of restoration or rejuvenation, then finds no
place in Endgame. It is not that the text is not funny, at moments it is quite funny, but
it is not the kind of humour that readily invites laughter because it is not the kind of
text that encourages the active involvement from either characters or the reader.
Valerie Topsfield argues that “despite the uncompromisingly gloomy setting [of
Endgame], Beckett’s inborn dicacity is much in evidence, and there is a wide
spectrum of humour in the piece, ranging from the arch or intellectual, to the risus
purus, the defiant laugh at what is unhappy” (Topsfield 112). However, Endgame’s
relentless repetition disallows remembrance in a meaningful sense since the causality
of memory is incommensurable with the reiterative directionality of the simulation.
There cannot be meaningful defiance here because the text will not allow it.
Certainly the text’s humour is sophisticated, but it proceeds without the temporal
logic of that which makes laughter restorative. Without remembrance, without past
or future, Beckett’s text disrupts the biases of what it means to represent what is alive
both literally and metaphorically.
Simulation does, after all, aim to stand in as a proxy: the more mimetically precise,
detailed, and accurate, the better. Keller identifies the central question regarding
simulation: “how closely can a mechanical simulacrum be made to resemble an
organism in the most fundamental attributes? What properties would the simulation
need to have before it could be said to be alive?” (206). Early automations are
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seductive enough in their simple power for self-animation and self-progression.
Despite the seductive quality, the animation in itself is not enough to compel a belief
in a mechanism as a living being. The simulation is made; it is fabricated as a means
of instilling and inhabiting a likeness to its original object. Yet, in the techne that the
maker practices is an embedded object as actant. The object contains and
accommodates its telos, the simulation is assembled and so self-assembles, graduating
from a copy to an intimation and an intimacy. Imitation is the most intimate of
processes for a simulation. The simulation’s purposiveness is to be precisely intimate
with its original object, to enshroud its rank as representation, to be absolutely iconic.
Its end is its beginning; it shimmers as rapidly oscillating symmetries. Though the
object may be feigned, it ultimately represents, not an original object, but that which
has no existence. The stage in Endgame, and its constitutive actors, reveals itself as a
proxy for that which is not. The natural environment, nature itself, is a simulation
and, as we have already seen, there is repetitive evidence from the text suggesting that
the characters are uncannily aware of this condition. Far more than a demonstration
of meaningless, then, Endgame imitates the processes that constitute the shimmering
symmetries of simulation: the text expresses nature in a cycle of iterative sterility.
Simulations “have come to constitute an alternative reality,” Keller notes, “one that
appears ever more easily interchangeable with the original” (208). Yet, how the
sterile environment in Endgame relates to the extra-diegetic level is complex.
Something, indeed, is taking its course; something is happening because it just so
happens to be precisely what happens, has always happened, and will always happen.
The play represents processes, yet it also unveils the thing it aims to represent, a thing
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that it resists: the extra-diegetic. “A good part of the appeal of [simulation]” Keller
remarks, “derives from the exhibition of computational results in forms that exhibit a
compelling visual resemblance to the processes they are said to represent” (207).
How closely can a demonstration of meaninglessness be made to resemble the
fundamental attributes of its object? So long as it propels itself and animates itself—
its rituals of mechanization may not constitute life—the play unveils the silence of the
fundamental attributes of the extra-diegetic in question. The impulse of Endgame
animates a simulation of both nature and life. The play ceaselessly merges with, as it
departs from, its original object: the realm of the reader. The sterility of the text
suggests the absence, or pending absence, of the reader: a mysticism of the void.
“How is it possible,” asks Hayles, “that in the late twentieth century to believe, or
at least claim to believe, that computer codes are alive? And not only alive, but
natural?” (146). She remarks that the question is more difficult to answer than one
may initially think largely because the question itself involves narrative assumptions
that have been adequately unveiled and articulated. The conjecture underlying
inquiry’s logic cannot stand on its own but is instead a dynamic series of parts
circulating about in a constitutive cultural conversation. “Pull any one thread,” she
continues, “and a tangled weave of interconnected strands begins to vibrate” (146).
So, given the complexity of this tangle of narratives and cultural presuppositions, it is
perhaps most effective to approach the subject indirectly. That is, rather than solely
regarding the scientific content of cellular automata or other modes of artificial life,
one must look “at the stories told about and through them” (147). The narratives
Hayles examines are those explicitly involved in artificial life programming and
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coding as well as the language used to talk about the product of this programming and
coding. Here, however, the focus is on a conceit: that Beckett’s Endgame is itself a
simulation of a kind of automata, a zero-player game operating without a gamer,
something that unfolds ab initio. Heidegger asks “when does language speak itself as
language?” (Heidegger “The Nature of Language” 59) and so it seems that Endgame
is asking when does a narrative speak itself as a narrative? If “language is the house
of Being” (63), as Heidegger famously remarks, and we extend the question to one of
diegesis—that is, narrative is the house of Being—inter-diegetic knots, narrative
relations, are the psycho-ecology, the tangled environment, in which this locale of
familiarity is built. Yet, though “we speak our language,” Heidegger writes, “our
relation to language is vague, obscure, almost speechless” (58). Endgame’s
diminution of language, the gradual stripping away of dialogue, dramatizes this
trajectory of speechlessness as that which ultimately silences the house of being. It is,
oddly enough, in this state of being almost speechless that we must examine Endgame
through a similar mode that Hayles suggests we consider whether cellular automata or
other simulated life: we must lose our sense of locale, or our singular position, as
reader in order to, paradoxically, allow the narratives to operate as themselves. This
movement inward is also, indeed, a movement outwards: a positionless position for
the reader, disguising the ontological position of one who animates the text, retreating
from the diegetic equation.
7. Simulation and the Body: Merleau-Ponty, Endgame,
and a Phenomenology of Exclusion
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With Endgame, the reader and the narrative are equiprimordial; that is, they each
disclose themselves to themselves, co-originating, yet moving apart. Beckett’s play
takes its own course, and the reader—through the present conceit—retreats. This
repetition operates ad infinitum. That is, it does not gesture towards but instead
gestures iteratively. Hayles suggests that “while artificial life marks a decisive break
in the ‘nature’ of human being through the narratives it tells, it also re-inscribes
traditional ideas and stories. Characteristic of the narrative field as a whole is a
seriated pattern of innovation and replication” (147). Endgame, however, is the
seriated pattern of innovation and replication atrophied. While Jane Alison Hale
remarks that “movement is a fundamental characteristic of the time and space of
Endgame;” that “time passes; the characters ‘get on’; yesterday and the future
continually contaminate the present” (Hale 71), the logicality of this chronological
directionality is complicated by the text. The brief tableau that opens the text is itself
co-original with that which ends the text. Thus it dramatizes a symmetry that at once
defies linearity yet remains inscribed via iterative processes:
Bare interior. Grey light. Left and right back, high up, two small windows,
curtains drawn. Front right, a door. Hanging near door, its face to wall, a
picture. From left, touching each other, covered with an old sheet, two
ashbins. Centre, in an armchair on castors, covered with an old sheet,
HAMM. Nothingness by the door, his eyes fixed on HAMM, CLOV. Very
red face. Brief tableau. (Beckett Endgame 1)
And the apex of the text’s loop:
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Cover me with the sheet….[He tries to move the chair, using the gaff as
before. Enter CLOV, dressed for the road. Panama hat, tweed coat, raincoat
over his arm, umbrella, bag. He halts by the door and stands there, impassive
and motionless, his eyes fixed on HAMM, till the end. HAMM gives
up]…[He covers his face with handkerchief, lowers his arms to armrests,
remains motionless.]…[Brief tableau.] (82-84).
The initial point, the brief tableau opening the play, is also the brief tableau at its
terminal point. This diegetic structure, unsettling as it is, operates as both as the
narrative propulsion and, yet, like Clov, establishes a movement that stands there as if
it is impassive and motionless. “The end is in the beginning,” riddles Hamm, “and
yet you go on” (69). The narrative thus emerges out of what cannot constitute
narrative: “Moments for nothing,” remarks Hamm, “now as always, time was never
and time is over, reckoning closed and story ended” (83). The story, of course, has
not ended. Clov, with the play’s opening line, declares that “it’s finished, nearly
finished, it must be nearly finished” (1) articulating the embeddedness of a
paradoxical ending in the beginning. At the opening of the text there is the sense that
much has already transpired. Indeed, Hale remarks that
The time and space of Endgame, as announced by its title are those of an
ending; the form and content of the play convey the impression of a world that
is in gradual decline, where everything and everybody are weakening,
winding down, running out. In spite of this progressive diminishment,
however, the end toward which all seems to be moving is uncertain, unknown
because unknowable, and perhaps unattainable. (Hale 72)
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The reason for this conundrum: that the beginning is, indeed, somewhere in an
extended and knotted chronology. Though the play has just begun, it is already “time
it ended” (3); that is, we see that what has already transpired is what will inevitable
follow. Pushed along the current of the game’s automatic determinism, we have
Hamm’s declaration: “And yet I hesitate, I hesitate to…to end. Yes, there it is, it’s
time it ended and yet I hesitate to—(he yawns)—to end” (3). That, amidst his
hesitation, Hamm’s yawn is indicative of something tedious, repetitive, and
exhausting. To assume Hamm’s boredom is the result of the play beginning in
medias res, however, would be misleading. The beginning is the play’s ending and
the ending is what precedes its commencement. We are not in the middle of some
kind of action, but rather the play opens somewhere, stochastically anywhere amidst
oscillating still life. Hamm is tired because he must be exhausted, he will always
yawn, because he has indefinitely yawned at this locale in the diegetic loop. If Hamm
asks Clov where the latter is, Clov must declare that he is “here” (8), and yet when
Hamm demands that Clov “come back” (8) and again asks “where are you?,” Clov
will again answer “here” (8). Not only does this exchange express the narrative
oscillating static in micro, it establishes orientational determinism. Hamm will be
exhausted, in the same place, every time just as Clov must always be in the
relativistically indeterminate “here.” Indeed, Hamm’s yawn—like all yawns in the
play—is a most suitable action because it, like the most nuanced details of the
narrative, is involuntary in its most absolute sense. Pages closed, one imagines
Endgame silently taking its course at any number of narrative velocities silently on
the reader’s bookshelf. The play, once emerged, repeats its million moments ad
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nauseum. Repeating itself indefinitely, the reader vanishes indefinitely. The decay of
Endgame, is not at all entropic but static and stochastic. The play remains and will
continue to proceed.
The process of reading Endgame, a process which ultimately denies the reader the
satisfaction of identifying as the primum movens, is also a process which invites
phenomenological investigation. Because such a reading is one of locating
dislocation, diegetic level crossing from simulation to the quiescent encoder, it
assumes the conceit of an interaction between perceptual and spatial recognition as a
site of being. While the recognition here, spatially a level away from the narrative,
operates on the metaphor of the reader’s exclusion, a reader-as-abyss, the reader notes
the disjunction in his intimacy he shares with the actant. Because the narrative space
of Endgame is a simulation, the semiotics here are, to borrow from Scott Bukatman,
“post referential” (Bukatman 117). The reader must suspend his or her disbelief in
the narrative conceit, while at the same time, suspend the assumption in his own
presence. Bukatman suggests that “a phenomenology of science fiction34 helps us to
understand the strategies of these works: specifically their attempt to redefine the
imperceptible (and therefore absent to consciousness) realms of the electronic era in
terms that are physically and perceptually familiar” (117). Beckett’s play is not one
concerned so much with mapping the cognitive tools for the electronic age, however.
Instead of making that near which is lacking from consciousness, the gesture of
Endgame is to make consciousness itself, on the extra-diegetic level, disappear.

34

A recent reading of Endgame as a work of post-apocalyptic science fiction is included in Charles A.
Carpenter’s Dramatists and the Bomb: American and British Playwrights Confront the Nuclear Age,
1945-1964 (1999). Carpenter’s reading is quite good, though it is worth noting that, throughout his
life, Beckett vehemently objected to this kind of evaluation of the play.
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While “an emphasis upon the absolute reality of the world ‘in itself,’ has evident
benefits in constructing a phenomenology of an abstract and nonphysical space”
(117), Endgame discloses the simulated reality of a world that has created itself, that
unfolds itself: the last million last moments of a still life corpsed yet shivering at its
apex.
Bukatman remarks that the simulated space in the work of Baudrillard or
cyberpunk literature depends upon metaphors of spatial movement and human
perception. He writes that the rhetoric of simulated space depends upon a specific
phenomenology of perception in the likes of that elaborated upon by Merleau-Ponty’s
materialist and existentialist philosophy. Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology
recognizes the reality status of the objective environment, however, his main
contribution is on the spaces of interaction that situate themselves between the
physical objects as innately perceptible and the subjective “motile perceiver”
(Bukatman 117). The interaction between these two is what constitutes the
consciousness of the subject. Bukatman writes that “Merleau-Ponty’s preliminary
emphasis on the primary activity of perception corresponds to the paradigmatic
strategies of visualization which are shared by narrative, scientific, and philosophical
elaborations of electronic space” (118). This is explicitly engaged with the reality
status of real and simulated spaces and the hierarchy of values that accompanies such
formulations. The dichotomy of form and matter is intimately bound in a series of
ontological biases. “Reality,” writes Hayles, “at the fundamental level is seen as a
form rather than matter” (Hayles 154). She continues: “the assumption that form
occupies a privileged position relative to matter is especially easy to make with
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information technologies since information is defined in theoretic terms as a
probability function and thus as a pattern or form rather than a materially instantiated
entity” (155). In the end, however, whether or not simulated spaces are real,
Bukatman adds, is not really the question since our experience of such spaces
certainly is ontologically significant.
Merleau-Ponty famously posits the body as a “point of view upon the world” (70).
At first glance, this position may seem at odds with the conceit of character as
constitutive functions of the diegetic actant and the reader as an absent body in
Endgame. What this formulation does achieve, instead, is a consideration of how
certain symmetries in the play operate to anesthetize and delimit the primacy of the
body. This process proves, ultimately, to make the body—through its
disappearance—manifest to itself. Furthermore, this mode also inquires into certain
assumptions we may have regarding the intentionality of the agential nature of
diegetic actants and their relation to the strange experience of Endgame. Much in the
same way as Heidegger,
Merleau-Ponty looks beyond the subject object divide to try to gain insight
into the concrete structures of worldly experience. But whereas Heidegger
does little more than mention the problem of embodiment in passing,
Merleau-Ponty bases his entire phenomenological project on an account of
bodily intentionality and the challenge it poses to any adequate concept of
mind. (Carman 206)
In general, the issue of embodiment is engaged in discussions over the status of how
mental activity may be a divergent locale from the body for phenomenological
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investigation. That is, whether the phenomenological sphere of the mental itself is a
distinct mode for the subject’s orientation with physical surroundings. “MerleauPonty never doubts or denies the existence of mental phenomena,” Carman clarifies,
“but he insists, for example, that thought and sensation as such occur only against a
background of perceptual activity that we always already understand in bodily terms,
by engaging in it” (Carman 206). Symmetries in the unique attributes of bodies in
Endgame, serve to simultaneously emphasize the body as a site of perception and
negate the effectiveness of the body through complementary mutilations. Perhaps the
most explicit example is that Hamm “can’t stand” (Beckett Endgame 10) while Clov
“can’t sit” (10). This complementary structure at once emphasizes the body’s
primacy and, at the same time, in its relation to its complement, negates its
potentiality as an effective site of agency and perception. Hamm and Clov are
symmetrical complements, though, those that negate through diminution: ones and
zeroes. In order for Hamm to be a site of bodily perception, he needs Clov as an
extension of himself. Clov, likewise, needs the bodily attribute of sitting acquired by
Hamm in order to be a fully operating site of perception. However complementary
they appear, the two are indelibly separate and as mutually affirming as they are
delimiting.
Merleau-Ponty evocatively notes a paradox of regress in identifying the body as
the locale of perception; indeed, this logic also informs certain biases we commonly
hold regarding narratives as purposive agents. “I observe external objects with my
body, I handle them, examine them, walk round them, but my body itself is a thing
which I do not observe: in order to be able to do so, I should need the use of a second
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body which itself would be unobservable,” writes Merleau-Ponty (Phenomenology of
Perception 91). What he suggests here is that the body cannot observe or engage
with itself in the same manner is it does with exterior objects. It cannot, in other
words, achieve transcendence from itself as a means of positioning itself as an
objective observer of that which is the “subject-object” (Merleau-Ponty 95) of
observation. Like Hofstadter’s “I,” as a heterarchical strange loop, Merleau-Ponty’s
point is that while one can see and touch parts of the body, a gradual movement up
the hierarchy of unity and completion, one can never fully observe the “perceiving
organ in relation to itself” (Carman 207). When Merleau-Ponty writes that “my
visual body includes a large gap at the level of the head” (PP 94), the conundrum of
the bodily structure of perception proves to be largely anchored at the eyes. The body
plays a constitutive role in experience precisely,” writes Carman, “by grounding,
making possible, and yet remaining peripheral in the horizons of our perceptual
awareness” (Carman 208). That the eyes are at the centre of this strange loop in the
question of perception again attests to the negation of intentionality on behalf of the
narrative in Endgame. Mary F. Catanzaro suggests that “Central to Endgame is the
theme of coupling and partnership—and its seeming impossibility—where we see the
full spectrum of broken promises that undermines agreement and accord” (Catanzaro
165). Indeed, the need for “the use of a second body” to observe oneself is somewhat
dramatized by another strange symmetry: Hamm’s blindness and Clov’s propensity to
stare, “his eyes fixed on Hamm, till the end” (82). Very early in the play Hamm
requests that Clov look into his eyes: “Did you ever see my eyes?” (Beckett Endgame
3) asks Hamm. Clov responds in the negative. “Did you never have the curiosity,
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while I was sleeping, to take off my glasses and look at my eyes?” (3) Hamm
continues in inquiry. Clov again responds in the negative: “Pulling back the lids?
(Pause.) No” (4). Hamm again: “One of these days I’ll show them to you. (Pause.) It
seems they’ve gone all white” (4). Hamm’s visual body indeed includes a large gap
at the level of his head in the literalized form of blind eyes. Asking Clov if he’s ever
seen his blind eyes is, by extension, asking Clov to act as a kind of second body.
Clov’s refusal, of course, attests to the impossibility of this formulation.
Ultimately, however, this dramatization demonstrates how the body in Endgame
may be a site of perception but, at the same time, is not an intentional agent of
perception. As simulations constituted by the diegetic actant, Hamm, Clov, Nagg,
and Nell, each in their unique relation to one another, prevent bodies from achieving
the status of a point of view upon the world. “I move external objects with the aid of
my body, which takes hold of them in one place and shifts them to another” writes
Merleau-Ponty. He continues,
But my body itself I move directly, I do not find it at one point of objective
space and transfer it to another, I have no need to look for it, it is already with
me—I do not need to lead it towards the movement’s completion, it is in
contact with it from the start and propels itself towards that end. The
relationships between my decision and my body are, in movement, magic
ones. (Merleau-Ponty 94)
In Endgame, however, the mutilated complementary bodies do indeed require one
point of objective space transferred to another. While the human body need not look
for itself at another point since it is already present, the simulated bodies in the
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diegesis do need to seek beyond themselves as a means of completing their
incomplete, mutated, and mutilated physicality. The cellular automaton, the zeroplayer game, at its point of still life, achieves a state of complementary disjunctions.
As a result, on the diegetic level of the play Beckett radicalizes the difficulty of
explaining and interpreting one’s situation or environment. On the diegetic level of
the play, bodies are less nodes of perception than pieces in a programmed puzzle.
That is, the bodily symmetries in Endgame negate one another. “The primary reason
that explanation and interpretation are inextricably entwined,” writes Hayles on the
difficulty of interpreting narratives of life, “is that the program is an artifact, not a
natural system…Analogy is not incidental or belated but central to the program’s
artifactual design” (Hayles 150). Complementary and yet self-negating pairs such
symmetries and zero-sum analogies go on but cannot move forward; these
programmatic pairs are, like Hamm, left shivering and trembling, the automata is
forever jammed, the game’s progression is gridlocked: diegetic kill screen. Such
configurations highlight the bodies in Endgame as mutilated simulations in a sterile
automaton rather than as physical bodies that activate and manage perception. Things
are complicated even further in that, Hayles continues, “the narratives which produce
life…are produced by it” (162); and yet, here, we have a nonliving artifact, a
simulation, automating itself.
Hayles notes that the assumptions we have about a system as an actant, “in
particular thinking of it as independent action undertaken by purposive agents, are
transported into the narrative” (Hayles 151). Considering the narrative as the
constitutive automata—that is, the narrative as programmatic actant—it is worth
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noting these assumptions to be misleading. The narrative motion of Endgame
proceeds without intention according to valueless processes. The actant is its own
code, and the code is the actant. The metaphorical grammar—or code—that moves
the narrative to its terminus only proves to have the diegesis deterministically loop
back to its origin and restart. There is, however, a polysemy to the metaphorical
sense of narrative as actant. Hayles identifies this mode as having two divisions:35
first, the constituents of diegesis are informational rather than physical. Second, the
actant is engaged in transformations and transfers from one narrative level to another.
Moving from code to the realm of the encoder, the actant, in its drama of bearing
forth and diminution, performs the inverse function of the reader, the encoder of the
text. The proper function, therefore, of the narrative as actant is not to signify, it does
not mean. Rather, it reaches beyond itself, revealing itself as actant, and,
consequently, also bears witness to that which it does not signify, or that which it
expedites the disclosure of the reader’s nonexistence: the reader. Endgame thus
resists the assumption that narrative as actant can operate as a purposive agent or an
independent code proceeding with something like intention. Hayles writes, of
cellular automata, that
Narrative tells a story, and intrinsic to story is chronology, intention and
causality…Each site will develop its own microecology. Because background
programs run when demands on the computer are at a minimum, the programs
will normally be executed late at night…Humans are active while the
‘creatures’ [or actants] are dormant; they evolved while we sleep…linking the

35

Hayles is concerned with the “characters” or “bodies” of cellular automata; that is, the simulated
organisms. Here, the focus remains on narrative itself.
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[actant’s] evolution to the human word in a complementary diuranal rhythm,
the proposal edges towards a larger narrative level that interpolates their story
into ours, ours into theirs. (151-152)
Yet Endgame eludes narrative in this sense. Its implied recursive structure resists
chronology, its dialogue protests against sustained causality, and the status of diegetic
intentionality is, here, staunched through the metaphor of narrative as actant. Instead,
Endgame incites. The way the play interpolates its story into ours and ours into that
of the text operates upon an unintuitive formulation that, ultimately, promotes a
strange mode of phenomenological investigation. “Information technologies seem to
realize a dream,” Hayles continues, “impossible in the natural world—the opportunity
to look directly into the inner workings of reality at the most elemental level” (155).
As a demonstration of meaninglessness, the play’s inter-diegetic architecture, cannot
signify. Instead, it calls forth, encourages, and summons the reader to identify with
that which minifies beyond the elemental: the abyss that no longer requires the reader,
the narrative that operates as its own servomechanism.
8. Thinking in the Void: Endgame, Vilém Flusser, and
The Twilight of Information Illiteracy
This formulation, however, is all very strange for the reader. After all, the reader
is to take the pose, or submit to the conceit, of exclusion. How then, if the characters
of the play are incapable of action or thought, is the reader to undergo experience
while accepting the position of that which negates experience? This is perhaps our
paradoxical intimacy with a text that resists intimacy. If we are to learn, we must
dispose of everything we do so that we may be open to the essentials of the text that

269

are given to us at any given moment. We learn to think by giving over our minds to
nothingness: to give our minds over to the demonstration of nothingness, that which
there is yet to think about and that which there is to think through. Like our idealized
text, we must allow something to take its course, to surrender to a poetic (or should
we say digital) procedure. “We never come to thoughts,” writes Heidegger, “they
come to us” (Heidegger “The Thinker as Poet” 6). Thoughts here in a traditional
sense, however, cannot truly arrive. Events are “the same as usual” (Beckett
Endgame 4), remarks Clov, while Hamm concurs: “there’s no reason for it to change”
(5) because telos in our thought experiment is impossible. There is no end-point, only
an endgame. Hamm wishes for a terminus, “old endgame lost of old,” he muses,
“play and lose and have done with losing” (82), but he cannot escape the patterns
which oscillate forever. Clov, perhaps hopefully, remarks that “it may end. (Pause.),”
yet remains partially practical: “all life long the same questions, the same answers”
(5). Yet, each knows that the later portion of Clov’s remark is accurate and his
hopefulness is procedural and without opportunity. “That’s always the way at the end
of the day, isn’t it, Clov?,” Hamm remarks, and Clov, astutely: “Always” (13). And
this is, in itself, the revelation—a re-revelation—of infinite iterations: “it’s the end of
the day like any other day, isn’t it, Clov?,” Hamm asks, though only grammatically a
question. Clov’s response, acting as the eyes of Hamm: “looks like it” (13). The
strangeness here, is not only one of positioning for the reader, it is one that
undermines the conventional expectations of humour. Humour, of course, depends
on repetition. Endgame does not, however, provide any definitive punch lines. Both
Nell and Clov, using the same words, ask “why this farce, day after day?” (14, 32).
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Perhaps a punch line would answer this conundrum: this farce, day after day, will be
broken, cathartically shattered by pattern-disruption and laughter. As if demanding of
the possible joke: “Have you not finished?” Hamm asks, “Will you never finish?
(With sudden fury.) Will this never finish?” (23). It does not matter whether we have
“asked these questions millions of times” (38) because the answers must, at the level
of text, always be the same. Hamm, like Clov, seems to embody this. Yet, more so
than Clov, he expresses it, even if via proxy:
You’ll be sitting there, a speck in the void, in the dark, for ever, like
me…You’ll look at the wall a while, then you’ll say, I’ll close my eyes,
perhaps have a little sleep, after that I’ll feel better, and you’ll close them.
And when you open them again there’ll be no wall any more. (Pause.) Infinite
emptiness will be all around you, all the resurrected dead of all the ages
wouldn’t fill it, and there you’ll be like a little bit of grit in the middle of the
steppe. (36)
By identifying with this speck in the void, this little bit of grit—like Hamm and like
Clov—one may wait and hope to no triumph. The infinite emptiness that surrounds
them is not only spatial: it is potential and conceptual: it is a procedure that proceeds
without value. Hamm and Clov experience that which is both strange and intimate to
the reader: the possibility of undergoing the experience of disappearing influence of
alphanumeric language and the narratives that it makes possible.
What proves significant with undergoing an experience with a text like Endgame,
our idealized text that constantly resists the possibility of agential experience, is the
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manner through which this undertaking proves remarkable. “To undergo an
experience with something,” writes Heidegger
means that this something befalls us, strikes us, comes over us, overwhelms
and transforms us. When we talk of ‘undergoing’ an experience, we mean
specifically that the experience is not of our own making; to undergo here
means that we endure it, suffer it, receive it as it strikes us and submit to it. It
is this something itself that comes about, comes to pass, happens. (“The
Nature of Language” 57)
Though with each pass, something takes its course. Endgame does not permit an
experience beyond what appears as the text itself. As a little speck in the void, Clov
and Hamm experience what comes about, what comes to pass, and what happens:
they experience proceduralism. But this, for them, is what must always constitute
experience. For the reader, however, Endgame establishes a textual conundrum
through which the reader succumbs to the twofold nature of undergoing an
experience. The narrative delimits experience to something confined and defined:
that is the narrative of Endgame is a procedural gesture. The experience of the
reader, however, as a zero-player, thus undergoes an experience that is not his own
making. One must endure it, suffer it, receive as it strikes us. Endgame is a text to
which we must submit if we wish to learn and think in new ways.
Such an experience is and has been for us textual, linguistic; however, prospective
experience suggests something programmatic and procedural. “To undergo an
experience with language…means to let ourselves be properly concerned by the claim
of language by entering into and submitting to it” (Heidegger “The Nature of
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Language” 57), writes Heidegger. He continues, “man finds the proper abode of his
existence in language” (57) and therefore any “experience we undergo with language
will touch the innermost nexus of our existence. We who speak language may
thereupon become transformed” (57). If language is indeed the “house of being,”
then the narratives of digital code anticipate very alien architectures. That Clov is
“doing his best to create a little order” (Beckett 57), is indicative of his struggle with
this procedure. What is more, this struggle against the constitutive process shows that
Clov’s behavior is not only inauthentic but ridiculous. He cannot submit and allow
the experience to come and pass because he is bound to the procedure by a different
logic. “A program is to be understood as writing directed not toward human beings
but toward apparatuses,” writes Flusser (Flusser Does Writing Have a Future? 56).
“Here no human beings require instruction,” he continues, “instructions can instead
be issued to apparatuses. In this way, it becomes clear that the goal of instruction,”
that is, proceduralism, causes subjects—or simulations of subjects—to “behave as
they should automatically” (56). Heidegger’s gesture towards the authenticity of an
experience with language is indeed that which makes more striking the impossibility
for thinking or experience on the level of Endgame as conceived in our thought
experiment. Indeed, the manner we experience alphanumeric language differs
radically from the way we experience digital code.
“Scientific and philosophical information about language is one thing; and
experience we undergo with language is another,” Heidegger suggests, “whether the
attempt to bring us face to face with the possibility of such an experience will
succeed, and if it does, how far that possible success will go for each one of us—that
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is not up to any of us” (Heidegger “The Nature of Language” 59). And while the
possibility of any experience is something that proceeds beyond our agency—it
strikes us, we do not, like in our reading of Joyce, activate it—the possibility of
experience in Endgame’s proceduralist simulation is strikingly demoted. Indeed, for
Heidegger information about language—a text as simulation—thus produces
something radically altered from an experience with language. Does Endgame as a
text that simulates the effects of our information illiteracy become a space or gesture
of cruelty? Hamm’s constant physical discomfort, and his addiction to pain killers,
suggests a kind of simulation whereby this discomfort proceeds pitilessly as if
inflicted by the something that is taking its course, that some kind of constitutive
narrative (even cultural narrative) unfolds then repeats relentlessly and indifferently.
The demonstration at play is a text that proceeds without intention. What is
uncomfortable for us in the humanities is that we, as readers and theorists of
narrative, are left out of the equation. On six occasions Hamm asks for his pain killer
(Beckett 7, 12, 24, 35, 48, 71). Hamm, with his programmed addiction, expects that
there should be relief. “There’s no more pain-killer” (71), Clov finally responds,
therefore assuming that, at this final yet endless recursive iteration, there never was
and never will be pain-killers for Hamm. Hamm’s response, “Good…!” (71), is not
so much one of reserve or coming-to-terms as it is an approval that, as always,
something is taking its course as it should. That is, he responds not to the
nonexistence of the pain-killer so much as to the functional accuracy of the diegetic
actant proceeding recursively and unintentionally as it must. Indeed, “in logically
constructed computer programs,” writes Flusser, “there is no symbol for should”
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(Flusser Does Writing Have a Future? 57). Indeed, the textual simulation, the
procedural actant is another thing entirely from an experience with language. There
is no symbol for should and, resultantly, to assume Endgame as a cruel simulation is
to approach the situation before us with misleading criteria. The cruelty here is akin
to Antonin Artaud’s sense of the word: Artaud writes that this sense of cruelty “is not
sadistic or bloody, at least not exclusively so…The word cruelty must be taken in its
broadest sense, not in the physical, predatory sense usually ascribed to it…cruelty
means strictness, diligence, unrelenting decisiveness, irreversible and absolute
determination” (Artaud 77); that is, cruelty here is the absolute indifference and
determination of a procedure. Our text here, the zero-reader text, does not invite
intimacy, it excludes us. The cruelty is that digital narrative is something very alien,
something that proceeds with absolute indifference. We can talk about it with the
critical biases, but we cannot fully engage with it because there is a fundamental
change in the predominant code underlying knowledge (which is embedded in
knowledge production and knowledge mobilization) currently taking place.
One the level of the reader, then, the procedural indifference plays out in a slightly
different way: it is not painful so much as anxious and uncomfortable. Though the
conceit of our thought experiment is that Endgame is a zero-player game, the text is
nevertheless expressed through language. Oddly enough, though, for our thought
experiment we must imagine that the language negates itself by posing as something
like programmed code. “When the issue is to put into language something which has
never yet been spoken, then everything depends on whether language gives or
withholds the appropriate word” writes Heidegger (“The Nature of Language” 59).
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That which has never been spoken, in the case of Endgame, is the use of language for
the conceit of absolute procedural narrative motion: digital code is not fully informed
by our thinking yet there is evidence that it may gradually constitute our thinking. So
Endgame, like the reader, proceeds to put into motion that which is already in motion,
to endure the diegesis but also submit to their absence from its very proceduralism.
The experience of Endgame is, then, where experience breaks off just as, for those of
us who are not digital code literate, our experience with the coming dominant cultural
code breaks off. “Where something breaks off, a breach, a diminution has occurred.
To diminish means to take away, to cause a lack,” Heidegger notes (60). He goes on:
“no thing is where the word is lacking” (60); that is, no thing—simulation—is where
code determines. Furthermore, the reader, being where the word is lacking, poses as
an absence. This absence, though, is not a renunciation; indeed, it would be absurd to
push the conceit so far. Instead, the sense and ability to think about no-sense and
unthinking opens the possibility for the simultaneity of experience and nonexperience. And code, simulation, and proxy are the best sites for this procedure.
“This relation [between word and thing] is not, however, a connection between the
thing that is on one side and the word that is on the other,” suggests Heidegger, “the
word itself [and thus the code itself] is the relation which in each instance retains the
thing within itself in such a manner that it ‘is’ a thing” (66). And, resultantly,
nonentity is, by this logic, a kind of entity that serves a paradoxical, though
imaginatively productive, disclosure of the transformative possibilities of our thought
experiment experience of Endgame. “The aistheton, what can be perceived by the
senses,” Heidegger writes, “lets the noeton, the nonsensuous, shine through”
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(Heidegger “A Dialogue on Language” 14). And so, the text will “be there to solace
[its] last million last moments” (Beckett 49) and the reader vanishes with each
iteration. With each recognition of the play taking its course on behalf of the reader,
the absence—even the corpsing—of the reader thus shines through. Not only is the
play a demonstration of meaninglessness its effects operate to dramatize the
diminution of the self. It provides the analgesia that is forbidden to Hamm; if we
submit, it reveals the threshold of experience.
In the years since Beckett’s death in 1989, developments in the instruction of
digital code have rapidly taken root. Ultimately, the pose the reader must assume
when reading Endgame interrogates a fundamental conundrum at the centre of
reading today, a conundrum that goes beyond Beckett and modernist studies.
Jonathan Boulter writes that one of the fundamental themes of Beckett’s work is “the
agonizing fact of being in a language that endlessly composes and decomposes the
subject. Being in Beckett means existing, finally and forever, in a language” (Boulter
133). For Heidegger, Being is Dasein; more specifically, Being is an openness and
submission to linguistic and poetic experience. The language of Endgame is that
which asks the reader to assume the submission to its proceduralism: our thought
experiment asks of us how Endgame also makes manifest the agonizing fact of being
amidst digital code. Ogden suggests that the language of Endgame “might justly be
considered a dialect, a language that shares an alphabet and lexicon but that differs
grammatically and syntactically to such a degree that communication can effectively
break down between those speaking the dialect and those speaking the language from
which it derives” (Ogden 135). But Beckett goes even further than this. He quite
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masterfully establishes a textual logic in which the text must speak itself. Flusser
suggests that the transition from alphanumerical language to digital code will have a
radical impact on the very nature of critique. With this transition, “critique becomes a
synthesized practice, based on knowledge that is interdisciplinary and part of a
network of knowledges” (Finger 74). The transition to learning digital code, for
Flusser, serves a similar function as does the pose of ontological clearing in
Heidegger; that is, it is a way to relearn thought:
For us, thinking was, and still is, a process that moves forwards, that frees
itself from images, from representations, that criticizes them, thereby
becoming increasingly conceptual. We have the alphabet to thank for this
understanding of thought and this understanding of thought to thank for the
alphabet (feedback). The new digital codes arose from the new understanding
of thought, and feedback is making us think in quanta and images more
clearly the more we use the new codes. (Flusser Does Writing have a Future?
145).
Assuming a more intense degree of intentionality than Heidegger’s openness,
Beckett’s negation, or Bogost’s proceduralism, Flusser does, however, anticipate a
kind of subtle productivity to this shift. Perhaps the old endgame is alphanumeric
language itself. That which will ultimately be lost of old will indeed play and lose
and have done with losing. The alternative is, however, digital code; while it offers
alternatives, it nevertheless also attracts the alternatives of the zero-player game, of a
different order of proceduralism, a new kind of poetic submission. While Murphy
suggests that, in Beckett, “expression necessarily precedes existence” (Murphy 222),
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here we suggest that being submits to procedure and precedes the codification of
existence. The engagement with digital code for most readers, however, is of a
different order of reader negation: illiteracy. If we push Endgame’s process of
diminution into the twenty first century, then this facet of the text calls upon a more
intense anxiety. Worton notes that
we must persuade ourselves that we exist, somehow we must find justification
for our lives. In…Endgame, as in many of the later plays, such proofs of
existence as movement, thinking, dialogue and a relationship with God that
have been proposed by philosophers are replaced by anxiety—by an anxiety
which leads to the compulsion to repeat and, above all, to fictionalize.
(Worton 82).
Worton’s evaluation of anxiety, perhaps, needs further elaboration. The reader’s
proof of existence is made manifest via the pose of absence: the anxiety here is the
intense non-self awareness or intense self non-awareness. We are not compelled to
repeat so much as we are compelled to recognize that repetition, oscillation, and still
life are apt metaphors for how closely we are able to truly identify with the stories—
and the technical means upon which they are made possible—that we rely upon. The
reader’s inability to identify on an intimate level with the text is an expression of the
inability to engage with the zero-player automaton; moreover, though, is that our
exclusion is an experiment for the literate to experience the coming illiteracy. “An
experiment is a text about a nontextual situation, later tested by others to decide
whether or not it is simply a text,” writes Latour, “if the final trial is successful, then
it is not just a text, there is indeed a real situation behind it, and both the actor and its
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authors are endowed with a new competence” (Latour 124). Not only does the effect
of Endgame allow us to imagine a zero-reader text in the sense that it calls for the
clearing for thinking, it is the zero-player game whose central conceit is bringing to
light our absence from the coming thought of a new competence via a new language.
So, it is appropriate to recognize the ontological puzzle that Beckett lays bare as
one that is in itself linguistic, poetic, and procedural. Yet, Endgame, in our thought
experiment in particular, expresses most intensely the poetic procedure: that which
calls for surrender and proves a demonstration of meaninglessness. Without
meaning, the semantic force of language, we experience anxiety; that the anticipation
of Being, with the removal of language-as-meaningful, awaits extinguishing. Yet,
Heidegger suggests that “anxiety strives to expect resoluteness of itself. It clears
away every covering over of the fact that Dasein is itself left to itself. The
nothingness before which anxiety brings us reveals the nullity that determines Dasein
in its ground, which itself is as thrownness into death” (Heidegger Being and Time
295). Because Being for Heidegger is the clearing and openness that allows thinking
to take place, the removal of self in our thought experiment demands of the reader to
assume the role of thinker. The flux here is complex and difficult to navigate: to
think of nothingness is to dedicate a concept or referent to nothing thus negating its
very status as that which it is, which is the is not. So, Heidegger suggests that the
equation reverse role: rather than deform nothingness by giving it form, we must
assume nothingness as a means of being open to its valuelessness, to submit and
surrender to its procedure. In this way—though difficult and in many ways outside
articulation—Endgame discloses a remarkable opening for thought. By
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deconstructing the biases of perception, Endgame projects, to borrow a phrase from
Paul Éluard, a “vision beyond this crass, insensible reality which we are expected to
accept with resignation, [and] conducts us into a liberated world where we consent to
everything, where nothing is incomprehensible” (Eluard “Beyond Painting”158-159).
Our thought experiment demands that we must take seriously the idea that the text
takes its course and that our identification with nothingness is the very path to
considering how we may go on when we can no longer go on. And so Topsfield is
absolutely correct to remark that, despite the relentless logic of diminution and
negation in Beckett, “the ‘message’ of Endgame is positive” (Topsfield 112). Our
non-engagement is our path to engagement with the procedure and “since that’s the
way we’re playing it,” Hamm determines, “let’s play it that way and speak no more
about it, speak no more” (Beckett 84). With this inability to speak and think from
nothingness, whether our illiteracy is linguistic or digital, Endgame becomes the path
for a potential revelation through the surrender and submission to new and
unconventional procedures of perception. Like Hamm’s experience, the effects of
Endgame ask us to acknowledge the procedures that surrender without intention: the
effects ask us to be nothing, to urgently “think of something.” Ultimately, what these
effects offer us is an instructional unfolding of the minimizing of the self; the
recognition that radically different narratives are radiant in the twilight; that
something unarticulated is always on the horizon. If digital code has something of a
narrative embedded in it, it will be very strange to us indeed. So, the overwhelming
irony of this chapter is evident: it is an intentional and agential staging of criticism. It
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is more so, however, a kind of opening remark. A procedural analysis may begin
only as our thought experiment comes to a close.
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Epilogue
___________________________
Marcus Aurelius remarks that “there are obvious objections to the Cynic
Monimus’s statement that ‘things are determined by the view taken of them’; but the
value of his aphorism is equally obvious, if we admit the substance of it so far as it
contains a truth” (Aurelius Meditations 2.15). That is, the affirmation of a selfreflexive system is also its negation. While this may seem alien, it is also remarkably
close to home. The uncanny contexture that unsettles the logic of causation that
weaves the inter-diegetic fabric of Wilde’s The Picture of Dorian Gray proves at
once ostensibly affected and, yet, expressive of a more intrusively organic process of
linguistic thought. Woolf’s To the Lighthouse also draws the reader in to its diegetic
architecture by making manifest that the reader does not only experience being-inthe-world but also being-in-the word. This profound intimacy with the text offers the
possibility of temporal disclosure; that is, with narrative experimentation with
diegetic temporality, Woolf offers life as a whole in miniature. Being-in-the-world is
thus analogous to being-in-the word; both modes of being are translatable as an
invasive, and yet obsequious, finitude: being-as-temporality. Finnegans Wake offers
entry points to endless linguistic and cognitive transformations; and, yet, embedded in
this infinite novel are the notable moments of sentimentality, moments of tenderness
that serve as reminders that our extension into text—and text’s extension into us—is,
though something that seems to proceed on its own, experienced with radically
singular instances of emotionality. My treatment of Beckett’s Endgame is a bit
stranger since it complicates the inter-diegetic loops in question.
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The impulse of the fourth chapter was personal. When I first read Endgame five or
six years ago, I felt very much like Hamm and Clov in the sense that the text—their
constitutive environment—was proceeding regardless of how intensely I wanted to
understand and intervene. It was this confusion experienced between intervention
and understanding that made me reflect on the act of reading as something that is both
active and submissive. As I drafted the chapters of this dissertation, I was also at
work publishing articles on the intersections between the information sciences and
late twentieth and early twenty-first century experimental fiction in England and
Japan. A recurring theme in the research of this area is the coming information
illiteracy. The language that I write here is very different from the program that
makes possible the logical substratum of my word processor. It is the latter that is
becoming dominant in late capitalist culture despite the evidence that the majority of
the population of the developed world is incapable of intervening in digital code or
programming more generally understood: we are excluded from the narrative of code
because we are informationally illiterate. This is not what Endgame is about,
certainly. But the intense effect the text has on the reader between the conundrums of
choice and the indifference of determinism seems a particularly appropriate analogue
to our current relation to a cultural environment that is increasingly more interested in
serving apparatuses rather than human beings. Reading Endgame discloses the
potential difficulties of the reflexive system between text and reader by expressing a
diegetic environment that seems to proceed regardless of reader agency. This reading
experience simulates a kind of exclusion: it is as if we are not there. And yet, this is
obviously a critical conceit: we have to imagine that we are not there in order to
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recognize that there is, indeed, a threshold that establishes the limit of experience
with language and cultural narrative.
Each text examined here has embedded in it both the potentiality of Coleridge’s
flower and the flower’s Coleridge. Level-crossing between reader and text—and the
consequential cognitive mutations—tangles the linear causation between poetic
reading and the reader as the text’s entity of poesis. Reading is, then, both intimately
active and creatively submissive. The experimental tendency of Modernist fiction
offers a spontaneity and playfulness into the conventional substratum of cultural
narrative at the time: this impulse is timelessly relevant. Experimentalism urges
metanoia and unpredictable cognitive change fuels experimentalism. To varying
degrees, all expression is poetic expression because the neurological site of
expression is itself a locale for poesis. The proceduralism of digital code presents
itself to us as inflexible simply because the literate are unwilling to infect it with the
experimental spirit of the modernists. Hofstadter calls for fluid concepts and creative
analogies in information coding as a means of making code more human rather than
the human more code-like. That is, the future of cultural narrative—both literary and
programmatically digital—must serve poetry, not apparatuses. Feedback loops must
be creative and productive rather than inflexible and indifferent. Like Wilde, we
must create monstrosities; we must strive to be as subtle and intelligent as Woolf; as
ineffable and playful as Joyce. If only Clov were as courageous as Beckett: he must
leave the room. The worst that could happen is failure. But, as Gleick remarks, the
more errors there are in a data stream, the more information rich it will prove to be
(Gleick 257). Failure is especially and inevitably poetic. What is imperative, in the
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end, is that both Coleridge and the flower are mutually possessive and reciprocally
lush with blooming.
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